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ARTICLES
Jails, Sheriffs, and Carceral
Policymaking
Aaron Littman*
The machinery of mass incarceration in America is huge, intricate, and
destructive. To understand it and to tame it, scholars and activists look for its
levers of power—where are they, who holds them, and what motivates them?
This much we know: legislators criminalize, police arrest, prosecutors charge,
judges sentence, prison officials confine, and probation and parole officials
manage release.
As this Article reveals, jailers, too, have their hands on the controls. The
sheriffs who run jails—along with the county commissioners who fund them—
have tremendous but unrecognized power over the size and shape of our
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criminal legal system, particularly in rural areas and for people accused or
convicted of low-level crimes.
Because they have the authority to build jails (or not) as well as the
authority to release people (or not), they exercise significant control not merely
over conditions but also over both the supply of and demand for jail bedspace:
how large they should be, how many people they should confine, and who those
people should be. By advocating, financing, and contracting for jail bedspace,
sheriffs and commissioners determine who has a say and who has a stake in
carceral expansion and contraction. Through their exercise of arrest and release
powers, sheriffs affect how many and which people fill their cells. Constraints
they create or relieve on carceral infrastructure exert or alleviate pressure on
officials at the local, state, and federal levels.
Drawing on surveys of state statutes and of municipal securities filings,
data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, case law, and media coverage, this
Article tells overlooked stories—of sheriffs who send their deputies out door
knocking to convince voters to support a new tax to fund a new jail, and of
commissioners who raise criminal court fees and sign contracts to detain “rental
inmates” to ensure that incarceration “pays for itself.” It also tells of sheriffs
who override the arrest decisions of city police officers, release defendants who
have not made bail, and cut sentences short—and of those who would rather
build more beds than push back on carceral inertia.
A spotlight on jails and the officials who run them illuminates
important attributes of our carceral crisis. The power and incentives to build
jail bedspace are as consequential as the power and incentives to fill it.
Expanding a county’s jailing capacity has profound ramifications across local,
state, and federal criminal legal systems. Sheriffs have a unique combination
of controls over how big and how full their jails are, but this role consolidation
does not produce the restraint that some have predicted. Their disclaimers of
responsibility are a smokescreen, obscuring sheriffs’ bureaucratic commitment
to perpetuating mass incarceration. State courts and federal agencies have
increasingly recognized and regulated public profiteering through jail
contracting, and advocates have begun to hold jailers accountable, challenging
expansion in polling booths and budget meetings.
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INTRODUCTION
Just before Thanksgiving 2019, Lindie Keaton, a resident of
Greene County, Ohio, to the east of Dayton, attended a public hearing
on a proposed sales tax increase to fund a jail expansion, which she
opposed.1 Almost everyone who spoke shared her concerns: “wanting
less, not more, community members jailed” and no one incarcerated due
1.
Lindie Keaton, Writer Wants Reforms, Not New Jail, XENIA DAILY GAZETTE (Nov.
21, 2019), https://www.xeniagazette.com/opinion/letters/44707/writer-wants-reforms-not-new-jail
[https://perma.cc/8KRP-855A]. Her experience was far from unique. See, e.g., Pauline Black, Insist
on a Better Plan for the Jail, ASHLAND TIDINGS (Nov. 29, 2019), https://ashlandtidings.com/
opinion/guest-opinion/insist-on-a-better-plan-for-the-jail [https://perma.cc/VSA6-CWNQ] (similar
demands by residents; officials “admitted that the county could have structured a tax increase for
both the jail and alternative services but chose not to”); cf. Katie Kull, Council Approves Municipal
Inmates Housing Agreement with Jail Completion Years Away, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Oct.
12, 2019), https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/local/ozarks/2019/10/13/springfield-councilapproves-housing-inmates-vernon-county/3934742002
[https://perma.cc/H393-3ST2]
(local
resident, previously incarcerated, urged officials to “rein in officer discretion to arrest people for”
misdemeanors, instead of paying surrounding counties to jail them).
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to inability to pay bail.2 The responses she heard from the commissioner
and sheriff moved her to write a letter to the editor of her local
newspaper. One commissioner said that “this was not the time” to talk
about reforms, opining that “we need to build a new, bigger jail, and
then we can talk about how to reduce[ ] the jailed population.” 3 The
sheriff said he would “pray that the beds wouldn’t fill.”4
Things are more complicated than these officials would have Ms.
Keaton believe: building more bedspace will impede population
reduction, and sheriffs need not wait for divine intercession to
decarcerate. With some notable exceptions, existing scholarship
suggests that criminal legal policy is made primarily at the state level
in the legislature and at the county level in the courtroom or on the
street.5 But as this Article demonstrates, the sheriffs who run jails, as
well as the county commissioners who fund them, have considerable
control over both the supply and demand sides of jailing. Concretely,
these often-neglected officials exercise power over both the number of
jail beds and the number of jail detainees. It is this extraordinary
confluence that gives them control over not just the conditions within
our carceral system but also its size and shape. 6 A thick account of jail

2.
Keaton, supra note 1.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Some prison scholars have demonstrated the ways that correctional administrators,
operating in obscurity, shape the conditions in and sometimes the sizes of the facilities they run,
becoming “penal policy initiators, rather than implementers.” Keramet Reiter, Reclaiming the
Power to Punish: Legislating and Administering the California Supermax, 1982-1989, 50 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 484, 501 (2016); see also KERAMET REITER, 23/7: PELICAN BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF
LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 5, 87–120 (2016) (arguing that it was “administrative elites”
who “invented the supermax” and revealing how in vivid detail); Keramet Reiter & Kelsie Chesnut,
Correctional Autonomy and Authority in the Rise of Mass Incarceration, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 49 (2018) (reviewing literature on prison administrators’ influence on policy).
6.
Although sheriffs and commissioners are critical players in local criminal legal systems,
they have been largely overlooked, and even at times misunderstood or dismissed, by legal
scholars. See, e.g., Marie Gottschalk, The Past, Present, and Future of Mass Incarceration in the
United States, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483, 486 (2011) (calling on scholars to “consider
intently the implementation of penal policies at the local level by all the key actors in the criminal
justice system—from police to prosecutors to judges to parole and probation officers,” but notably
omitting sheriffs and commissioners); Lauren M. Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Criminal
Justice Reform, 61 B.C. L. REV. 523, 547 n.88 (2020) (suggesting that sheriffs and county
governments have little impact, without considering their roles as jail administrators and
builders). Criminal legal system scholars often flatten the distinctiveness of sheriffs, eliding them
into the “same basic process” of “urban municipal policing.” David N. Falcone & L. Edward Wells,
The County Sheriff as a Distinctive Policing Modality, 14 AM. J. POLICE 123, 123 (1995). This is
perhaps because we know relatively little about them. See id. at 124 (“[S]urprisingly little
empirical research or published documentation exists to describe the specific form of the modern
sheriff’s office.”); Lee P. Brown, The Role of Sheriff, in THE FUTURE OF POLICING 227, 227–28 (Alvin
W. Cohn ed., 1978) (noting the “dearth of information on the role of the sheriff”). Immigration
scholars, to their credit, have offered fuller accounts of the part sheriffs play in that arena. See,
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administration and administrators—mapping both their parallels in
other carceral contexts and their distinctive features—will help
advocates like Ms. Keaton know what and whom to target.
On the supply side, this Article shows that sheriffs and
commissioners make jail construction happen, often for reasons that
have little to do with local public safety.7 They are responsible for
proposing, justifying the need for, obtaining support (whether from the
electorate or other sources) to fund, and determining the size of an
expansion. In doing so, they treat carceral expansion as an imperative
rather than an option, ignoring the possibility that shifts in policy
(including their own) could obviate the need for more bedspace. They
circumvent public refusal to pay for jail building through mechanisms
of municipal finance, including some that impose costs directly on
criminal defendants by pledging revenues from court fines and fees to
satisfy construction debt. And they participate in a bedspace market
that generates revenue from jailing persons from other jurisdictions
and fuels jail growth. This Article draws on a set of thousands of

e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration Federalism in the Weeds, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1330, 1377–78,
1391–92 (2019).
The very small contemporary law literature on sheriffs focuses primarily on their
electoral selection and otherwise distinctive treatment under state law, and their attendant lack
of accountability, but does not address in sustained fashion their role as jailer. See Anthony
O’Rourke, Rick Su & Guyora Binder, Disbanding Police Agencies, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 44–53), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3733121
[https://perma.cc/2PWD-KVEV] (engaging deeply with the local government law of sheriffs’ offices
and recognizing, albeit in passing, that “the funding structure of sheriffs’ offices continues to be
far more entrepreneurial than that of police departments,” including through “the ‘leasing’ of
excess [jail] capacity”); James Tomberlin, Note, “Don’t Elect Me”: Sheriffs and the Need for Reform
in County Law Enforcement, 104 VA. L. REV. 113 (2018) (arguing that the sheriff’s “hybrid stateand-local status insulates him from regulation,” and urging reform through “coalescence” of city
and county policing agencies); Janet C. Hoeffel & Stephen I. Singer, Elections, Power, and Local
Control: Reining in Chief Prosecutors and Sheriffs, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER &
CLASS 319, 323–24 (2015) (explaining that because sheriffs typically run unopposed, the electoral
process offers little accountability).
Notably, the word “sheriff” appeared a single time in a recent symposium featuring over
a dozen essays by leading scholars arguing for the democratization of the criminal legal system.
See Tracey Meares, Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities to Increase
Democratic Participation, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1525, 1532 (2017) (stating in passing that sheriffs
served on a presidential task force alongside the author). Similarly, David Sklansky’s important
article, Police and Democracy, does not address them. David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy,
103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005). When Bill Stuntz, the intellectual father of the democratization
school, mentioned sheriffs in his opus, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, it was primarily
to lump “police forces or sheriff’s offices” together or to describe particular historical Southern
holders of the office. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 65, 91,
104–06, 109, 139, 145, 151, 189, 204, 233 (2011). But see id. at 68 (observing without elaboration
that “[p]erhaps electing county sheriffs has something to recommend it”).
7.
See infra Part II.
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municipal finance documents to demonstrate the perverse incentives
for and impacts of perpetual jail expansion.8
On the demand side, this Article reveals that sheriffs—in their
unified roles as law enforcement chiefs, jail administrators, and county
politicians—have the ability and authority to reduce the number of
people confined in their jails.9 As the supervisors of patrol deputies,
they can deprioritize high-volume, low-level crimes and order the use of
citations in lieu of arrest in many cases. As the custodians of jails, they
can exercise a panoply of powers: citing people at booking, releasing
them from pretrial detention, placing them on home confinement, and
shortening their sentences. As the colleagues of police chiefs, district
attorneys, and judges, they can push for changes to policy and practice
to reduce the number of people entering their jails and the durations of
their stays. This Article provides the first comprehensive survey of the
varied powers sheriffs possess under state law to control the demand
for jail bedspace.
Just as the story of American criminal adjudication lacked
rigorous accounts of misdemeanor justice until Alexandra Natapoff and
Issa Kohler-Hausmann offered them, the story of American mass
incarceration is incomplete without a deep understanding of how jails
are built and run and the critical role of sheriffs in shaping their sizes
and contours.10 This Article begins to address that gap.
It highlights the often-overlooked jail and the sorely
understudied sheriff as site and agent of carceral policymaking. It
marshals quantitative data to show trends in county jail capacity,
population levels, and contracting with other jurisdictions. In the vein
of Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s pathbreaking work on prison finance, it
investigates the fiscal incentives that motivate jail construction and

8.
Using the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s Electronic Municipal Market Access
(“EMMA”) system, which compiles official statements for municipal securities issued since 1990,
the author searched for, individually downloaded, and reviewed official statements for all 1,323
issues with descriptions containing the following words or abbreviations thereof: corrections (134),
detention (183), jail (356), justice (223), law enforcement (123), public safety (299), and sheriff (5).
This search process was both over- and under-inclusive; some of these securities funded projects
other than jail construction, and some securities used to fund jail construction are not clearly
described as such. Official statements are accessible online at https://emma.msrb.org.
9.
See infra Part III.
10. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2013) [hereinafter
Natapoff, Misdemeanors]; Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors,
66 STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014) [hereinafter Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice]; ALEXANDRA
NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE
INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018); ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN,
MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS
POLICING (2018).
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outlines how everything from child support enforcement to deportation
is facilitated by the availability of jail capacity. 11
This Article also offers a conceptual taxonomy for cataloging the
forms of sheriffs’ control over supply of and demand for jail bedspace,
emphasizing the interplay between them and showing that expansion
saps sheriffs’ authority to limit the number of people they incarcerate.
It assesses sheriffs’ place within two influential literatures, both
concerned with the ways that institutional structure shapes public
officials’ behavior. Many have suggested that fragmentation of
responsibility between actors in the criminal legal system distorts
incentives and is partially to blame for carceral overgrowth, but in the
case of sheriffs, role consolidation does not lead to restraint.12 Instead,
this Article argues, sheriffs’ carceral policymaking reflects their
interests as the leaders of jail bureaucracies.13
Finally, this Article considers how we might best advance the
urgent project of curbing jail expansion. It traces a thread through a
series of esoteric state court decisions and Department of Justice and
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) audits, showing that these disparate
bodies have recently come to recognize and regulate the fiscal incentives
that underlie the jail bedspace market.14 And it draws insights from an
emerging political science literature on sheriff elections and nascent but
powerful movements to defeat them—and defund their offices,
suggesting strategies for decarceral advocacy going forward. 15
I. JAILS AND JAILERS
A. Jails by the Numbers
Jail is an unmistakable feature of the American cultural
landscape. Monopoly tells its players to go “directly” to it,16 and Elvis
Presley “rock[ed]” it.17 Yet jails are frequently and erroneously elided
(even conflated) with prisons. Though jails are often neglected in the

11. See RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION
(2007).
12. See infra Section IV.A.
13. See infra Section IV.B.
14. See infra Section V.A.
15. See infra Section V.B.
16. See Mary Pilon, The Secret History of Monopoly: The Capitalist Board Game’s Leftwing
Origins, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/apr/11/secrethistory-monopoly-capitalist-game-leftwing-origins [https://perma.cc/5QCU-7NEJ].
17. ELVIS PRESLEY, JAILHOUSE ROCK (RCA Victor 1957).
IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA
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legal academy in favor of easier-to-study prison systems,18 policy
researchers and advocates across the political spectrum, from the Vera
Institute of Justice19 to the American Conservative Union Foundation,
have identified jails as “the next frontier of criminal justice reform.”20
This Section analyzes data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and
the Vera Institute to describe jails in the United States and the people
they incarcerate.21
18. There has long been a “broad tendency” to “ignore jails.” Margo Schlanger, Inmate
Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1579 n.76 (2003). In 2014, the National Research Council
published a nearly five-hundred-page volume by a committee of leading scholars of incarceration,
entitled The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences.
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014). But the
committee’s “charge and main focus” was those sentenced to prison, to the extent that the term
“incarceration” was used “to refer only to those in prison.” Id. at 36 n.2. But see Sharon Dolovich,
Two Models of the Prison: Accidental Humanity and Hypermasculinity in the L.A. County Jail, 102
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 965 (2012) (studying detainee culture inside a unit in the country’s
largest jail system). Jails have been discussed in the literature on pretrial detention as the site
thereof, albeit with little focus on them as institutions or on jailers as actors. See, e.g., CHRISTINE
S. SCOTT-HAYWARD & HENRY F. FRADELLA, PUNISHING POVERTY: HOW BAIL AND PRETRIAL
DETENTION FUEL I NEQUITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 132–39 (2019).
19. The Vera Institute has done superb empirical work on the expansion of jails in rural
America. See RAM SUBRAMANIAN, RUTH DELANEY, STEPHEN ROBERTS, NANCY FISHMAN & PEGGY
MCGARRY, VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA
(2015),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/incarcerations-front-door-report_02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/56E6-FCG3]; CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON, JOSHUA RINALDI & RUTH DELANEY, VERA
INST. OF JUST., THE PRICE OF JAILS: MEASURING THE TAXPAYER COST OF LOCAL INCARCERATION
(2015), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/price-of-jails.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB33R9FX]; JACOB KANG-BROWN & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., OUT OF SIGHT: THE
GROWTH OF JAILS IN RURAL AMERICA (2017), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/out-ofsight-growth-of-jails-rural-america.pdf [https://perma.cc/E43X-5M2U]; JACOB KANG-BROWN,
OLIVER HINDS, JASMINE HEISS & OLIVE LU, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE NEW DYNAMICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION (2018), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/the-new-dynamics-of-massincarceration-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RKT2-HYQB]; CHRIS MAI, MIKELINA BELAINEH, RAM
SUBRAMANIAN & JACOB KANG-BROWN, VERA INST. OF JUST., BROKEN GROUND: WHY AMERICA
KEEPS BUILDING MORE JAILS AND WHAT IT CAN DO INSTEAD (2019), https://www.vera.org/
downloads/publications/broken-ground-jail-construction.pdf [https://perma.cc/EUL5-D42B]. Vera
has also published a series of stories about the impacts of jails on communities in its In
Our Backyards series, available at In Our Backyards Stories, VERA INST. OF JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/in-our-backyards-stories
(last
visited
Feb.
4,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/98XD-Y6X9].
20. David Guenthner & David Safavian, The Next Frontier of Criminal Justice Reform:
County Jails, HILL (Dec. 13, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/474213-the-nextfrontier-of-criminal-justice-reform-county-jails [https://perma.cc/6UQY-U6TV].
21. Unless otherwise cited, statistics in this Section are drawn from the author’s analysis of
the Vera Institute’s Incarceration Trends data set, which compiles and cleans all released data
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Censuses and Surveys of Jails. This dataset is available at
Incarceration Trends Dataset, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://github.com/vera-institute/
incarceration-trends (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/K4Z5-XMQ6]. Jails were sorted
into jurisdiction types—county, city, regional, and private—using facility names where conclusive
(i.e., based on the presence of the following words: county, parish, sheriff, city, metro, municipal,
police, and regional) and the data set’s flag for private facilities. Eighty facilities did not contain
one of those words in the name or have a private flag; of those, all but twelve were manually coded
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Jails are a major element of our system of mass incarceration.
At any given time, jails house about 750,000 people, roughly a third of
this country’s 2.3 million detained people. But even this figure
dramatically understates their impact. Prisons hold detainees for
longer, but jails “churn” through more people: at least 5 million
individuals—over 1 in 100 Americans—are jailed every year.22 Jails are
often addressed in passing, as an adjunct to prisons, but to most people
who have been behind bars, jails are the site of mass incarceration; to
nearly all, they are its front gate.
Jails also serve radically more diverse functions than do prisons.
They are not only incarceration’s front door but also its all-purpose and
overflow rooms, housing detainees at many stages of different criminal
and civil legal processes, on behalf of a dizzying array of law
enforcement agencies. At the front end, jails hold virtually all those who
have not yet been convicted. Whether arrested by the local sheriff’s
office, local police departments, state police, or other law enforcement
agencies, pretrial detainees wind up in county jails. 23 Convicted
detainees serving short misdemeanor sentences are usually held in jails
rather than prisons. In some states, prisoners even serve long felony
sentences in jails. They also hold people who have been accused of
violating or found to have violated probation, parole, and child support
obligations, as well as people who are pending possible civil
commitment due to mental incapacity. Many jails also confine detainees
pursuant to contracts with other counties and federal agencies,
including the U.S. Marshals Service and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”).24
with confidence. Only two of the remaining dozen held significant numbers of detainees in 2013:
the D.C. Department of Corrections, which holds the District’s pretrial population, and the
Baltimore Pretrial Complex, which serves the city but is actually run by the Maryland Department
of Public Safety & Correctional Services. R code is available upon request.
22. See Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer, Arrest, Release, Repeat: How Police and Jails Are
Misused to Respond to Social Problems, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/repeatarrests.html [https://perma.cc/7KH4-PLTE]. Among
young men of color, the rate is much higher. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 11 (Black
people represent 13% of the population but 36% of jail detainees). As John Pfaff argues, decarceral
reformers “should [aim] to reduce the number of prisoners, not the prison population,” because
“many of the collateral costs of admission max out pretty quickly.” JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED I N: THE
TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 69 (2017). But using
carceral bedspace for more, shorter stints is also likely to maximize any deterrent effects—that is,
the benefits of incarceration, such as they are, also max out quickly. See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN,
WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT 75–78 (2009).
23. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 716, 716 nn.18–19 (2017) (indicating that
prior to the passage of bail reform, more than half of the misdemeanor defendants in Harris County
(Houston), Texas, were incarcerated, about half were in Baltimore, and about a quarter were in
New York City).
24. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 7.
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For example: a county jail in rural Utah might hold a person
arrested by a state trooper for driving while he was intoxicated, a
homeless person arrested by local police for shoplifting but unable to
make bail, a person convicted of murder and transferred from a state
prison hundreds of miles away, and a noncitizen who was living in
Virginia until she was arrested for unlawful possession of opiates and
detained during the pendency of her removal proceedings.
Jails are organized into fundamentally different and more
numerous institutional arrangements than are prisons. 25 There are fifty
state prison systems, plus the federal Bureau of Prisons. Each is a
centrally planned and governed network. By contrast, there are around
2,750 operating jail systems, though “system” is usually a misnomer;
most jurisdictions have a single facility.26 Jails are operated by most
(82%) of the 3,144 counties27 and a small fraction (1%) of the 19,495
incorporated cities and towns in the country.28 For a clearer sense of
scale, there are about twice as many jail systems in the country (again,
some with multiple facilities) as there are individual prison facilities.
These jail systems vary dramatically in size. A few are enormous. The
largest is Los Angeles County’s. As of the end of 2019, it held over
17,000 people—more than the prison systems of over twenty states—in
seven main jail facilities.29 Another nine jurisdictions held more than

25. Cf. PFAFF, supra note 22, at 15 (“[A] national story is too blunt of an instrument to convey
the complexity of the criminal justice system . . . . Ideally, we would need to tell 3,144 stories, one
for each county in the United States.”).
26. See Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1
(June 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YCL-TUT6]
(describing data from a sample of jail jurisdictions).
27. Traditional county jails do not exist in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode
Island, and Vermont, which have combined jail-prison systems. Barbara Krauth, A Review of the
Jail Function Within State Unified Corrections Systems, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 2 (1997),
https://nicic.gov/sites/default/files/014024.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZA6-7TP4]. Some states require
each county to have one; some allow for regional or contractual arrangements in lieu of (rather
than in addition to) local jails. Compare N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 217 (McKinney 2021) (“Each county
shall continue to maintain a county jail as prescribed by law.”), with NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 211.010(2),
277.080–277.180 (2021) (permitting commissioners, “with the concurrence of the sheriff,” to enter
into an agreement with another county or city to house detainees in lieu of providing a jail).
28. The vast majority of jail detainees—over 88%—are housed in county jails, in the custody
of sheriffs. About 5% are in city jails, some of which are short-term police lockups but a few of
which are large. There are also a relatively small number of regional, tribal, and private jails.
Almost 90% of those held in private jail facilities are federal detainees held for ICE or the Marshals
Service. Gerald G. Gaes, Current Status of Prison Privatization Research on American Prisons and
Jails, 18 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 269, 271–72 (2019).
29. L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, CUSTODY DIVISION POPULATION Q UARTERLY REPORT
OCTOBER - DECEMBER 2019, at 3 (2019), https://lasd.org/transparency%20data/custody%
20reports/Custody%20Division%20Population%202019%20Fourth%20Quarter%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2T6N-XN5F]; JACOB KANG-BROWN, CHASE MONTAGNET, EITAL SCHATTNERELMALEH & OLIVER HINDS, VERA INST. OF JUST., PEOPLE IN PRISON 2019, at 2 tbl.2 (2020),
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5,000 people.30 Outside of metropolitan areas, though, small systems
with one or perhaps two jail facilities predominate: about 1,300 have
detainee populations of between ten and ninety-nine people.31
The patterns and drivers of jail growth are also distinctive. As
any observer of mass incarceration will be unsurprised to learn,
America’s jail population has more than tripled since the 1970s. But the
growth has been uneven, and this unevenness is significant. City jail
populations have remained low; nearly all of the growth has occurred
in county jails.32 And although the national jail population, like the total
state-prison population, has leveled off from its meteoric rise in recent
years, jail populations continue to grow to this day in rural areas.33
Data also reveal a shifting relationship between jail population
levels (people) and jail capacity (beds), as illustrated by the Figure
below. In the late seventies and early eighties, the national jail
population grew at a faster rate than capacity, until, in 1988, national

https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/people-in-prison-in-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
7FHJ-MS9L].
30. Two of these jails—in New York and Philadelphia—are city-run. The rest are operated
by sheriffs in metropolitan areas: three in California (Orange, San Bernardino, and San Diego
Counties), two in Texas (Harris and Dallas Counties), one in Illinois (Cook County), and one in
Arizona (Maricopa County).
31. On small jails, see Rick Ruddell & G. Larry Mays, Expand or Expire: Jails in Rural
America, 31 CORR. COMPENDIUM 1 (2006).
32. Between 1999 and 2013, county jail populations increased by about 125,000 people.
During this same period, city jail populations actually shrank very slightly. Regional jails, which
are generally controlled or at least utilized by multiple counties, more than doubled in size between
1999 and 2013, but still incarcerated a small fraction (less than 4%) of jail detainees. Their growth
occurred primarily in a handful of states: Kentucky, Mississippi, Virginia, and West Virginia.
33. KANG-BROWN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 19, at 6; see also KANG-BROWN ET AL., supra
note 19, at 14 (discussing a similar trend in prison admission rates). Rural criminal legal systems
are distinctive and under-studied. Rick Su, Democracy in Rural America, 98 N.C. L. REV. 837, 852
(2020) (positing that the “urban bias of academics . . . [who] tend to come from cities and suburbs”
leads to minimal study of rural local governments). As discussed in Section III.A, sheriffs are
responsible for a much larger portion of the policing in these communities. Rural jails are smaller,
without the same economies of scale. Rural Americans have a harder time getting the mental
healthcare that helps them stay out of jail and a harder time getting treatment once they have
been incarcerated. C. Holly A. Andrilla, David G. Patterson, Lisa A. Garberson, Cynthia Coulthard
& Eric H. Larson, Geographic Variation in the Supply of Selected Behavioral Health Providers, 54
AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. S199, S201 tbl.1 (2018) (noting one-fifth as many psychiatrists per
capita in nonurban versus metropolitan counties; 80% of rural counties had zero psychiatrists).
Access to counsel is also particularly meager in rural regions. See Lisa R. Pruitt, Amanda L. Kool,
Lauren Sudeall, Michele Statz, Danielle M. Conway & Hannah Haksgaard, Legal Deserts: A MultiState Perspective on Rural Access to Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 19 (2018). Detainees
with low-level charges are particularly likely to languish without adequate representation, unable
to obtain release and waiting months to have their charges adjudicated. See Pamela Metzger,
Rural Justice Systems Low on Pretrial Resources Leave Some to Languish, Die, USA TODAY (Dec.
13, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/spotlight/2019/12/13/rural-justicesystems-low-pretrial-resources-leave-some-languish/4415770002/ [https://perma.cc/LS3K-QRGF].

872

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4:861

jail population and capacity were about equal.34 Since then, capacity
has grown at a faster rate than population.35 This jail-building spree
was particularly dramatic during the first decade and a half of the new
millenium, during which time about a quarter of county jail
jurisdictions significantly expanded their jail bedspace.36
The composition of the jail population has also changed in
important ways, as likewise illustrated by the figure below. Pretrial
detainees make up an increasing share of county jail populations, now
around 60%. Growth in pretrial detention accounted for all of the
growth in county jail populations between 1999 and 2013. 37 Detainees
held for other jurisdictions also represented an increasing share of their
incarcerated populations—20% in 2013, compared to 13% in 1978.38
More jails have entered the bedspace market; participation increased
significantly between 1978 and 2013, from about half to three-quarters
of county jails.39

34. This was true in the aggregate; of course, some jails were overcrowded and others had
empty space.
35. The Bureau of Justice Statistics conducts the nationwide Census of Jails, on which this
analysis is based, only once every five to seven years, and the data from the 2013 Census are the
most recent available in full. National Jail Census Series, NAT’L ARCHIVE OF CRIM. JUST. DATA,
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/NACJD/series/68 (last visited Apr. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
7ENN-SPJT]. Summary results from the 2019 collection were released shortly before this Article
was published and reflect that this trend has continued; while the nationwide jail population
remained virtually level between 2013 and 2019, jail capacity continued to expand. Zhen Zeng &
Todd D. Minton, Jail Inmates in 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 7 tbl.6 (Mar. 2021),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji19.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYR8-EH2V].
36. “Significantly” meaning by at least one hundred beds. Fewer than a dozen city jail
systems expanded by at least one hundred beds during this period (from 1999 to 2013); about half
of the regional jails (all of which are substantial in size) expanded by that amount.
37. Minton & Zeng, supra note 26, at 1–3 (similar analysis for all jails). Jail stays across all
facilities also got longer. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 10 (average of twenty-three
days in 2013, up from average of fourteen days in 1983).
38. KANG-BROWN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 19, at 14 fig.5 (similar analysis for all jails).
Other jurisdictions include cities, other counties, states, and the federal government, which houses
both criminal and immigration detainees in county jails. The categories of pretrial detention and
detention for another jurisdiction are not mutually exclusive. Id.
39. Id. (similar analysis for all jails); see infra Section II.C (discussing interjurisdictional
bedspace sharing). On the interplay between jail and prison populations, see KANG-BROWN ET AL.,
supra note 19, at 25–30 (discussing states where “merely shifting populations between prison and
jail custody” operates as “a kind of incarceration shell game”).
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FIGURE 1: COUNTY JAIL POPULATION AND CAPACITY, 1978–2013

Jails also appear to be easier than prisons to empty. Although
prison population levels barely budged during the first months of the
COVID-19 pandemic, jail populations across the country—in big, urban
facilities and small, rural ones alike—dropped dramatically, by an
average of around a third and as much as two-thirds.40 As the pandemic
has worn on, however, arrest rates have rebounded, transfers from jails
to prisons have slowed or stopped, and jail populations have risen.41

40. Emily Widra & Peter Wagner, While Jails Drastically Cut Populations, State Prisons
Have Released Almost No One, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 14, 2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/05/14/jails-vs-prison-update
[https://perma.cc/PG25A6QG] (noting also that some state prison population cuts are “even less significant than they
initially appear” because such cuts were achieved “partially by refusing to admit people from
county jails”); see also ACLU OF COLO., COVID-19 JAIL DEPOPULATION IN COLORADO 1–2,
12–14
(2020),
https://acluco-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/aclu_
decarcerationreport_100720_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUQ8-CD64] (describing steps taken by
Colorado sheriffs to reduce jail populations during the COVID-19 pandemic).
41. See Emily Widra, How Much Have COVID-19 Releases Changed Prison and Jail
Populations?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
blog/2021/02/03/january-population-update/ [https://perma.cc/Y9ZU-CZ2X].
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B. The Harms of Jailing
Although jails tend to hold people for shorter stints, especially
in the case of pretrial detention, harm accrues rapidly. 42 Being jailed,
even for a few days, is hugely disruptive to the economic and emotional
well-being of criminal defendants and their family members; they may
lose employment, housing, and custody of children.43 The best evidence
available suggests that pretrial detention does not reduce future crime
and may even be criminogenic.44
Jails pose particularly acute threats to the health and safety of
detainees. Most strikingly, the risk of suicide is much higher in jail than
in prison, in part because of detainees’ immediate proximity to the
mental health crises and trauma that both precipitated and resulted
from many of their arrests.45 Rates of serious mental illness are four to
six times higher among jail detainees than the general population;
while 9% of Americans have diagnosable substance use disorders, 68%
42. See SCOTT-HAYWARD & FRADELLA, supra note 18, at 135–47 (discussing adverse effects
of pretrial detention); David C. May, Brandon K. Applegate, Rick Ruddell & Peter B. Wood, Going
to Jail Sucks (and It Really Doesn’t Matter Who You Ask), 39 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 250, 255, 260
(2014) (explaining that “jail is viewed as significantly more punitive than prison” by the general
public, judges, probation/parole officers, and incarcerated people). A new empirical study suggests
that members of the public view incarceration as an “incredibly harmful experience” and that most
would choose to be the victim of a crime over even a short stint in jail, with the median respondent
saying that a “single day in jail is as costly as a burglary.” Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G.
Mayson, Pretrial Detention and the Value of Liberty 5–6 (forthcoming 2021) (Univ. of Va. Pub. L.
& Legal Theory Paper Series, No. 2021-14, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3787018 [https://perma.cc/B735-LS3M].
43. See Heaton et al., supra note 23, at 713, 713–14 n.4; Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal
S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence
from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 227–30, 235–36 (2018) (estimating the
impact of initial pretrial release on earnings and employment); see also Shima Baradaran
Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (2017) (discussing the costs of
pretrial detention to both detainees and society).
44. See Heaton et al., supra note 23, at 759–68 (estimating the magnitude and discussing the
possible mechanisms of pretrial misdemeanor detention’s effects on future crime); Dobbie et al.,
supra note 43, at 226–27, 234–35 (observing a short-run incapacitation effect but medium-run
criminogenic effect of pretrial detention); see also CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE
VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL
DETENTION 19–25 (2013), https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_
Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4KX-BH2U] (finding that defendants who were
detained pretrial were 1.3 times more likely to recidivate than those released at some
point pretrial).
45. See David E. Patton & Fredrick E. Vars, Jail Suicide by Design, 68 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 78, 82 (2020); see also Conrad Wilson, Jail Suicide Epidemic Doesn’t Extend to
Northwest Prisons, OR. PUB. BROAD. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.opb.org/news/article/suicide-jailstatistics-oregon-washington/ [https://perma.cc/KU8F-BQ8T] (discussing the discrepancy between
Pacific Northwest jails, where suicides accounted for 47% of detainee deaths, and the region’s
prisons, where suicides represented 6% of detainee deaths); Texas Law Fails to Slow Jail Suicides,
PROGRESSIVE FARMER (Dec. 22, 2019), https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/news/worldpolicy/article/2019/12/22/texas-law-fails-slow-jail-suicides [https://perma.cc/LY4X-J32L].
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of jail detainees do.46 These rates are higher even than in state prison
populations.47 Mental health care, though deficient in correctional
facilities of all types, is often especially bad in small jails. 48 People in
jail suffer in horrifying conditions and frequently die due to abuse and
neglect.49 Although detailed and comprehensive data on jail deaths are
frustratingly hard to find, a recent investigation by Reuters
documented over 7,500 detainee deaths in approximately 500 large jails
over the course of the past decade; the study found that the death rate
had climbed 35% in this time and that at least two-thirds of those who
died were detained pretrial.50
C. Jail Governance and Administration
The governance and administration of jails also differs
profoundly from that of prisons, along a number of metrics.

46. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 12.
47. Id.
48. See Steve Coll, The Jail Health-Care Crisis, NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/04/the-jail-health-care-crisis
[https://perma.cc/
Y2N5-VRZY]; Max Blau, For Sheriffs, Healthcare for Inmates Can Be a Burden. For One Doctor,
It Has Been the Opportunity of a Lifetime., ATLANTA MAG. (Dec. 12, 2019),
https://www.atlantamagazine.com/great-reads/for-sheriffs-healthcare-for-inmates-can-be-aburden-for-one-doctor-it-has-been-the-opportunity-of-a-lifetime [https://perma.cc/QB2Y-72WR];
Max Blau, ‘They Only Cut Off Half My Left Foot.’ What Happens When Inmate Care Goes Wrong
in Georgia?, MACON TEL. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.macon.com/news/state/georgia/
article238307543.html [https://perma.cc/K9DT-8V46].
49. See, e.g., Maurice Chammah, They Went to Jail. Then They Say They Were Strapped to a
Chair for Days., MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/02/
07/they-went-to-jail-then-they-say-they-were-strapped-to-a-chair-for-days [https://perma.cc/29R2JF6A] (reporting that detainees who became agitated or attempted self-harm were placed in
restraint chairs, which were associated with twenty deaths in the past six years, and that one man
was addressed with the n-word, force-fed, and left to urinate and defecate on himself for five days);
Elisha Fieldstadt, Mother with Mental Health Symptoms Died in Jail from ‘Torturous’ Neglect,
Lawsuit Claims, NBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mothermental-health-symptoms-died-jail-torturous-neglect-lawsuit-claims-n1135981 [https://perma.cc/
YX2U-DUJV] (indicating that a bipolar detainee who was “observed vomiting, stumbling in circles,
grabbing her genitalia, spinning in circles,” and throwing food into the toilet was denied
psychiatric care and meals, leading to ketoacidosis, insatiable thirst, and death).
50. Peter Eisler, Linda So, Jason Szep, Grant Smith & Ned Parker, Dying Inside: The Hidden
Crisis in America’s Jails, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/usa-jails-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/9KZB-Z3YN] (first in a series of stories with linked data
set); see also Katie Rose Quandt, America’s Rural-Jail-Death Problem, ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/03/americas-rural-jail-death-problem/618292/
[https://perma.cc/ZD5A-38AN] (“A disproportionate number of [jail] deaths happen in America’s
smallest jails.”); Matt Sledge, Louisiana Doesn’t Count People Who Die Behind Bars, So Loyola
Law School Will Fill the Void, NOLA.COM (Mar. 28, 2021), https://www.nola.com/news/courts/
article_ae4490d4-8e4a-11eb-8968-e762f7d9234f.html [https://perma.cc/V5ZE-3R4P] (describing
data-gathering project).
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Dispersion. As previously discussed, a few dozen state and
federal prison systems have centralized administrations.51 Thousands
of jail systems, by contrast, are little fiefdoms, run separately
and independently.
Leadership.
Prison
administrations
are
headed
by
commissioners of corrections appointed by governors, while jails are run
by elected sheriffs.52 Commissioners of corrections have a singular
ambit: corrections. Sheriffs, though, are also generally their counties’
chief law enforcement officers, responsible for policing as well as jails.53
Officials who run prisons and jails thus differ along two important axes:
to whom they are accountable, and the scopes of their responsibility
and authority.
Funding. Prison officials seek appropriations from state
legislatures and their executive-branch superiors, who have total
control over correctional budgets. But the relationship between sheriffs
who operate jails and the county commissioners54 who fund them is
instead one of (messy) power sharing between coequal elected officials.55
51. See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text.
52. On the state of political science research on sheriffs, see generally Mirya R. Holman &
Emily Farris, Sheriffs in the United States: Authority and Autonomy in Local Criminal Justice, 28
COMPAR. POL. NEWSL. 38 (2018). In our federal system, there is significant variation between
jurisdictions; when speaking generally about the modal sheriff and jail, this Article ignores these
differences, but they are worth noting. Sheriffs do not exist in Alaska (no county governments),
Connecticut (replaced by marshal system), or Hawaii (deputy sheriffs serve in state Department
of Public Safety). Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 18 app. at tbl.9 (July 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/25X2-BP6L]. Sheriffs in Rhode Island and a few counties in other states are
appointed rather than elected. State-by-State Election Information, NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N (2015),
https://www.sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GovAffairs/State-by-State%
20Election%20Chart%20updated%2008.13.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5U7-NGA3].
53. Falcone & Wells, supra note 6, at 143.
54. The county governments with which sheriffs partner vary significantly in name and form
between and within states; for convenience, their officials are referred to here as “commissioners,”
the most frequent denomination. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CNTYS., COUNTY GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE:
A STATE BY STATE REPORT 7 (2009), https://www.pfw.edu/dotAsset/98216b7d-e66c-4da6-a78b1871b6c1f439.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK2U-9V29]. Common to nearly all is fiscal control over the
local criminal legal system. See The American County Platform and Resolutions 2019-2020, NAT’L
ASS’N OF CNTYS. 132 (2019), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/20192020%20American%20County%20Platform%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUS6-J8P5].
55. Nearly all county jails are run by sheriffs, though there are a handful of exceptions in
metropolitan areas, such as the jails in Miami-Dade County, Florida, and King County,
Washington. In certain counties, commissions can take over jail management without the
agreement of the sheriff. See, e.g., Kristen M. Kraemer, Update: Benton Co. Republicans Want Jail
Returned to Sheriff. 2 Commissioners Say No, TRI-CITY HERALD (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.tricityherald.com/news/local/article238231399.html [https://perma.cc/Q2FZ-PEES]. In others, a
sheriff can force a commission to take control of the jail system. Aaron Brilbeck, Oklahoma County
Sheriff Extends Jail Transfer Deadline with Conditions, NEWS 9 (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.news9.com/story/41434614/oklahoma-county-sheriff-extends-jail-transfer-deadlinewith-conditions [https://perma.cc/8GYL-LJQD]. In most jurisdictions, this cannot occur. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Hayes v. Cummins, 42 S.W. 880, 881–82 (Tenn. 1897) (holding that the sheriff may
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As the Eleventh Circuit once put it, “counties and their sheriffs
maintain their county jails in partnership”; the sheriff “manages the
institution,” while the county “provides the facility and the money for
upkeep.”56 This partnership can be highly collaborative or full of tumult;
sheriffs and county commissioners not infrequently come into conflict
regarding budgeting decisions, contracting authority, and the use of jail
facilities.57 Counties in many jurisdictions are precluded by state
constitutional law from dictating how sheriffs spend their budgets, but
do with some exceptions control the overall purse strings.58 This is
especially relevant when it comes to jail construction or renovation,
which involves expenditure well beyond a sheriff’s annual budget and
generally necessitates incurring debt.59
As the remainder of this Article will demonstrate, these features
of jail governance and administration shape the extent to which and on
whose initiative jails are expanded; the mechanisms by which they are
paid for; how many and which people fill them, and who has the ability
not be deprived of exclusive supervision of county jails). City and regional jails are generally run
by appointed officials. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 211.115 (2021) (city jail administrators); VA.
CODE ANN. § 53.1-106 (2021) (regional jail superintendents).
56. Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1478–79 (11th Cir. 1989). Historically, the distinction
between jail management (the sheriff’s purview) and jail building and repair (the county’s purview)
arose in the context of liability for escape. See, e.g., Stiles v. Dearborn, 6 N.H. 145, 145–46 (1833).
In many states, a sheriff was liable for escapes that occurred through “his negligence,” whereas
the county was responsible for escapes that occurred due to “the insufficiency of the gaol.” Id.
57. See, e.g., Nash County Cuts Off Funds to Sheriff’s Office amid Jail Spat, WRAL.COM
(Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.wral.com/nash-county-cuts-off-funds-to-sheriff-s-office-amid-jailspat/18852179 [https://perma.cc/WPX3-QP7H]; Steve Vockrodt, Judge Says Clay County
‘Intentionally Manipulated’ Sheriff Budget, Orders $1M Payment, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article234519322.html [https://perma.cc/
YD76-DR9X]; Quinton Chandler, Sheriff Revolt over County Jail Conditions Shines Spotlight on
Low Funding, STATEIMPACT OKLA. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/
2019/04/11/sheriff-revolt-over-county-jail-conditions-shines-spotlight-on-low-funding
[https://
perma.cc/YKL8-YPWY]. Recently, disagreements have arisen between sheriffs and county officials
over whether to house immigration detainees for ICE and who has the power to decide. See Gloria
DeLeon, Commissioner, Sheriff Disagree on Federal Contract to House Immigrants at County Jail,
KFOX14 (June 28, 2018), https://kfoxtv.com/news/local/commissioner-sheriff-disagree-on-federalcontract-to-house-immigrants-at-county-jail [https://perma.cc/RXK3-3Y8H]; see also Steve Bohnel,
Opinion: County Executive Has No Legal Authority to Sign Sheriff’s 287(g) Agreement, FREDERICK
NEWS-POST (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.fredericknewspost.com/news/politics_and_government/
levels_of_government/county/sheriff/opinion-county-executive-has-no-legal-authority-to-signsheriff/article_bb853871-23b8-5a4a-b6b5-04c271540bae.html [https://perma.cc/X6YT-2WXZ].
58. See, e.g., Tomberlin, supra note 6, at 134–35, 134 n.132 (indicating that Florida sheriffs
have the right to appeal county budget limits to the governor under FLA. STAT.
§ 30.49(4)–(5) (2021)).
59. See, e.g., N.Y. State Comm’n of Corr. v. Ruffo, 530 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472 (Sup. Ct. 1988)
(concluding that because the sheriff “is not authorized by law to build a new jail, or to raise taxes
to fund a major renovation, he cannot be ordered to do that which is not within his power”), aff’d
in relevant part as modified, 550 N.Y.S.2d 746 (App. Div. 1990). Relatedly, state legislatures have
much control not only over carceral funding but also over fundraising; they are able to raise taxes
and incur debt for prison building more readily than county commissions can for jail building.
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to increase or decrease their population levels; and the avenues by
which their use can be challenged.
II. JAIL BEDSPACE: THE SUPPLY SIDE
Mass incarceration requires a massive apparatus. 60 Although
jail cells can be filled beyond capacity, with detainees forced to sleep on
the floor or in shifts, space is a limiting factor. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore
argues, carceral infrastructure is half of the story: “[W]e must [not only]
understand[ ] how prisoners became so massively available as carceral
objects, [but also] figure out how the ground the [jails] stand on becomes
available for such a purpose.”61
This Part excavates the role that sheriffs and county
commissioners play together in proposing, arguing and securing
support for, and deciding on the scope of jail construction. 62 It shows
them circumventing popular opposition through creative use of
municipal securities, imposing the fiscal burden of carceral growth on
the incarcerated, and aggressively seeking intergovernmental funding
sources. And it shows them facilitating a perpetual cycle of expansion,
untethered to local public safety needs, through participation in the
bedspace contracting market. It demonstrates these officials’ power
over the supply of jail bedspace and illuminates their incentives as jail
administrators and criminal legal policymakers.
A. Promoting and Planning
Sheriffs and county commissioners, the officials who bear daily
responsibility for managing jail populations and pay for jail operations,
play a primary role in advocating for additional jail bedspace. Often, a
sheriff brings a building proposal to the county commission, which
works out whether and how to finance it.63 Even when a jail-planning
60. This is true across the system of criminal adjudication and punishment. Cf. PFAFF, supra
note 22, at 129–30 (suggesting one “important explanation for why felony filings rose as crime
rates fell: there were simply more prosecutors”).
61. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 130; see also HEATHER SCHOENFELD, BUILDING THE PRISON
STATE: RACE AND THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION 4 (2018) (“[R]efram[ing] the story of mass
incarceration as a story of the dramatic increase in the state capacity to punish”—that is, “carceral
capacity”—“points to the importance of physical space.”).
62. This role is especially important because, as James Jacobs wrote of prisons, filling jails
“requires a vast number of small decisions” by numerous officials, while building them “requires a
small number of large decisions” by a few key actors. James B. Jacobs, The Politics of Prison
Expansion, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 209 (1983).
63. See, e.g., Goldie Rapp, New Jail, Law Enforcement Center Officially Underway,
NEWSTRIBUNE (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.newstrib.com/2019/11/13/new-jail-law-enforcementcenter-officially-underway/ahcylm7 [https://perma.cc/959X-GA8J] (noting that at the
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process appears to be more deliberative, sheriffs and commissioners are
typically the prime movers. 64 Other local criminal legal system actors
who “use” the jail—judges, prosecutors, and police chiefs—may voice
support for an expansion, but they rarely, if ever, lead advocacy efforts;
they are certainly not empowered to sign a construction contract or
raise revenue to cover it.
If a funding plan requires voters’ approval, sheriffs and
commissioners generally play the lead role in the public messaging
required to encourage voters to accept a tax increase, despite the
possibility that such activities run afoul of prohibitions on the use of
public money to advocate for ballot measures.65 In advance of a 2017
election in Pueblo County, Colorado, for example, sheriffs’ deputies
went out to canvass, going door-to-door to ask residents to vote in favor
of a new facility.66 Despite their efforts, the measure failed.67 In Sanpete
County, Utah, commissioners held an open house at the existing jail
facility to show residents why a $12 million, 128-bed facility was needed
to replace the old 44-bed building.68 In Guthrie County, Iowa, a sheriff’s
deputy recently went live on Facebook to urge voters to support a jail
addition tripling its bedspace, at a cost to taxpayers of $8 million.69 The
Canyon County, Idaho, sheriff created a Jail Education website,
complete with an election countdown clock.70 A National Institute of
groundbreaking for a new jail, the sheriff said, “My hat goes off to the county board . . . . We
brought this idea to them, they are the ones who oversaw it, looked at our plan and brought
it together”).
64. See, e.g., Sarah Volpenhein, Marion Judge Pushes for Jail Expansion, Signals
Withdrawal of Overcrowding Release Order, MARION STAR (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://www.marionstar.com/story/news/local/2019/11/13/marion-judge-pushes-jail-expansionwithdraw-release-order/4177750002 [https://perma.cc/5VBP-DATA] (detailing the decision to
draw up plans for a new jail made by a “jail commission,” comprised of sheriffs and commissioners).
65. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 74-604 (2020); IOWA CODE § 68A.505 (2021).
66. Elise Schmelzer, Despite Fewer Arrests, Arapahoe County Jail Remains Overcrowded.
The Sheriff Has a $462M Solution That Could Mean a Tax Hike., DENVER POST,
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/06/26/arapahoe-county-jail-crowding-tyler-brown (last updated
June 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/D2RE-TE2E].
67. Id.
68. Ben Winslow, Sanpete Says New Jail Needed Badly, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 24, 2006),
https://www.deseret.com/2006/4/24/19949948/sanpete-says-new-jail-needed-badly [https://perma.
cc/B6A9-UDWC]. In Houghton County, Michigan, the board planned an “ ‘effective and
comprehensive’ public outreach” campaign in order to “have it marketed properly,” out of concern
that voters did not “believe[ ] the people directly involved with the jail.” Garrett Neese,
Houghton County Continues Jail Talks, DAILY MINING GAZETTE (Oct. 26, 2019), https://
www.mininggazette.com/news/2019/10/houghton-county-continues-jail-talks
[https://perma.cc/
4L9U-4Y3A].
69. Laura Bacon, New Jail Needed for Guthrie County Sheriff’s Office, ATL. NEWS TEL. (Dec.
24, 2019), https://www.swiowanewssource.com/atlantic/news/article_1557c404-828d-5e91-a0b012c2d358233f.html [https://perma.cc/B44R-5WAG].
70. Jail Education, CANYON CNTY., IDAHO, https://www.canyonco.org/elected-officials/
sheriff/jaileducation (last visited Feb. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/UL99-4RK5].
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Corrections Bulletin goes so far as to recommend that sheriffs “[u]se the
personal touch,” urging them to “[p]lan campaign events as you would
plan a party.”71
When the project will rely on an outside source of funding,
sheriffs and county commissioners may band together to ask for it.72 In
2006, the County Commissioners Association of Ohio and Buckeye
State Sheriffs Association jointly advanced a proposal for state funding
for jail construction. In it, they explained that there is currently “ ‘no
room in the inn’ for individuals who ought to be incarcerated” and that
people convicted of misdemeanors are “waiting to serve their sentences
but can’t.”73
Some of these officials are unabashed boosters of incarceration,
while others are more circumspect. One sheriff in Vanderburgh County,
Indiana, recently explained that he is “tired of people telling me we are
over-incarcerated” and “want[s] to make sure we don’t under-build.”74
A few, though, argue that uncontrolled jail growth is undesirable or
ineffectual; some are even “trying to shrink” their carceral systems.75
71. Gail Elias, Building Community Support for New Jail Construction, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
8 (May 2006), https://info.nicic.gov/nicrp/system/files/021328.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK8Z-LBSF].
72. See, e.g., Chris Daley, Sheriff Tracks Jail Expansion Funds, MOUNTAIN DEMOCRAT (Feb.
20, 2017), https://www.mtdemocrat.com/news/sheriff-tracks-jail-expansion-funds [https://perma.
cc/6BHG-TCF3]; Taylor Deville, Sheriff Gets OK to Chase Grant for Jail, ENTERPRISE (June 21,
2019),
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-enterprise/20190621/281492162843989
[https://
perma.cc/2V27-QD95].
73. County Legislative Information Program: State Capital Funds Sought for County Jail
Construction, CNTY. COMM’RS ASS’N OF OHIO 1–2 (2006) (emphasis omitted),
https://www.ccao.org/wp-content/uploads/5-4-06%20NA%20Jail%20Funding.pdf [https://perma.
cc/FH6N-TWSQ]. In 2018, though, the County Commissioners Association of Ohio opposed a ballot
measure that would have addressed overcrowding by prohibiting jail sentences for drug
possession, claiming that it would lead to an unfunded mandate for treatment services. CCAO
Opposes Issue 1, CNTY. COMM’RS ASS’N OF OHIO (Sept. 25, 2018), https://ccao.org/ccao-opposesissue-1 [https://perma.cc/8AS9-2YNT]. Ohio’s sheriffs continue to advocate for more state funding
for jail construction, modeling their proposal on the state’s school construction funding formula.
See Sheriff Everhart Attends Press Conference to Support Legislation Establishing a County Jail
Construction Funding Formula, WKTN (Feb. 19, 2021), https://wktn.com/sheriff-everhart-attendspress-conference-to-support-legislation-establishing-a-county-jail-construction-funding-formula
[https://perma.cc/U9CZ-R6Q8].
74. John T. Martin, Vanderburgh County Jail Expansion Talk to Resume; Many Tough
Questions Remain, COURIER & PRESS (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.courierpress.com/story/news/
2019/12/01/tough-questions-surround-possible-expansion-vanderburgh-co-jail/4307228002
[https://perma.cc/VX4G-F7ER]; see also Amelia Harper, Conditions at Nash Jail Under Study,
ROCKY MOUNT TELEGRAM (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.rockymounttelegram.com/news/local/
conditions-at-nash-jail-under-study/article_79945825-e99d-54b7-acc6-2b99d83d5f80.html
[https://perma.cc/X4YN-M6GX] (reporting that the sheriff would double jail capacity “if money was
no object”).
75. See, e.g., Diana Anghel, Champaign County Jail Inmates Endure Detrimental Conditions,
DAILY ILLINI (Dec. 2, 2019), https://dailyillini.com/news/2019/12/02/champaign-county-jailinmates-endure-detrimental-conditions [https://perma.cc/EM5X-CKSF]; see also Kristina Gaffny,
Leaders Advocate for Funds to Support Jail-Diversion Programs, YOURARLINGTON.COM (Nov.
3, 2019), https://www.yourarlington.com/search/news-archive/359-pol-serve/16304-diversion-
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Increasingly, in response to activism, jailers acknowledge the
demand for responses to crime that sound in rehabilitation rather than
incapacitation or deterrence, but they often claim that jail is the best
place to provide such services.76 In Jackson County, Oregon, for
example, the sheriff maintains a website to “educate citizens,” making
the case for a new jail.77 A professionally produced video segment
asserts that “often,” the parents of a detainee “will basically beg us to
please keep their son or daughter in jail” to receive drug treatment, a
sentiment echoed by treatment providers who argue that their services
will be delivered more effectively if their patients are held captive.78 The
video even offers one local police chief’s view that legal representation
is improved by incarceration: “[O]ne of the biggest issues that criminal
defense attorneys have is that they can’t engage with their clients in a
meaningful way if the client’s not kept in jail, because a lot of the clients
are transient.”79
Poor conditions are also sometimes cited as justification for
expansion. Sheriffs and commissioners may worry about the prospect
110319.html [https://perma.cc/C9J5-R6TB] (sheriff advocated for state-funded diversion programs
because “we cannot arrest and incarcerate our way out of the behavioral health challenges we
face”); Scott Liles, Judge: Low Construction Costs Give Jail Extra Space for Expansion, BAXTER
BULL. (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.baxterbulletin.com/story/news/local/2017/11/18/judge-lowconstruction-costs-jail-expansion-beds/867674001 [https://perma.cc/23N8-UW2J] (sheriff opposed
to building extra bedspace that voters rejected and said he would not use it to house detainees).
76. See MAI ET AL., supra note 19, at 16 (“Whether it is a new wing or a new facility to
accommodate and enhance service provision, these efforts are often accompanied by an increase in
the number of jail beds.”). Some sheriffs have even attempted to use their partially empty jail
facilities to house people who are homeless or have substance-use disorders but have not been
charged with any crime. See Jessica Pishko, The Repurposing of the American Jail, ATLANTIC (Nov.
19,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/11/going-jail-substance-abusetreatment/602206 [https://perma.cc/8A7H-RKC5]. This is a new iteration of a longstanding
dynamic. See Melanie D. Newport, Jail America: The Reformist Origins of the Carceral State (July
2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University) (ProQuest) (arguing, with a focus on Cook County
Jail, that policymakers rationalized the growth of large urban jails from the 1950s to 1990s by
branding them as providers of social services and rehabilitation); cf. JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING
UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 12–13 (2017) (describing Black
advocacy for “an all-of-the-above strategy” to crime-fighting that paired policing and incarceration
with jobs, schools, and housing, but explaining that “African Americans never got the [all-of-theabove strategy]—just the tough-on-crime laws”). It parallels the “mission creep” in policing. See
Tracey L. Meares, The Path Forward: Improving the Dynamics of Community-Police Relationships
to Achieve Effective Law Enforcement Policies, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1365 (2017).
77. New Jail Project, JACKSON CNTY. SHERIFF OR., https://jacksoncountyor.org/
sheriff/Jail/New-Jail-Project (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/G6BJ-WSAL].
78. Jackson County Sheriff, Jackson County Jail—Capacity Crisis, YOUTUBE (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY0a_MNOGOQ (video at 3:20–3:40).
79. Id. (video at 5:35–5:50). The sheriff’s office commissioned a survey of county residents to
gauge their support for a $100 million jail-construction bond; although voters disfavored it, “the
dream of a new jail remains.” Jamie Parfitt, Sheriff: Fewer Inmates Being Released from Jail Due
to Overcrowding, KDRV.COM (June 26, 2018), https://www.kdrv.com/content/news/Sheriff-FewerInmates-Being-Released-from-Jail-Due-to-Overcrowding-486598051.html
[https://perma.cc/
VG4X-3USX].
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of litigation or the risk of having the jail closed down by oversight
officials,80 many of whom feel that their role pertains only to the quality
of the carceral enterprise and requires agnosticism as to its size. 81 They
may also be motivated by the threat overcrowded conditions pose to the
safety of their staff and to the well-being of detainees. There is, though,
an intersection between the quality and quantity of jail bedspace, and
an attendant risk that efforts to address substandard conditions of
confinement—which could also be remedied if the same physical plant
and staff were used to house and attend to fewer people—provide
humanitarian cover for county officials’ latent carceral expansionism.
Whether or not overcrowding is cited as the impetus for
expansion, sheriffs and county commissioners proposing a jail
construction project often rely on a population projection—that is to say,
they attempt to predict how many people they will incarcerate in ten or
twenty years.82 In Vanderburgh County, Indiana, for example, which
had 512 beds, a consultant to jail planners concluded that adding 750
would “meet projected incarceration needs 20 years into the future . . .
while a 500-bed addition could be full on its opening day.”83

80. See MAI ET AL., supra note 19, at 18–19. For recent examples of the role played by statelevel jail monitors in spurring carceral growth, see Dennis Ting, Jefferson County, Indiana,
Residents See Income Tax Hike for New Jail, WHAS11 (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.whas11.com/
article/news/local/jefferson-county-indiana-residents-see-income-tax-hike-for-new-jail/41747a78bee-296a-41f8-8887-905e04af4b48 [https://perma.cc/66VY-NLS4]; Dan Browning, Three
Minnesota Counties Must Rebuild Old Jails, with More to Follow, STARTRIB. (Dec. 7, 2019),
https://www.startribune.com/three-minnesota-counties-must-rebuild-old-jails-with-more-tofollow/565933602 [https://perma.cc/5TGF-Z2P5]; DANA KAPLAN, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., IMPACTS OF
JAIL EXPANSION IN NEW YORK STATE: A HIDDEN BURDEN 1 (2007). For a rare example of an
oversight body criticizing jail profiteering, see Charlie Deitch, Allegheny County Will Make $4.3
Million Profit in New Contract to Provide Phone Calls for County Jail Inmates, PITTSBURGH
CURRENT (July 2, 2020), https://www.pittsburghcurrent.com/acj-phone-profits [https://perma.cc/
B5A5-G3AD]. For a survey and assessment of jail oversight mechanisms, see generally Michele
Deitch, But Who Oversees the Overseers?: The Status of Prison and Jail Oversight in the United
States, 47 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2020). For critiques of their role in prison expansion, see GILMORE,
supra note 11, at 89–92, 242; and BRETT STORY, PRISON LAND 96–97, 175 (2019).
81. See, e.g., Tom Sissom, State Reports Show Many Jails Overcrowded, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETTE (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/oct/28/state-reports-showmany-jails-overcrowd [https://perma.cc/6XH3-73YP] (reporting that coordinator of oversight body
said inspection reports “don’t make policy recommendations,” and “don’t tell [a county] . . . that
they need to build a new jail,” as “[t]here are lots of ways to manage population and construction
is only one of them”).
82. On analogous problems with prison population projections during California’s prisonbuilding boom, see Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, The Growth of Imprisonment in
California, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 83, 90–94 (1994). Those making prison population
projections, however, have much less direct control over prison population levels than do sheriffs
over jail population levels.
83. John T. Martin, Meeting Vanderburgh Jail Long-Term Needs Will Take 750 Beds,
Consultant Says, COURIER & PRESS (May 14, 2019), https://www.courierpress.com/
story/news/2019/05/14/consultant-vanderburgh-jails-long-term-need-750-more-beds/3671518002
[https://perma.cc/A4ZT-PSFD].
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Because jails are long-term investments, such an endeavor is in
some sense unavoidable, but close attention to the process of population
projection is revealing. Sheriffs and county commissioners generally
take these predictions of future incarceration as gospel. A study of the
jail-bond issuance process in seven municipalities found, however, that
the architecture firms, construction companies, and underwriters with
financial stakes in potential projects “commission feasibility studies
that demonstrate the benefits of the jail bonds to underpin their
pitches.”84 In some cases, they fabricate or inflate the fiscal benefits and
underestimate the costs of the proposed facility.85 Another review of
population projections by Vera Institute researchers found the
projections lacked a “standardized, accepted methodology”; some
assumed continued straight-line growth at recent, exceptionally rapid
rates.86 Others reject as “unrealistic” models that predict declines in jail
population based on recent policy shifts, such as the increased use of
cite and release by local law enforcement.87 This refusal to engage
critically with the range of available law enforcement policy choices is
especially remarkable given that the same sheriffs urging jail
construction are themselves empowered, as discussed in Part III, to
reduce jail populations in a number of ways.

84. ACTION CENTER ON RACE & THE ECONOMY, ACTIVEST AND IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, JAIL
BONDS REPORT 2 (October 2017) (on file with author); see also GILMORE, supra note 11, at 96
(describing the advocacy function of population projections by the California Department of
Corrections, which “combined technical number-crunching skills with a flair for emphasizing the
drama inherent in the ‘crisis’ ”). On the risks of relying on consultants to manage jails, see Ian
MacDougall, New York City Paid McKinsey Millions to Stem Jail Violence. Instead, Violence
Soared., PROPUBLICA (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-city-paidmckinsey-millions-to-stem-jail-violence-instead-violence-soared [https://perma.cc/Y5DG-YDZ2].
85. JAIL BONDS REPORT, supra note 84, at 2 (observing that these feasibility studies “find[ ]
a need in the region for [contract] beds, overestimating the daily fees [they would generate], and
underestimating the number of staff needed at the facility”).
86. MAI ET AL., supra note 19 at 22; cf. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS I NCARCERATION IN AMERICA 163–68 (2016) (discussing
Nixon’s Long-Range Master Plan for expansion of the federal prison system, “based not on the
reality of crime but on population growth projections” and since-disproven assumptions about the
demographics of crime).
87. MAI ET AL., supra note 19, at 23. Unexpected decarceral policy shifts may render such
projections inaccurate and the resulting expansions unnecessary. See, e.g., Sara Gentzler,
Thurston County Commissioners OK Estimated $19 Million Plan to Expand County Jail, DAILY
CHRON. (Nov. 16, 2019), https://www.chronline.com/crime/thurston-commissioners-ok-estimatedmillion-plan-to-expand-county-jail/article_d12e599e-08aa-11ea-9f30-5f0bcc563c76.html
[https://perma.cc/TDC6-B6QG]. County officials could use thoughtful and nuanced analyses to help
them evaluate decarceral approaches and the attendant cost savings. Cf. Carri Graham, Harrison
County Jail Has More Inmates Than It Can House, HERALD-STAR (Jan. 2, 2020),
https://www.heraldstaronline.com/news/local-news/2020/01/harrison-county-jail-has-moreinmates-than-it-can-house [https://perma.cc/NY8M-5NKH] (county hired an engineering firm to
resolve dispute between sheriff and commission regarding extent of an expansion).
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B. Financing
Jails are major investments, expensive and long-lasting.88 As a
matter of both financing and logistics, they are difficult to expand
gradually. In rural counties, jail expansions are often “the most
expensive forms of capital expense a county can incur.”89 The capital
cost of building normally exceeds the amount available to a county
without either incurring debt or obtaining external assistance.90 And
the bills do not stop once construction is complete. As Michelle
Anderson has shown, jails’ annual operating budgets, which increase
when facilities expand, make up a significant portion of routine local
government spending.91 A recent study of county jail budgets in
Kentucky and Tennessee found that jail spending comprised an average
of 15% of total county budgets in both states, and varied quite widely;
over a third of Kentucky counties spent at least a quarter of their
annual budgets on jails.92 In Penobscot County, Maine—a fairly
extreme case—funding to run the jail made up half of the county’s
entire budget for 2020.93
88. Chris Rogers, Jail Construction Could Cost County $22M, WINONA POST (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://www.winonapost.com/Article/ArticleID/62306/Jail-construction-could-cost-county-$22M
[https://perma.cc/QCL4-B9AR] (“Whatever Winona County builds, it will be stuck with for a long
time, staffing costs included.”).
89. Rebecca Sitzes, Jail Expansion Planned in Shelby, GASTON GAZETTE (Jan. 4, 2020),
https://www.gastongazette.com/news/20200104/jail-expansion-planned-in-shelby
[https://perma.cc/472H-QWPR]; see also Giana Magnoli, County Supervisors Extend Contract,
Costs, Completion Date for Oft-delayed Northern Branch Jail, NOOZHAWK (June 9, 2019),
https://www.noozhawk.com/noozhawk/print/supervisors_antenna_system_northern_branch_jail_
santa_maria_20190609 [https://perma.cc/T26Z-MKRX] (Santa Barbara County, California’s jail
was the “largest capital improvement project in county history”); Juliette Daniels, Opinion, No on
Jail, CASCADIA WKLY. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.cascadiaweekly.com/cw/currents/32849
[https://perma.cc/C7SK-MQJA] (same in Whatcom County, Washington); Chairman Liakakis
Signs Jail Expansion Construction Contract, SAVANNAH HERALD (Mar. 2, 2011),
https://savannahherald.net/chairman-liakakis-signs-jail-expansion-construction-contract-p13731.htm [https://perma.cc/QZ6W-UTKL] (same in Chatham County, Georgia).
90. It is rarely possible for counties to build major jail expansions using cash reserves. See
Andrew Hartsig, Investing in America’s Infrastructure: County Funding for Capital Facilities,
NAT’L ASS’N OF CNTYS. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.naco.org/featured-resources/investingamerica%E2%80%99s-infrastructure-county-funding-capital-facilities
[https://perma.cc/8PRPZJJ2].
91. Michelle W. Anderson, The Western, Rural Rustbelt: Learning from Local Fiscal Crisis in
Oregon, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 465, 478 (2014); see also Local Spending on Jails Tops $25 Billion
in Latest Nationwide Data, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/
en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2021/01/local-spending-on-jails-tops-$25-billion-in-latestnationwide-data [https://perma.cc/B5WG-QXDQ] (reviewing national data on state and local
jail expenditures).
92. What Jails Cost Statewide, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://www.vera.org/publications/whatjails-cost-statewide (last visited Apr. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/K4Z5-XMQ6] (click on each state
to access data about its counties’ jail spending and revenue).
93. Judy Harrison, Penobscot County Is Still Trying to Nail Down a ‘Reasonable’ Cost for a
New Jail, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 14, 2019), https://bangordailynews.com/2019/11/14/
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Indeed, because it is much harder for counties to raise revenues
than it is for states to do so,94 fiscal incentives may be even more
relevant to jail policy than they are to prison policy.95 This is especially
true in poor, rural counties, which, as Lisa Pruitt and Beth Colgan have
shown, struggle mightily to raise revenue and provide basic services
given their limited tax bases.96 In recent years, scholarly attention has
increasingly shifted towards the local budgetary processes that shape
the functioning of the criminal legal system. This work has identified
and challenged the generation of municipal revenue through court fines
and fees and policing, raising concerns about resource extraction from
the poor and about the pro-carceral incentives this creates.97 Fiscal
motives for bedspace expansion are no less important or troubling.
Together, sheriffs and county commissioners pursue several
sources of funding for jail expansion, each of which shapes their carceral
policymaking incentives in important ways.98 They can put their plans
to build the capacity to incarcerate more people to a vote, seeking
news/bangor/penobscot-county-is-still-trying-to-nail-down-a-reasonable-cost-for-a-new-jail
[https://perma.cc/AB4B-REAP].
94. See JOSHUA MCLAURIN, NAT’L A SS’N OF CNTYS., A LOOK AT COUNTY REVENUE AUTHORITY:
A STATE BY STATE REPORT 1–3 (2008), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/
County%20Revenue%20Authority.updated.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26EK-UJ63]
(explaining
constraints on counties’ ability to generate revenue).
95. Ruth Gilmore’s work identifies other aspects of the political economy of incarceration with
which this Article does not attempt to grapple but which are doubtless important chapters of the
story of jail expansion. See GILMORE, supra note 11, at 58–84 (analyzing the roles of surplus
finance capital, surplus land, surplus population, and surplus state capacity in California’s prisonbuilding boom).
96. Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding
of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 227–29 (2010). See generally KATHERINE S. NEWMAN &
ROURKE L. O’BRIEN, TAXING THE POOR: DOING DAMAGE TO THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 87–93
(2011). Of course, county-level public finance is very much relevant to understanding where
prisons a state has decided to build are sited.
97. See Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison,
65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 6–8 (2018) (discussing the exploding use and effects of economic sanctions on
individuals in the criminal process); Beth A. Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures, in 4 REFORMING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT BY THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE 205, 209–12 (Erik Luna
ed., 2017), https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/Reforming-CriminalJustice_Vol_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TYS-53EZ] (examining the distortions of criminal justice
incentives that result from the use of economic sanctions); Robert A. McBride, Policing for Profit:
How Urban Municipalities’ Focus on Revenue Has Undermined Law Enforcement Legitimacy, 9
FAULKNER L. REV. 329, 331–32 (2018) (discussing law enforcement agencies’ perverse economic
incentive to issue more citations in order to boost their budgets).
98. Though there is an extensive literature on private prisons, the financial incentives public
officials face are no less powerful. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55
DUKE L.J. 437, 523–41, 544 (2005) (just as private prison companies and officer unions have
financial interests in incarceration, officials “view[ ] incarceration in economic terms and regarding
prison inmates as the economic units of a financial plan”). John Pfaff has similarly urged a renewed
focus on the fiscal incentives of public officials as the “engines behind prison growth.” PFAFF, supra
note 22, at 7; see also id. at 80–82, 93, 225 (“[P]rivate pathologies (‘Keep the prison filled!’) are just
as apparent in the public sector as in the private sector.”).
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funding through voter-approved general obligation bonds. In these
cases, they may be forced by organized taxpayers to justify the necessity
of expansion and to consider alternatives. Or they can circumvent the
electorate through more complex municipal financing techniques,
focusing more on reassuring investors that incarceration will continue
to produce revenue than on convincing residents that it is good policy.
They can saddle the very people they are confining—defendants—with
the financial burden of building bedspace, pledging court fines and fees
to cover the cost of the jail. And they avoid traditional municipal debt
by looking to state and federal grants and loans, prospecting in the
interjurisdictional incarceration market.
General Obligation Bonds. The lion’s share of jail building is
financed by issuance of municipal securities through which the county
takes on debt, to be repaid over a span of many years. In the baseline
case, general obligation bonds are used; the county promises to use its
power to tax (specifically, to tax local property owners) to satisfy its
debt.99 Ordinarily, voters have the opportunity to approve the issuance
of general obligation bonds for jail construction.100 Often, they reject
them—sometimes, like in Canyon County, Idaho, repeatedly.101 Public
opposition is undoubtedly founded in part on resistance to higher taxes,
although votes against bond issues inherently reflect some amount of
cost-benefit analysis by voters; there is evidence from public opinion
surveys that even tough-on-crime voters who want more funding for
policing do not support additional spending on incarceration. 102 In some

99. See, e.g., General Obligation Jail Bonds, Series 2017A, BECKER CNTY., MINN. 2 (2017),
https://emma.msrb.org/ER1061438-ER831417-ER1232355.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HPH-WDV7].
100. See Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 196 & n.23 (2001).
101. See Voters Overwhelmingly Reject $187 Million Request to Build New Canyon County
Jail, KTVB (May 22, 2019), https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/politics/elections/voters-reject-187million-request-to-build-new-canyon-county-jail/277-5c885d9b-c1f6-4509-bfe9-468cbc2aabcf
[https://perma.cc/N9R6-UXQC] (four-time rejection). Additional tax levies may also be proposed
(and voters may likewise refuse) to fund the ongoing operations of a jail. See, e.g., Anderson, supra
note 91, at 481–82 (indicating that voters rejected levy despite warnings that existing revenues
were insufficient to cover the cost of running the jail, even if the county eliminated every other
service from the budget).
102. See Mark A. Cohen, Roland T. Rust & Sara Steen, Prevention, Crime Control or Cash?
Public Preferences Towards Criminal Justice Spending Priorities, 23 JUST. Q. 317, 318–19 (2006);
Marie Gottschalk, The Carceral State and the Politics of Punishment, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 205, 232–33 (Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks eds., 2013) (citing
references); see also Jack Norton, Life and Jail in Southern Colorado, VERA INST. OF JUST.
(Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.vera.org/in-our-backyards-stories/life-and-jail-in-southern-colorado
[https://perma.cc/65FY-C2HH] (providing examples of the reasons voters gave for rejecting two
successive ballot measures to construct a larger jail). More data and analyses are required to
determine why jail construction and renovation bonds are so frequently rejected. Are voters
consistently more inclined to pay for policing than they are for incarceration, or are voting patterns
better explained by tax burdens than by policy preferences? Do voters prefer increasing jail
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cases, opposition is explicitly framed in terms of concern about overincarceration, especially of people of color.103 This financing structure
discloses to a community that it will be funding carceral growth, and it
gives residents a say.
Revenue Debt. Because taxpayers often vote against general
obligation bonds for jail building, officials committed to expansion
frequently circumvent them, using a range of opaque municipal finance
instruments that do not require approval by the local electorate in a
referendum. One particularly common vehicle for departing from
taxpayers’ preferences is the lease-revenue bond. As Ruth Wilson
Gilmore put it when describing the use of these bonds in the California
prison-building boom, when public officials need to “raise much more
money than anyone [is] brave or foolhardy enough to request from
voters[,] [l]ease revenue bonds [are often] the solution.”104
The “end run around voters” works like this: The sheriff and
commissioners of the county want to build a new jail but fear (perhaps
based on past experience) that voters will not agree to pay for it through
increased property taxes.105 So they arrange for the county building
authority, which lacks the ability to impose taxes directly, to issue a
bond. Investors who buy the bond issue are informed that the building
authority will use the bond funds to build the jail, which it will lease to
the county itself; the debt will be satisfied using the payments the
county makes to its own building authority for use of the jail.106 After a
period of years, the county acquires the jail. Hypothetically, the county
capacity over improving jail conditions, or vice versa? Are those jurisdictions able to finance jail
construction without voter approval building jail bedspace at a faster clip?
103. See, e.g., Jim Meadows, Champaign County Board to Look at Jail Consolidation Proposal
Thursday Night, WILL (Oct. 24, 2019), https://will.illinois.edu/news/story/champaign-countyboard-to-look-at-jail-consolidation-proposal-thursday-night [https://perma.cc/VV58-KXBZ].
104. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 99; accord An Introduction to Municipal Lease Financing,
ASS’N FOR G OVERNMENTAL LEASING & FIN. 2 (2000), https://aglf.memberclicks.net/
assets/docs/municipal_lease_financing.pdf [https://perma.cc/KAC2-Q4ES]. Early scholarship on
correctional privatization recognized it as similarly “abrogat[ing] [the] power of the people” to
disapprove of jail construction. Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40
VAND. L. REV. 813, 816–17 (1987) (noting that voters twice rejected a jail-bond issue before a
private financier underwrote it).
105. AB900 Borrows $7.5 Billion to Build New Prisons: Fact Sheet on the Use of Lease Revenue
Bonds to Build Prisons, CALIFORNIANS UNITED FOR A RESPONSIBLE BUDGET 2 (2008),
https://www.curbprisonspending.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Fact-Sheet-on-Lease-RevenueBonds-Updated-May-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2UZ-TFT8]. This is the diametric opposite of the
participatory approach to budgeting now demanded by abolitionist movements. See Allegra M.
McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1634–37 (2019) (describing
recent participatory budgeting campaigns).
106. Cf. Alex Anderson, Hiding Out in Prison Bonds, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2008),
https://www.forbes.com/2008/10/22/prison-correctional-bonds-pf-ii-in_aa_1022fixedincome_
inl.html?sh=272e23db6e33 [https://perma.cc/5EY4-36PJ] (explaining the mechanics of how
municipalities use lease revenue bonds to finance prisons).
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could stop using the facility in the interim, leaving investors high and
dry; as a practical matter, it would have nowhere else to incarcerate its
residents and has no plans to stop jailing them.107
This is sleight of hand: whether or not tax revenues are formally
pledged, taxpayers will repay debts incurred to build jails. It requires a
“political suspension of disbelief” to characterize a government agency
and its public works board as “entities buying, selling, and leasing
property and rights between them.”108 In certain cases, courts have
recognized as much, deeming these financing strategies shams and
invalidating them.109 As these courts have appreciated, lease-revenue
bonds can serve to “mislead . . . citizens as to real costs” and “enable
government officials to avoid public scrutiny.”110
Fine and Fee Revenue. In some instances, county officials resort
to another tactic: shifting the burden of jail construction onto criminal
defendants, including those they incarcerate. Although detainees are
regularly charged for the daily cost of their room and board111—a very
107. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance,
97 MINN. L. REV. 369, 381–82 (2012) (noting that the financing entity “operate[s] as an integral
part of [county] government,” and is therefore “too-important-to-fail”).
108. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 100. County commissioners generally appoint or approve the
members of the board of a municipal building authority.
109. Courts considering functionally identical arrangements have reached different outcomes.
Compare Montano v. Gabaldon, 766 P.2d 1328, 1330 (N.M. 1989) (disapproving of such financing
absent voter approval and finding it to create indebtedness because the county is, practically,
“obligated to continue making rental payments in order to protect [its] growing equitable
interest”), with Mun. Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 276, 279 (Utah 1985) (approving of such
financing because the county is entitled to terminate its annual lease, despite recognizing that “of
course, as a practical matter the county will renew the lease for the next twenty years” and then
acquire the jail).
110. Schwarcz, supra note 107, at 376–77, 384.
111. See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind
Bars May Violate the Excessive Fines Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 319, 321–23 (2014) (detailing
the history of detainee fees and pay-to-stay practices); Michael Wetzel, Jail Fees Hurt Inmates’
Loved Ones, Help County Budgets, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 24, 2019),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/alabama/articles/2019-11-24/jail-fees-hurt-inmatesloved-ones-help-county-budgets [https://perma.cc/BW8F-EWFV] (recognizing that such fees are
often paid out of detainee accounts into which family members deposit funds). Lately, some courts
and even some sheriffs have begun to appreciate that these fees can “feed the cycle of
incarceration.” E.g., Angie Jackson, Washentaw County Forgives $509K in Jail Debt for More Than
31,000 People, DETROIT FREE PRESS, https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/
2021/02/04/washtenaw-county-jail-debt/4388377001 (last updated Feb. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
UP3T-3XTK]; see State v. Richey, 569 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Mo. 2019) (holding unanimously that jail
board bills are not taxable as court costs and failure to pay cannot result in further incarceration).
Jailing also involves other expropriative practices, like the charging of extortionate phone fees to
fill public coffers with kickbacks. See Stephen Raher, The Company Store and the Literally Captive
Market: Consumer Law in Prisons and Jails, 17 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 3, 12–15 (2020)
(“[A] nationwide survey of prison phone contracts found commission rates of up to 60%, with an
average nationwide rate of 42%.”); Brian Highsmith, Commercialized (In)justice: Consumer Abuses
in the Bail and Corrections Industry, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 21–22 (2019), https://www.nclc.org/
images/pdf/criminal-justice/report-commercialized-injustice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XFF5-XC8S];
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rough approximation of the marginal cost of their incarceration—
criminal defendants also contribute to the fixed costs of additional
bedspace.112 This takes different forms. In many counties, criminal
court fines and fees go into the county general fund and are then used
to pay to service jail-construction debt.113 In others, though, the link is
much clearer: criminal court fines and fees paid by criminal defendants
are pledged to expanding the jails that incarcerate them. 114 In these
cases, county policymakers have yoked themselves to perpetuation of a
roundly criticized program of resource extraction from poor people. The
link between choices officials made as jail administrators and their
criminal legal policy decisions could not be more direct or explicit.
When Washington County, Arkansas, issued bonds to finance
the construction of a 36-bed juvenile detention center, it elected to
Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, State of Phone Justice: Local Jails, State Prisons and Private Phone
Providers, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/
state_of_phone_justice.html [https://perma.cc/M6YB-BGDU] (explaining why jail phone contracts
are even more exploitative than prison counterparts).
112. On the use of commissary kickbacks to pay for the capital costs of jail expansion, see Mary
Fainsod Katzenstein & Maureen R. Waller, Taxing the Poor: Incarceration, Poverty Governance,
and the Seizure of Family Resources, 13 PERSPS. ON POL. 638, 641 (2015); Mark Shenefelt, Davis
County Plans to Bond for $9.8 Million Jail Medical Wing, STANDARD-EXAM’R (Nov. 14, 2019),
https://www.standard.net/news/government/davis-county-plans-to-bond-for-million-jail-medicalwing/article_0821a409-01a0-5919-9589-41d6a704d968.html
[https://perma.cc/C59Q-RW7E].
Sometimes, detainees are literally put to work building new jail facilities. See Taylor Upchurch,
Inmates Help Build New Jail with a Fresh Start in Mind, WYMT (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://www.wymt.com/content/news/Inmates-help-build-new-jail-with-a-fresh-start-in-mind—
507157201.html (labor for “cleanup, painting, and epoxy coating” will save over half a million
dollars); Jail Programs: A State and Local Partnership That Works, UTAH DEP’T OF CORR. 3 (2017),
https://corrections.utah.gov/images/pdf/2017-08-JAILBOOK2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8QYYCUK5]; cf. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 125 (proposal by officer union to have prisoners “do much
of the building” on new facilities, “saving labor costs”).
113. Revenue from court fines and fees is reported in financial disclosures accompanying bond
issues. See, e.g., Certificates of Participation (City of Atlanta Public Safety Projects), Series 2018,
GA. MUN. ASS’N 23 (2018), https://emma.msrb.org/ES1106319-ES864753-ES1265869.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VV6-8VHJ] (noting a reduction in general fund revenue from fines and
forfeitures due to reduced pretrial intervention revenues); Revenue Warrants (Walker County Jail
Project), Series 1996, WALKER CNTY. PUB. BLDG. AUTH. 10 (1996), https://emma.msrb.org/
MS127292-MS102600-MD198425.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ66-RSLL] (explaining that debt
obligations are expected to be paid with general fund revenue from new criminal-case and bailprocessing fees). Court fines and fees may also be used by one jurisdiction to pay another to house
its detainees. See, e.g., Trace Christenson, Calhoun County Sues Battle Creek over Jail Bed
Payments, BATTLE CREEK ENQUIRER (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.battlecreekenquirer.com/
story/news/2019/11/27/calhoun-county-sues-battle-creek-over-jail-bed-payments/4319015002
[https://perma.cc/PX4J-TV62] (county receives one-third of municipal court fines and costs in
exchange for housing detainees).
114. Although county officials choose to impose and pledge revenues from these fines and fees,
their power is not unconstrained; in certain states, counties and cities are statutorily authorized
to impose additional court fines and fees only if they are spent on jail. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-17-129 (2021). For a compelling argument that criminal legal fines and fees do not operate
like ordinary “user fees” (such as for toll bridges), see Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Nonmarket Criminal
Justice Fees, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 517 (2021).
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service the bonds not with the county’s general revenues, but with
revenues from court fines and costs. 115 In its bond disclosure documents,
the county promised not to reduce the fines and court costs imposed in
criminal cases—including in juvenile court—unless mandated by state
statute.116 To reassure prospective investors that adequate funds would
be available to avoid default, it reported that the criminal court fine
revenue it received had steadily increased—doubled, in fact—in the
preceding five years.117
In 2000, three rural Alabama counties—Cleburne, Conecuh, and
Lawrence—built new jails and likewise promised to pay for them in
large part with court fees they had recently imposed. 118 For example:
the previous year, the governing body of Cleburne County had adopted
an additional fee of thirty dollars in every case (civil and criminal,
including traffic cases but excluding small claims) in county and
municipal court, to be used to plan, build, and finance a county jail.119
It covenanted that it would continue to “impose, assess and collect”
court fees “to the maximum extent permitted by law.”120
Similarly, in Kentucky, bonds were issued to help finance the
construction of forty new county jails across the state.121 The bonds were
serviced primarily with pledged receipts from court costs. A ten-dollar
fee, assessment of which was “not subject to the discretion of the court,”
was collected from each defendant who pleaded or was found guilty; the
proceeds were used to pay the debt.122 Since a reduction in receipts
would impair the obligation of repayment, the issuing authority
covenanted to oppose by “appropriate legal action” any statute or
115. Capital Improvement Revenue Bonds (Juvenile Detention Center Project), Series 1999,
WASH. CNTY., ARK. 4, 10 (1999), https://emma.msrb.org/MS158876-MS134184-MD260341.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7TFQ-GAPY]. Of the top five bases for detention at the facility in 2018, four were
misdemeanors or technical violations; the other was theft by receiving. Not a single violent felony
made the top-ten list. WASH. CNTY. JUV. JUST. CTR., ANNUAL REPORT (2018),
https://www.co.washington.ar.us/home/showdocument?id=19515 [https://perma.cc/BY52-NA8F].
116. WASH. CNTY., ARK., supra note 115, at 10.
117. Id. at 18–19.
118. Revenue Warrants (County Jail Project), Series 2000, CLEBURNE CNTY. PUB. BLDG. AUTH.
8, 13, A-9 (2000), https://emma.msrb.org/MS168666-MS143974-MD279609.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GC7R-4Y3F]; Revenue Warrants (Conecuh County Jail Project), Series 2000, CONECUH CNTY. PUB.
BLDG. AUTH. 12 (2000), https://emma.msrb.org/MS168315-MS143623-MD278909.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J9QR-8KJQ]; Revenue Warrants (County Jail Project), Series 1997, LAWRENCE CNTY.
PUB. BLDG. AUTH. 7, A-8 (1997), https://emma.msrb.org/MS133511-MS108819-MD210582.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8XRB-JHT5].
119. CLEBURNE CNTY. PUB. BLDG. AUTH., supra note 118, at 8.
120. Id. at A-9.
121. Multi-County Correctional Facilities Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series 1994, KY. LOC.
CORR. FACILITIES CONSTR. AUTH. at iv, 1 (1994), https://emma.msrb.org/MS99577-MS74885MD145089.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8BU-5UDJ].
122. Id. at 6–7 (noting annual revenues of about $4 million stemming from 400,000
adjudications of guilt).
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regulation that would reduce the court revenues available to service the
bond debt, and, if necessary, to request that the legislature increase the
costs assessed.123 Because the bond issue was not set to mature—to be
paid off—for twenty years, this financing decision effectively cemented
the use of economic sanctions for the foreseeable future.124
State and Federal Funding. Finally, sheriffs and commissioners
hoping to build a jail sometimes look outside the ordinary avenue of
municipal debt entirely, obtaining financing instead from the state
legislature or the federal government. At a basic level, this funding
weakens local political control over jail expansion decisions by offering
an alternative way to fund carceral growth that the electorate
disapproves of, and it undercuts budgetary arguments for reducing
population rather than increasing bedspace.125
State funding is particularly significant in California, where
billions of dollars have been made available to counties through the
process of “realignment”—the transfer of prisoners to local jails to ease
overcrowding
in
the
prison
system.126
As
a
result,
“malcontent . . . sheriffs” have traveled to the capitol to “express their
frustration [to the state corrections board] at being passed over for the

123. Id. at 6–7, C-19.
124. See id. at 10.
125. Cf. Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
870, 940–44 (2015) (demonstrating that federal funding for police departments disrupts local
accountability). Although federal grants cover under 1% of total annual criminal legal system
spending by local governments, PFAFF, supra note 22, at 102, they are very significant
for the counties that receive major infusions of funding for jail construction, unlike for a larger
prison system.
126. See John F. Pfaff, Why the Policy Failures of Mass Incarceration Are Really Political
Failures, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2673, 2683–84 (2020) (discussing jail-building subsidies that
accompanied realignment). In advocating for shifts from prison- to jail-based incarceration, Frank
Zimring has recently suggested that because some realignment funding was given unconditionally,
it did not create any “incentive to the counties to expand institutional capacity or, for that matter,
to expand the number of persons locked up in existing facilities.” FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE
INSIDIOUS MOMENTUM OF AMERICAN MASS INCARCERATION 117–18 (2020). But in fact, counties
across California have invested heavily in jail construction in response to and using funds provided
through realignment. See Anat Rubin, California’s Jail-Building Boom, MARSHALL PROJECT (July
2, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/02/california-s-jail-building-boom [https://
perma.cc/79ME-NMNY] (“Twenty-eight counties are leveraging $1.7 billion in state grants to build
and expand 35 jails, [which] will initially add about 12,000 jail beds in the state [and] are designed
to accommodate future expansions . . . .”).
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[jail-building] grants and to make a final appeal.”127 State financing,
however, plays a major role in other states as well.128
The federal government, too, has financed the construction of
jails. Although such facilities often dedicate bedspace to be used for
federal detainees, the funds—which can come from unexpected sources
like the Department of Agriculture and federal mine lease districts—
are often designed to promote local economic development. 129 One press
release called the doubling of a jail’s size an “investment[ ]” in the “rural
way of life that stands as the backbone of our American values.”130

127. Rina Palta, State Awards $500M in Jail Construction Funds: Sheriffs Want More
Resources, Protesters Want Fewer Jails, KPCC (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.scpr.org/news/2014/
01/16/41642/state-awards-500-million-in-jail-construction-fund
[https://perma.cc/2LM3-9AMD]
(discussing a category of realignment-era grants exclusively for jail construction). Sometimes
counties “give back” jail-construction grants because the operating costs would be too high (“(It’s
like) you win a car, but now you can’t afford the gas and insurance.”), but they must be careful:
“counties can get ‘strikes’ that will count against them for winning future jail grants.” Alayna
Shulman, Shasta County $20 Million Jail Grant: Where It Went, Where It Didn’t, REC.
SEARCHLIGHT,
https://www.redding.com/story/news/local/2017/08/04/heres-what-happened-20million-jail-grant-shasta-county-gave-up/538386001 (last updated Aug. 4, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
F4PG-X9L8]. On the historical roots of the “long struggle[ ] over which level of government should
be responsible for incarceration,” see W. David Ball, “A False Idea of Economy”: Costs, Counties,
and the Origins of the California Correctional System, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 26,
28–29 (2016) (explaining that California’s first penal code deemed the county jails the state prison).
On the history of state funding for California’s county jails, see Jacob Kang-Brown & Jack Norton,
Funding Jail Expansion in California’s Central Valley, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://www.vera.org/in-our-backyards-stories/funding-jail-expansion-in-californias-centralvalley [https://perma.cc/4YHX-VAP7].
128. As of 2009, seven states provided state funding for the construction or renovation of local
and regional jails, while twenty-eight provided state funding for jail operations. Dep’t of Crim.
Just. Servs., Virginia’s Peculiar System of Local and Regional Jails, COMMONWEALTH OF VA. 6
(2010), https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/research/virginiaspeculiar-system-local-and-regional-jails.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHQ8-KJB2]; see also Ben R.
Williams, Henry County Will Borrow Money to Fund Jail Construction, MARTINSVILLE BULL. (June
28, 2018), https://www.martinsvillebulletin.com/news/henry-county-will-borrow-money-to-fundjail-construction/article_79be5250-7a8e-11e8-b139-4ba496eab9ba.html
[https://perma.cc/8ZZS7RLW]; Larry Limpf, County to Ask for State Help with Jail Expansion, PRESS (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://presspublications.com/content/county-ask-state-help-jail-expansion
[https://perma.cc/
CR7K-EPTL] (Ohio commissioners and sheriffs asked legislature for continued state-county jailbuilding “partnership”).
129. See Off. of the Inspector Gen., Audit Div., The United States Marshals Service’s
Cooperative Agreement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1 (2005), https://oig.justice.gov/
reports/USMS/a0528/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8QA-CA3E] (outlining use of direct capital
investment in jails in exchange for guaranteed bedspace); Brian Sonenstein, Since 1996, US
Agriculture Department Gave over $277 Million to Fund Local Jail Construction, SHADOWPROOF
(June 6, 2018), https://shadowproof.com/2018/06/06/277-million-usda-jail-construction-boom
[https://perma.cc/49EB-UR3L] (“USDA-backed jail projects called for building extra bedspace
specifically to generate revenue.”); Grace Reader, Mesa County Awarded $1.5 Million Grant for
Jail Expansion, KJCT8 (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.kjct8.com/content/news/Mesa-Countyawarded-15-million-grant-for-jail-expansion-508471101.html [https://perma.cc/6LS4-A7Y5].
130. Press Release, Michelle Jacobs, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Celebrates Completion of
Putnam County Jail Expansion (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.rd.usda.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/usda-celebrates-completion-putnam-county-jail-expansion [https://perma.cc/V77U-847Q].

2021]

CARCERAL POLICYMAKING

893

Another federally funded jail construction project, one of the local
sheriff’s “top priorities,” was celebrated as a “most welcome government
gesture for our taxpayers.”131
C. Contracting
Bedspace contracting—with cities, other counties, the state,132
and the federal government—also plays an important role in decisions
by sheriffs and county commissioners about how much carceral capacity
to make available. As discussed above, interjurisdictional bedspace
sharing has increased significantly over time.133 Though there is also
an interstate “trade” in convicted prisoners between departments of
corrections, its scale pales in comparison to the jail bedspace market:
while roughly one-fifth of jail detainees are held for another
jurisdiction, only about one-hundredth of state prisoners are held out of
state.134 The contracts that govern jails’ cooperative detention
arrangements are sought, negotiated, and signed by commissioners and
sheriffs.135 These intergovernmental arrangements not only fill beds
but also support and even drive jail construction.136 Contract revenue

131. Press Release, U.S. Congressman Henry Cuellar, New Jim Hogg County Jail Receives
over $5 Million in Federal Funds from the USDA (Feb. 8, 2010), https://cuellar.house.gov/
news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=169762 [https://perma.cc/KVN2-UYB7].
132. For a fifty-state survey of the legal and fiscal arrangements by which state prisoners are
housed in county jails, see Brian Albert, State Prisoners in County Jails, NAT’L ASS’N OF CNTYS.
6–15 (Feb. 2010), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/State%20Prisoners%20in%
20County%20Jails%20Updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PK5-FZMV].
133. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (between 1978 and 2013, the percentage of
jails holding detainees for other jurisdictions almost doubled, and the percentage of jail detainees
being held for other jurisdictions increased by one and a half times).
134. See Emma Kaufman, The Prisoner Trade, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1819–20, 1879–82
(2020) (explaining that the prisoner trade is primarily concentrated in a few jurisdictions). The
sheer multiplicity of competitive participants in the jail bedspace market probably helps to explain
its more significant growth.
135. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Agreement Between Hall County, Georgia and City of Flowery
Branch Regarding Housing of City Inmates at the Hall County Jail, ST. OF GA., CNTY. OF HALL
(Mar. 28, 2019), https://legistarweb-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/attachment/pdf/
338385/Jail_Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ68-ULEF] (providing for signatures by the
chairman of the board of commissioners and the sheriff, among others).
136. Jacob Kang-Brown & Jack Norton, America’s Hidden Gulag, N.Y. REV. (Feb. 19, 2021),
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2021/02/19/americas-hidden-gulag [https://perma.cc/TG4C-M5G7]
(“[The] relationship between federal agencies and county jails has encouraged jail expansion,
and . . . rewarded anti-immigrant policy among sheriffs and county administrators.”).
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can also help to prevent jails from closing when sentencing137 and bail138
policy reforms have sapped local demand.139 At the same time
contracting spurs jail growth based on economic rather than public
safety needs, it obscures it; because per diem checks and detainee
transport vans are crossing jurisdictional lines, contracting delocalizes
and therefore undermines accountability.
Counties regularly overbuild their new jails, with the
expectation that the detention facilities will “pay for themselves,” in
whole or in part, through revenue received for holding detainees for
other jurisdictions.140 The relative scale of this growth can be
enormous.141 Asotin County, Washington, has a jail built to house
sixteen people; it currently houses three times that many. Based in part
on the promise of rent from neighboring counties, the county plans to

137. See Bryn Stole, In North Louisiana, Sheriff and Private Prison Operator Trade Prisoners
for ICE Detainees, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.nola.com/news/article_9927b374f388-11e9-8eca-43ec3c782d9f.htm [https://perma.cc/SFQ2-RGTH] (“Louisiana’s Department of
Corrections, which has long paid sheriffs to house state prisoners, is holding a dwindling number
of inmates” and the resulting “availability of cheap jail beds in rural lockups” has led to a boom in
immigration detention).
138. See Joleen Ferris, Bail Reform Guts Local Jail Populations as Herkimer County Seeks
Revenue Options, WKTV (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.wktv.com/content/news/Bail-reform-gutslocal-jail-populations-Herkimer-County-seeks-revenue-options—566665181.html
[https://perma.cc/7TZN-SSV3] (following bail reform, “everybody’s gonna be fighting for that same
[federal] inmate,” meaning that the revenue generated will likely fall).
139. A new contract can also replace revenue lost when an existing one is terminated. See, e.g.,
Michaelangelo Conte, Deal to Bring Mercer Inmates to Hudson County Jail Could Spell End of
ICE Contract, Freeholder Says, NJ.COM (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nj.com/hudson/2019/09/dealto-bring-mercer-inmates-to-hudson-county-jail-could-spell-end-of-ice-contract-freeholdersays.html [https://perma.cc/WC46-LW3Z] (officials saw housing neighboring county’s detainees as
“exit strategy” from “lucrative, but controversial” ICE contract to help jail “remain . . . viable”
despite bail reform); see also Kevin Shea, Plan to Jail Mercer Inmates in Hudson County Back on
the Front Burner, with Touted Savings of $12M a Year, NJ.COM (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.nj.com/mercer/2019/09/plan-to-jail-mercer-inmates-in-hudson-county-back-on-thefront-burner-with-touted-savings-of-12m-a-year.html [https://perma.cc/B4DC-9MNF] (noting
resistance from the correctional officers’ union).
140. See Taxable Jail Addition Revenue Bonds, Series 2010, MERCER CNTY. PUB. BLDG COMM’N
8 (2010), https://emma.msrb.org/EP447090-EP349883-EP746744.pdf [https://perma.cc/R23SYBWH] (county built “substantially more” beds than currently required and informed investors it
would seek an increased per diem rate for federal detainees, which county officials believe would
make the addition self-supporting).
141. See Tom Spigolon, Sheriff Says Voters Approved Jail Paulding Needed ‘to Continue to
Grow,’ MARIETTA DAILY J. (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.mdjonline.com/neighbor_newspapers/
west_georgia/sheriff-says-voters-approved-jail-paulding-needed-to-continue-to/article_e3549568a82f-11e6-a0ba-cfda679ca51f.html [https://perma.cc/28JS-MPKB] (explaining that the sheriff
promised voters that tripling the jail’s size would “keep them safe for years to come,” and noting
that the existing jail initially produced rental revenue until a “rapidly growing inmate population”
left it routinely overcrowded).
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spend $13.7 million in sales tax revenue to build a new jail with capacity
for 150 (readily expandable to 256).142
Sometimes county officials anticipate that the excess bedspace
will provide “room to grow” for the county to house its own detainees
down the road.143 Others justify their decision in purely fiscal terms:
they hope that detention will create a surplus.144 In Greene County,
North Carolina, for example, a new jail opened in January 2010, more
than quadrupling the county’s bedspace. As its website proudly reports,
this allows the county to rent beds to the State Misdemeanor
Confinement Program as well as to neighboring counties; as a result,
the jail “generate[s] a revenue.”145 In Utah, the state rents county jail
beds to house prison “overflow”: “Originally, this was a small-scale
operation using temporarily unoccupied beds in the counties. In recent
years, counties have built many more beds than they will need in the
foreseeable future so they rent them to the State . . . .”146
An investigation into conditions at the Cuyahoga County, Ohio,
jail in 2018 found that despite the deaths of seven detainees in four
months, “the chief conversation by county officials about the jail was
about how much revenue could result from a game-changing
consolidation” of city jails into the county system.147 A county
administrator advised other officials that the resulting revenue might
be sufficient, if enough beds could be filled, to “shore up the county
142. Marty Trillhaase, Editorial, Waiting for the Perfect Jail Plan Is No Plan at All, LEWISTON
TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2019), https://lmtribune.com/opinion/waiting-for-the-perfect-jail-plan-is-no-planat/article_4d397775-87ca-5faa-8506-0c56f10c4206.html [https://perma.cc/6Z4G-LCTR].
143. See, e.g., Nathan Brown, New Jerome Jail Has Room to Grow, MAGICVALLEY.COM (July
9, 2016), https://magicvalley.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/new-jerome-jail-has-room-to-grow/
article_a0bb50c1-a8f8-55f4-91aa-9383d8bc6cd6.html [https://perma.cc/T5WX-2ZWU].
144. See, e.g., Jack Norton, Why Are There So Many People in Jail in Scranton, PA?, VERA
INST. OF JUST. (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.vera.org/in-our-backyards-stories/why-are-there-somany-people-in-jail-in-scranton-pa [https://perma.cc/DJK9-7B3E] (explaining that the jail
renovation was done to “take advantage of potential influxes of state and federal prisoners” called
“paying customers”); Christina Goldbaum, $200 Million, Jailed Immigrants and a Democratic
Bastion Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/nyregion/
essex-county-jail-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/BX4L-ARBS] (reporting that a county
executive justified the decision to rent jail beds to ICE, saying, “[g]overnment cannot fund itself
entirely on property taxes”).
145. Jail, GREENE CNTY., https://greenecountync.gov/departments/sheriffs-office/jail (last
visited Mar. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/4M3V-WPZE].
146. UTAH DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 112, at 3. For a similar phenomenon in Kentucky, see
Jack Norton & Judah Schept, Keeping the Lights On, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.vera.org/in-our-backyards-stories/keeping-the-lights-on
[https://perma.cc/VD6EJBAA].
147. Courtney Astolfi & Adam Ferrise, What’s the Story Behind How the Cuyahoga County
Jail Became One of the Worst in the Nation? A Drive for Money, a Cleveland.com Investigation
Finds, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2018/11/whats-thestory-behind-how-the-cuyahoga-county-jail-became-one-of-the-worst-in-the-nation-a-drive-formoney-a-clevelandcom-investigation-finds.html [https://perma.cc/V4SG-4328].
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budget,” leaving tax revenue allocated to jail operations available for
other purposes.148 A jail administrator presented the county council
with a forecast, telling it that “[a]s long as we keep the beds filled up, I
think it’s a very safe projection.”149
Contracting incentives can induce a perpetual cycle of jail
growth. Initially, contracting out a small number of detainees to deal
with marginal or occasional overcrowding makes reasonable financial
sense, especially given that jail expansion is difficult to do
incrementally. Eventually, as jail populations grow, long-term boarding
of a large number of detainees becomes expensive and creates pressure
to expand the local jail to bring them back in house.150 When the
expansion eventually occurs, there is a financial incentive to overbuild
and contract out that additional space in order to reap the short-term
revenue available from other jurisdictions and have bedspace available
for purportedly inevitable growth.151
148. Id.
149. Id. It is no coincidence that county officials other than the sheriff are featured most
prominently in this story; Cuyahoga County is a rare jurisdiction with an appointed sheriff.
150. See Nathan W. Bowe, No Tax Hikes Needed for New County Jail, DL-ONLINE (Oct. 23,
2018), https://www.dl-online.com/news/4517907-no-tax-hikes-needed-new-county-jail [https://
perma.cc/DTT2-YFCT] (reporting that bond for constructing new jail will be serviced largely with
“$600,000 yearly savings from not boarding inmates in outside jails”); Linda Simmons, Jail
Overcrowding: Greene County Leaders Ask for Assistance from Another County, KY3 (Nov. 14,
2019), https://www.ky3.com/content/news/JAIL-OVERCROWDING-Greene-County-leaders-askfor-assistance-from-another-county-564925882.html
[https://perma.cc/WTL6-KXF8]
(county
building new jail to relieve “logistics mess” of transporting detainees “all around Missouri”).
Contracting expenses can rise precipitously when a receiving jurisdiction decides that it can get a
better deal. See Jacob Scholl, Weber County Jail Will No Longer House State Prison Inmates, Will
Continue to Hold Federal Detainees, STANDARD-EXAM’R (June 23, 2019), https://www.standard.net/
police-fire/weber-county-jail-will-no-longer-house-state-prison-inmates/article_38910266-96e95c0d-a8bb-a46b5c7a0b4d.html [https://perma.cc/G79V-EBYV] (county declined to renew contract
with state prison system in favor of federal contract with higher reimbursement rate). Sheriffs also
consider the availability of detainee labor in determining which contracts are most attractive. See
Jacob Dick, Daviess County Jail Questions Federal Inmates Increase, MESSENGER INQUIRER
(Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.kentuckynewera.com/news/ap/article_1200435c-99e3-11e8-b074d71c864ad0e7.html [https://perma.cc/4KX8-C6PH] (reporting that county officials prefer to house
state prisoners because they can be required to “do our laundry and cook the food” and without
them, “it would be hard to function”); see also Stacey Cameron, Sheriff’s Controversial Remarks
About “Good” Inmates Partly Motivated by Money, KSLA NEWS 12 (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.ksla.com/story/36635591/sheriffs-controversial-remarks-about-good-inmates-partlymotivated-by-money [https://perma.cc/7BQ2-5DDD] (explaining that the sheriff views state
prisoners as a “necessary evil to keep the lights on” and appreciates that they can “change the oil
in our cars” for free).
151. 2008 General Obligation Jail Bonds, CNTY. OF SOMERSET, ME. 22 (2008),
https://emma.msrb.org/MS271105-MS267581-MD529375.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9EYC-K9E3]
(noting that jail size was doubled to “accommodate” projected growth while the “business plan”
involved leasing available bedspace to other counties and actively pursuing federal detention
contracts); Isabel Albritton, Lincoln Parish Works to Relieve Inmate Overflow Through Jail
Expansion, MYARKLAMISS.COM, https://www.myarklamiss.com/news/local-news/lincoln-parishworks-to-relieve-inmate-overflow-through-jail-expansion (last updated Nov. 1, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/A9AA-7GVH] (explaining that the sheriff was pursuing expansion funded by contracting
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Vanderburgh County, Indiana, is a good example. After the state
shifted prisoners serving sentences for low-level felonies from state
prisons to county jails in 2014, the jail’s long-standing “population
crunch” worsened.152 Meanwhile, the county sent its detainees to be
housed at other counties’ jails; unless it expanded its own, the sheriff
warned, costs would “balloon.”153 At a hearing to discuss how to fund a
jail expansion, county officials heard testimony from a federal district
judge, who was invited to explain—in a striking display of carceral
boosterism—that a federal detention contract could bring much-needed
revenue. He sold his proposal enthusiastically, pointing out that a
neighboring county “has got a heck of a deal going” and that “we could
fill 50 beds here tomorrow and possibly more than that,” given the
growing number of federal pretrial detainees.154 The County Council
president found this presentation “encouraging[,] because it tells us we
could generate some positive cash flow.”155
The sheriff of Bulloch County, Georgia, made the connection
between detention contract revenue and persistent jail growth even
more transparent when he advanced the following proposal:
Since the last addition to the jail, the Sheriff’s Office has raised over $7.5 million in
revenue by holding federal prisoners . . . . In the future . . . I would suggest building at
least one high-security housing unit with 100 beds dedicated to holding federal prisoners.
This would pay for itself as well as an additional pod. I would also suggest that in the
future, any monies received from the U.S. Marshals for housing prisoners be earmarked
and placed in a separate fund specifically for future jail expansion.156

revenue so that the cost of “overflow” detainees would no longer require a “big dip” into the jail’s
budget); Debbie Rogers, Sheriff Asks for $9 Million Jail Expansion to Handle Female Population,
SENTINEL-TRIB. (June 4, 2019), https://www.sent-trib.com/news/sheriff-asks-for-million-jailexpansion-to-handle-female-population/article_cae7ffde-86f7-11e9-8109-3310acfa06de.html
[https://perma.cc/LXM8-RB8X] (reporting that the sheriff argued the expansion “could pay for
itself over a few years,” given expected rental revenue); Howard Greninger, Jail Size, Cost Remain
Issues as Vote Looms, TRIB.-STAR (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.tribstar.com/news/local_news/jailsize-cost-remain-issues-as-vote-looms/article_abe35839-1f5c-55c1-a49f-dcb0e7ca94a7.html
[https://perma.cc/FL2M-ZBBE] (noting that the sheriff argued that “vision” and “foresight”
required planning a jail expansion “much beyond our immediate need,” and suggested that if the
jail “initially” had excess space, it should house federal prisoners).
152. John T. Martin, Meeting Vanderburgh Jail Long-Term Needs Will Take 750 Beds,
Consultant Says, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS (May 14, 2019), https://www.courierpress.com/
story/news/2019/05/14/consultant-vanderburgh-jails-long-term-need-750-more-beds/3671518002
[https://perma.cc/U6E8-ASYR]. The county has also been losing money on some of its beds.
153. Id.
154. John T. Martin, Richard Young: Federal Inmates Could Help Fund Vanderburgh Jail
Expansion, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS (May 30, 2019), https://www.courierpress.com/story/
news/local/2019/05/30/federal-inmate-reimbursements-could-help-fund-vanderburgh-jailexpansion-says-richard-young/1284724001 [https://perma.cc/QL5R-K9ZA].
155. Id.
156. Holli Deal Saxon, Sheriff: Jail Overcrowding Is Urgent, STATESBORO HERALD,
https://www.statesboroherald.com/local/sheriff-jail-overcrowding-urgent (last updated Sept. 23,
2019) [https://perma.cc/B5TN-FQ3C].
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Frequently, however, the two primary benefits of jail expansion
identified by officials who build bedspace to contract out—revenue and
room to grow—do not materialize. In some cases, the demand for beds
or the resulting revenue is lower than expected; sometimes, the
shortfalls are so significant that jails are forced to close. 157 As one
Washington jail official put it, there can be considerable competition for
the commodity of people to detain: “There is a lot of pressure on the
market because jurisdictions are struggling,” he said, observing that
“[t]here are fewer inmates out there and more jurisdictions selling.”158
More commonly, expanded jails offer no “breathing room”
because they are actually “full the day they open[ ].”159 In the 216 county
jails constructed between 1999 and 2005, “a time of declining crime
rates,” researchers found that the median jail population rose
significantly after construction was completed.160 This is due in part to
157. See, e.g., Alissa Zhu & Jimmie E. Gates, Issaquena County Regional Jail to Close Due to
‘Financial Trouble.’ Sheriff Wants to Keep It Open., MISS. CLARION LEDGER (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2019/12/02/issaquena-county-mississippi-jail-closedue-financial-trouble-sheriff-wants-keep-open/2590894001
[https://perma.cc/DL4S-KNMD];
Amanda Albright & Jordyn Holman, A Kentucky County Is an Economic Prisoner of Its Own Jail,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-08/kentuckycounty-flirts-with-bankruptcy-as-jail-holds-it-prisoner [https://perma.cc/KR2Z-V3CJ]. Closed jail
facilities are expensive to repurpose, and even to demolish. See, e.g., Kris Maher, To Help Revive
Downtown, Detroit Looks Beyond a Failed Jail, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/to-help-revive-downtown-detroit-looks-beyond-a-failed-jail-11572427802 [https://perma.
cc/9V6M-DLKK]; Rebecca Ellis, Despite HUD Visit, Wapato Jail’s Future Still Unclear, OR. PUB.
BROAD. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.opb.org/news/article/wapato-jail-homeless-hud-futureuncertain [https://perma.cc/WL5Q-LKRV]. At times, state officials simply fail to pay for bedspace
they use in county jails; this appears to be a problem in Missouri. See NICOLE GALLOWAY, MO.
STATE AUDITOR, REPORT NO. 2020-130: DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS COUNTY REIMBURSEMENT
PROGRAM 14–15 (2020), https://app.auditor.mo.gov/AuditReports/ViewReport.aspx?report=
2020130 [https://perma.cc/KQ45-LZ7T] (showing that the Department of Corrections lacks
appropriated funds sufficient to reimburse county jails for detaining state prisoners); Blake
Sammann, Missouri Jail Debt Could Force Sheriff Deputy Layoffs, WGEM (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://wgem.com/2019/11/22/missouri-jail-debt-could-force-sheriff-deputy-layoffs [https://perma.
cc/Q8BV-PUJG] (reporting that sheriff’s offices might “have no choice but to layoff deputies if
the state doesn’t reimburse them for hundreds of thousands of dollars” owed for housing
state prisoners).
158. David Lester, ‘Contract Inmates’ Leaving Yakima County Jail, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 9,
2011),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/contract-inmates-leaving-yakima-county-jail
[https://perma.cc/C4AS-3SE9]. Additionally, opportunities in the bedspace market can be
compromised by legal reforms that prohibit interjurisdictional transfers and limit the number of
“legally available inmates.” Taxable Project Revenue Bonds (Juvenile Detention Facility Project),
Series 2012, GARZA CNTY. PUB. FACILITY CORP. 4 (2012), https://emma.msrb.org/EP834700EP645988-EP1047603.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DKT-PFK4].
159. Michael Lang, Is a New Jail on the Horizon for County?, VIDETTE (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://www.thevidette.com/news/is-a-new-jail-on-the-horizon-for-county [https://perma.cc/JE3NV65P]. The way a 1999 Denver Post article expressed this is illustrative in its logical incoherence:
“The 1990s trend of jails filling up much quicker than projected is expected to continue into the
next decade . . . .” Cindy Brovsky, Counties Race to Build More Jails, DENVER POST (Mar. 21,
1999), https://extras.denverpost.com/news/jail0321.htm [https://perma.cc/NL9R-HJM4].
160. MAI, ET AL., supra note 19, at 27.
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financial pressure; as one official put it, beds built to allow for future
demographic growth are immediately filled because “they get paid for
heads on beds.”161 Moreover, bedspace creates a vacuum for officials to
fill. As will be discussed in Part III, constraints on jail bedspace can
induce (or even empower) sheriffs and other decisionmakers in the
criminal legal system to make more arrests and release fewer people.162
The availability of contract revenue is used to sell jail
construction projects not only to other county officials and to voters but
also to purchasers of municipal bonds, to whom revenue is often
promised in repayment.163 A report by the Utah Department of
Corrections on its detention “partnership” with counties contends that
contracts to house state prisoners provide a necessary “infusion of
funding” to pay off construction bonds.164 Even when detention contract
revenues are not directly pledged to debt service, they are often put to
that purpose.165 In some cases, in fact, revenue from a past jail
construction project is used to repay the debt incurred in building the
next one.166 Jail construction motivated by market opportunity rather
than the demands of local public safety is self-propagating.

161. Editorial Board, Editorial, On Jail, Stick to the Facts, ASHLAND TIDINGS (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://ashlandtidings.com/opinion/editorial/on-jail-stick-to-the-facts
[https://perma.cc/HSJ5LCKZ].
162. Decisionmakers in the immigration enforcement system are likewise constrained by the
(un)availability of detention bedspace. See PATRISIA MACÍAS-ROJAS, FROM DEPORTATION TO
PRISON: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA
40–76 (2016).
163. See, e.g., Winslow, supra note 68 (noting that revenue from housing detainees would help
repay the bond debt); City Justice Center Leasehold Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series 2009, ST.
LOUIS MUN. FIN. CORP. 8–9 (2009), https://emma.msrb.org/EP316478-EP26108-EP648121.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4J7C-WYNL] (discussing repayment in part via revenues derived from boarding
state prisoners).
164. UTAH DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 112, at 3.
165. See, e.g., Certificates of Participation (1997 Central Jail Refunding), CNTY. OF SAN DIEGO
4 (1997), https://emma.msrb.org/MS133027-MS108335-MD209618.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q74DKDYT]; Bianca Reyes, Clinton County Jail to Start Housing Some Inmates from Scott County,
WQAD,
https://wqad.com/2019/12/03/clinton-county-jail-to-start-housing-some-inmates-fromscott-county (last updated Dec. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/89DA-PYFD] (reporting that the sheriff
planned to take revenue from the detention contract and “apply it to the bond referendum [to] save
the county taxpayers” money).
166. For example, Bent County, Colorado, used revenue from a private prison-building project
it undertook with Corrections Corporation of America to pay back investors in its subsequent jail
construction project. Certificates of Participation (Jail Facility and County Project), Series 1998,
BENT CNTY., COLO. 7 (1998), https://emma.msrb.org/MS152592-MS127900-MD247921.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3X3-VN6B]. Cf. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 164 (detailing how, in Corcoran,
California, revenue from an initial prison construction project was used to service a loan to build
a second prison).

900

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4:861

D. If You Build It, They Will Come167
Sheriffs’ and commissioners’ decisions to increase jail capacity
have profound ramifications across the criminal legal system and
invite—indeed, enable—many of the mostly roundly criticized forms
and uses of incarceration.
The availability of jail bedspace allows for overpolicing and
overprosecution of low-level (particularly “public order”) offenses; limits
on bedspace, in turn, can limit these excesses. As one judge in Drew
County, Arkansas, put it, he is “constrained from locking people up for
misdemeanor offenses, such as on failure-to-appear warrants, because
of a lack of space.”168 A growing body of scholarship on misdemeanor
adjudication explains that “process costs” of pretrial detention induce
guilty pleas. The fact that defendants are likely to spend more time in
jail if they contest charges than if they plead guilty tends to “distort
plea bargaining so much that the substantive law behind the bargainedfor conviction becomes irrelevant.”169
Because most cities, especially outside metropolitan centers,
lack their own jails, most municipal courts are totally reliant on county
jails; without their bedspace, the threat of jail would evaporate.170
Constraints can therefore even prompt decriminalization of some
offenses, or at least their recategorization by municipalities as citable
offenses.171 For example, officials in the city of Tuscaloosa, Alabama,
167. Vera researchers first used this apt turn of phrase, from the classic movie Field of
Dreams, to describe dynamics of jail expansion. Jack Norton & Jacob Kang-Brown, If You Build
It: How the Federal Government Fuels Rural Jail Expansion, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.vera.org/in-our-backyards-stories/if-you-build-it
[https://perma.cc/5PSQ-4PTY]
(describing federal incentives for jail building).
168. John Moritz, Arkansas Counties Moving Ahead on Jail Plan, NW. ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETTE (Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.nwaonline.com/news/2019/nov/28/counties-moving-aheadjail-plan [https://perma.cc/69G2-H7C2].
169. Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV.
F. 268, 269–70 (2015); see also Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note 10, at 663, 670
(quoting a public defender who says that for clients going through the plea process, “[t]he main
thing is to get out of jail”); Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 10, at 1347 (“For those with
children, jobs, or other obligations, the deprivations inflicted by a month in jail can be worse
punishment than they would face if they were convicted at trial.”).
170. Cf. Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964, 1037 (2021)
(discussing the role of jail both as penal sentence and as sanction for nonpayment of fines).
171. See Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U.
L. REV. 731, 738–40 (describing how “localities vary tremendously” in categorizing low-level
offenses); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT BY
THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 97, at 73, 75 (“States, counties, and municipalities control
every aspect of the petty-offense system, [including] defining and decriminalizing offenses . . . .”).
There is, however, a pernicious flipside: decriminalization that falls short of legalization
“eliminates the usual externalities that naturally constrain penal expansion” while continuing to
impose significant harms, especially financial ones, on criminal defendants. Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1100–01 (2015).
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pushed to reclassify possession of a small quantity of marijuana as a
citable offense so that “bedspace in the Tuscaloosa County Jail . . . could
be used toward more serious matters.”172 One state senator supported
the idea in light of “our overcrowdedness.” 173 The availability of jail
bedspace greases the wheels of misdemeanor “justice.”174
Empty jail bedspace also makes possible a variety of other
coercive processes beyond misdemeanor pleas. It enables the carceral
sanctioning of technical parole and probation violations, including
failures to satisfy work requirements and pay fines and fees; the threat
of jail makes possible an entire system of surveillance of and resource
and labor extraction from people convicted of crimes.175 Without
available jail beds, indigent parents cannot be compelled through civil
contempt to pay child support that they are unable to afford.176
In jurisdictions where a significant proportion of state prisoners
are held in local jails, the supply of bedspace affects felony sentencing
as well, preventing reconsideration of lengthy sentences even when
admittedly warranted. In Louisiana, with the promise of generous
reimbursement, sheriffs expanded their jails to house prisoners serving
long sentences. As the former general counsel for the state Department
of Corrections put it, “If the sheriffs hadn’t built those extra spaces, we’d
either have to go to the Legislature and say, ‘Give us more money,’ or
we’d have to reduce the sentences, make it easier to get parole and
commutation—and get rid of people who shouldn’t be here.”177
Constraints on county jail availability even alter the behavior of
federal law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges. For example,
172. Jason Morton, Tuscaloosa Seeks Citation, Not Jail, for Minor Marijuana Offenders,
TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.tuscaloosanews.com/news/20171207/tuscaloosaseeks-citation-not-jail-for-minor-marijuana-offenders [https://perma.cc/D38W-WHEG].
173. Id.
174. Alexandra Natapoff, The High Stakes of Low-Level Criminal Justice, 128 YALE L.J. 1648,
1677–78 (2019) (book review) (“[E]ven managerial justice deploys the punitive pains and burdens
of incarceration in a wide variety of ways.”).
175. See, e.g., Karnes County Public Facility Corporation Lease Revenue Bonds, Series 1995,
KARNES CNTY. PUB. FACILITY CORP. app. A at ii, 18, app. C at 9–10 (1995), https://emma.msrb.org/
MS108504-MS83812-MD162925.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGU9-4FLY] (proposed jail expansion
would permit incarceration of tens of thousands of people for parole violations and failure to pay
child support); Noah D. Zatz, Get to Work or Go to Jail: State Violence and the Racialized
Production of Precarious Work, 45 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 304, 317–19 (2020) (discussing community
supervision and labor programs as conditions of incarceration or probation).
176. See KARNES CNTY. PUB. FACILITY CORP., supra note 175, at app. A at ii, 18, app. C at 9–
10; Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent
Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 106 (2008) (“Despite their economic
limitations, indigent child support obligors often end up accumulating thousands of dollars in
arrearages, making them prime candidates for contempt proceedings.”).
177. Cindy Chang, Louisiana Is the World’s Prison Capital, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 13, 2012),
https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/article_8feef59a-1196-5988-9128-1e8e7c9aefda.html
[https://perma.cc/V9NF-UHY4].
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according to a market research report, the lack of “adequate bed
resources” for rent by the Marshals Service in jails in the Southern
District of California contributed to the adoption of a policy requiring
the Marshals Service to obtain permission from the U.S. Attorney’s
Office prior to making an arrest. In practice, this meant that people
charged with federal misdemeanors in the Southern District—
primarily border-crossing offenses—were not incarcerated, unlike in
other districts across the country.178 ICE, too, depends on the
availability of local carceral infrastructure. The agency’s collaboration
with county jails accounts for over a third of its interior (nonborder)
arrests.179 In a number of jurisdictions, sheriffs have justified their
refusal to honor immigration detainers and comply with administrative
warrants in terms of limited jail bedspace.180 Conversely, jail expansion
helps to fuel our nation’s deportation machine.
When sheriffs and commissioners opt to increase jail bedspace,
their decisions not only cost taxpayers a tremendous amount of money;
they also create carceral vacuums for diverse institutional users of
bedspace to fill with people who admittedly “shouldn’t be [t]here.”181 To
fully understand their responsibility for incarceration’s admitted
excesses, it is critical to appreciate that these same sheriffs also have
significant power to manage the use of available bedspace. Part III tells
this chapter of the story.
178. Imperial Regional Detention Facility Project, INDUS. DEV. AUTH. OF THE CNTY. OF LA PAZ,
ARIZ. app. C at 8–9 (2013), https://emma.msrb.org/ER682079-ER528172-ER930781.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KG6T-E4Q5] (noting that existing population levels are “somewhat artificial,”
and that the “priority system for incarceration” is a “reflection of space availability rather than the
numbers of individuals who should be detained”); see also id. at app. C at 11 (“[d]etentions as a
percentage of prosecutions declined from 91% to 48% between 2005 and 2012,” in part due to
“availability of custody beds”). As Ingrid Eagly has explained, the U.S. Attorney in the Southern
District of California under W. Bush opposed mass processing of illegal entry cases and the postarrest detention that would accompany it, and this position persisted under Obama. Ingrid V.
Eagly, The Movement to Decriminalize Border Crossing, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1967, 2004–07, 2005 n.191
(2020). But even once the Trump Administration implemented Operation Streamline, detainees
charged with illegal entry were forced to “sleep[ ] on the crowded floors of Border Patrol stations”
rather than being held in Marshals Service custody to “relieve overcrowding in the federal jail
system.” Max Rivlin-Nadler, California Border District Reverses Course on a Key Component of
Operation Streamline, INTERCEPT (Oct. 5, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/10/05/operationstreamline-san-diego-california-immigration [https://perma.cc/XK38-NSWB].
179. See Immigration and Customs Enforcement Arrests, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE,
SYRACUSE
UNIV.,
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/apprehend
[https://perma.cc/F2W2-XHH8] (providing data through May 2018; “Apprehension Method /
Agency” is “CAP Local Incarceration”).
180. See Christopher N. Lasch, R. Linus Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina Francesca Haynes, Annie
Lai, Elizabeth M. McCormick & Juliet P. Stumpf, Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 50 B.C. L.
REV. 1703, 1755–56 & n.263 (2018); Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal
Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245, 291–94 (2016) (discussing local fiscal constraints on enforcement of
federal immigration policy).
181. Chang, supra note 177.
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III. JAILED BODIES: THE DEMAND SIDE
A wide array of actors together determine how many people are
in jails. One thinks first of police making arrests, prosecutors making
charging decisions, and judges setting bail. But the sheriffs who run
jails also have underappreciated control over the demand for jail
bedspace. They can and do increase or limit the number of people they
confine in several ways, some of which become legally permissible or
politically feasible only when their jails are full; crucially, sheriffs are
themselves largely responsible for setting this threshold in deciding
whether or not to expand their jails. This Part narrows in on sheriffs
not to suggest that they are the sole determinants of jail population
levels—they certainly are not—but because their combination of powers
is unique. A sheriff’s decision to build bedspace must be viewed in
context, as a choice: he could have done something else.182
First, sheriffs are the police responsible for a substantial
percentage of arrests, especially in rural areas. As a result, they have
discretion to arrest more or fewer people by (de)prioritizing certain
types of enforcement or by issuing or declining to issue citations or
summonses in lieu of arrest. Second, they have limited but significant
authority as jailers to release people from or retain them in custody.
Though the scope of their power varies by state, they can effectively
override the decisions of other actors in the local criminal legal system,
including the decision of a municipal police officer to make a custodial
arrest, the decision of a prosecutor to request and a judge to impose bail,
and the decision of a court to order a particular sentence following
conviction.183 Third, they can decide what political use to make of
182. The baseline claim advanced here is a simple one: on the highway of local incarceration,
sheriffs control not only the number of lanes, but also some major on- and off-ramps. As a result,
however, they also have considerable discretion over which people get entangled, and to what
degree, in the criminal legal system’s dragnet. More empirical research on these fronts is sorely
needed. For some evidence of the effects of race on policing by sheriffs, see infra notes 368–370 and
accompanying text. There are important reasons, especially of racial and economic justice, to prefer
that the potential targets of criminal prosecution exit the carceral process earlier rather than later;
that is to say, if a person ought not be jailed for public urination, far better that he not be arrested
at all than that he be released from jail with an ankle monitor. See generally MAYA SCHENWAR &
VICTORIA LAW, PRISON BY ANY OTHER NAME: THE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF POPULAR REFORMS
(2020) (arguing that “alternatives” to prison, including ostensibly progressive ones, replicate
carceral control and continue to impose grossly disproportionate burdens on people of color and
poor communities).
183. On some occasions, sheriffs even override the decisions of other actors to release or retain
detainees despite lacking the legal authority to do so. See, e.g., Williams v. Dart, 967 F.3d 625, 630
(7th Cir. 2020) (plaintiffs alleged that sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, disagreed with revisions to
pretrial release policy and so detained individuals despite payment of bail; although he gave lip
service to judicial authority in describing his “administrative review,” involving “refer[ral] . . . back
to the court for further evaluation,” actual practice was to do “nothing, for days and even weeks”);
Connor Sheets, These Sheriffs Release Sick Inmates to Avoid Paying Their Hospital Bills,
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bedspace scarcity: push for expansion or outsourcing, or rely on it to
induce police chiefs, district attorneys, judges, and others to exercise
their respective authority to reduce the number of people incarcerated.
A. Arrest Powers: Sheriffs as Law Enforcement Chiefs
In most of the country,184 sheriffs are the only law enforcement
officials who simultaneously supervise large-scale policing and
detention operations.185 Although city dwellers may not realize it,
sheriffs’ deputies are responsible for a significant proportion of the lowlevel arrests made across the country. For example, in 2016, sheriffs’
offices made about one-fifth of the roughly 470,000 reported nationwide
arrests for possession of marijuana.186 (Local police departments made
about two-thirds, state law enforcement agencies made about onetenth, and a variety of other law enforcement agencies made the
remainder.) In less urbanized parts of the United States—and
especially in truly rural areas beyond the jurisdictions of municipal

PROPUBLICA (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/these-sheriffs-release-sickinmates-to-avoid-paying-their-hospital-bills [https://perma.cc/H64A-STN2] (reporting that
sheriffs released pretrial detainees without judicial approval to avoid liability for the expense of
hospitalizations); THAD SITTON, THE TEXAS SHERIFF: LORD OF THE COUNTY LINE 3 (2006) (“There
was something called a ‘Decker hold.’ Once it was noted beside a prisoner’s name by High Sheriff
Decker, it meant that no bond, no writ—virtually no power on earth—could open that prisoner’s
cell door until the hold was lifted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
184. As reflected in federal arrest data, sheriffs’ offices exist but engage in very limited or no
policing in Delaware and Massachusetts. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING DATA: ARRESTS BY AGE,
SEX, AND RACE, SUMMARIZED YEARLY, UNITED STATES, 2016 (ICPSR 37057) (2018),
https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR37057.v1 [https://perma.cc/3WSD-YJ35] (author’s analysis); see also
Del. Op. Att’y Gen. 12-IIB03 (2012), 2012 WL 1244473 (no statutory or common law authority to
arrest); Commonwealth v. Gernich, 67 N.E. 3d 1196, 1201 (Mass. 2017) (no power to make
warrantless arrest unless offense involves breach of peace in deputy’s presence).
185. Their employees, too, have overlapping roles: especially in rural counties, there is often
“no distinction between ‘road deputies’ and ‘jailers.’ ” Falcone & Wells, supra note 6, at 131; see
also Eric D. Poole & Mark R. Pogrebin, Deputy Sheriffs as Jail Guards: A Study of Correctional
Policy Orientation and Career Phases, 15 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 190, 192 (1988) (jail duty seen as
“dirty work” or a “rite[ ] of passage that must be endured before [deputies’] law enforcement careers
can begin”). Although some large cities have substantial jails, they are not run by police chiefs or
anyone within their chains of command. The only analogous arrangements exist on the federal
level. For a fascinating history of concerns about conflicts of interest between the law enforcement
functions of the Department of Justice and its detention arm (latterly housed within the Bureau
of Prisons), see Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the
Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 278–86 (2013).
186. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING DATA, supra note 184 (author’s analysis). For statespecific figures, see Appendix I. In Georgia, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming, sheriffs’
offices made more than a quarter of these arrests, and in Louisiana and South Carolina, they made
more than a third. Sheriffs’ offices made roughly the same proportions of arrests for drug
possession generally.
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police forces—sheriffs’ offices make an even greater share of the arrests
for low-level crime.187
Sheriffs have the discretionary authority to limit arrests made
by their own deputies.188 First, they can—indeed, must—choose how to
prioritize proactive enforcement efforts.189 Like other law enforcement
officials, they have broad power to arrest even for very minor crimes.190
A given number of deputies assigned to police low-level crime will fill
jail beds much more quickly than will the same number assigned to
investigate serious violent crime because investigations of marijuana
possession are much less time-intensive and higher yield than
investigations of murder.191 This can have powerful ramifications for
the demographic composition of those incarcerated in a sheriff’s jail; a
recent empirical study found that “the targeting of crime types appears
to be a primary mechanism by which sheriffs alter the [racial]
composition of arrests.”192 Although sheriffs may be disinclined to
acknowledge that they are deprioritizing enforcement of drug or publicorder laws, they publicly profess to exercise their arrest discretion in
other contexts. Some promise not to enforce gun laws they feel violate
the Second Amendment; others exercise their wide discretion regarding

187. It is impossible to measure this with precision using FBI Uniform Crime Reporting data.
Sheriffs’ offices and city police departments operate in jurisdictions with narrow geographical
bounds, coded with various indicators of rurality; statewide law enforcement and other agencies
do not. Comparing sheriffs’ offices with local police departments is illustrative, though. Within
metropolitan statistical areas, sheriffs’ offices make about one-fifth as many marijuana possession
arrests as do local police departments. Outside of metropolitan statistical areas, sheriffs’ offices
make over one-half as many. The author’s analysis of Texas data shows that in 2019, sheriffs’
deputies made about four times as many vehicle stops as police officers did on county roads, while
police officers made about nineteen times as many vehicle stops as sheriffs’ deputies did on city
streets. See Racial Profiling Reports: Law Enforcement Agency Requirements, TEX. COMM’N ON L.
ENF’T, https://www.tcole.texas.gov/content/racial-profiling-reports (last visited Mar. 13, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/QQV8-LAQ9].
188. Cf. Falcone & Wells, supra note 6, at 138 (arguing that sheriffs’ offices are more willing
than police departments to acknowledge existence of low-level discretion).
189. See Alec Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal
Justice Reform,” YALE L.J. F. 848, 896–99 (2019) (“Something important happens before a case
gets to a prosecutor: bureaucrats decide where to look for crimes.”).
190. See Alexandra Natapoff, Atwater and the Misdemeanor Carceral State, 133 HARV. L. REV.
F. 147, 153 (2020) (“[Atwater] permit[s] police to fill the nation’s jails for offenses deemed by state
legislators too petty to warrant incarceration.”).
191. See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1819–21 (1998)
(making this point with respect to vice crimes and street crimes more generally); Stephen Rushin,
Competing Case Studies of Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 14 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 113, 132 (2016) (“[A]rrests for serious crimes normally happen after lengthy
investigations, while arrests for minor crimes happen via police officers proactively monitoring the
streets and responding to visible wrongdoing.”).
192. George Bulman, Law Enforcement Leaders and the Racial Composition of Arrests, 57
ECON. INQUIRY 1842, 1855–57 (2019).
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enforcement of domestic violence or immigration laws.193 During the
COVID-19 pandemic, some have refused to enforce mask ordinances.194
In some states, statutes and ordinances ostensibly prohibit law
enforcement officers from refraining to initiate criminal process,
especially when judicial warrants are involved.195 In practice, though,
“full” enforcement is never possible.196 Washington law, for example,
imposes a mandatory duty to “make complaint of all violations” that
come to a sheriff’s attention, 197 and the attorney general has opined that
a sheriff “cannot forego or delay making arrests because it would be
costly or inconvenient for the jail to book and house more people.”198
But state court judges are unable to compel sheriffs whose jails are
full to arrest or book defendants—even those for whom they have
issued warrants.199
Second, sheriffs have the authority to instruct their deputies to
issue citations (alternately called summonses or appearance tickets) in
lieu of warrantless arrest in certain categories of cases.200 In almost all
states, arresting officers can cite and release arrestees for at least some
193. See Kerry Picket, Sheriffs May Go to Jail to Protect Second Amendment
Sanctuaries, Kentucky Congressman Says, WASH. EXAM’R (Jan. 02, 2020), https://
www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/sheriffs-may-go-to-jail-to-protect-second-amendmentsanctuaries-congressman-says [https://perma.cc/CA53-NKWK]; Emily M. Farris & Mirya R.
Holman, Public Officials and a “Private” Matter: Attitudes and Policies in the County Sheriff Office
Regarding Violence Against Women, 96 SOC. SCI. Q. 1117, 1126–28 (2015); Emily M. Farris &
Mirya R. Holman, All Politics Is Local? County Sheriffs and Localized Policies of Immigration
Enforcement, 70 POL. RSCH. Q. 142, 142, 152 (2017). On the “constitutional sheriffs” movement,
whose adherents “believe that the sheriff has the final say on a law’s constitutionality in his
county,” see Ashley Powers, The Renegade Sheriffs, NEW YORKER (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/30/the-renegade-sheriffs [https://perma.cc/3K33S426] (describing the “practice” of “getting ‘unarrested’ ” by the sheriff of Liberty County, Florida).
194. Teo Armus, ‘Don’t Be a Sheep’: Sheriffs Rebel Against New Statewide Mask Requirements,
WASH. POST (June 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/26/sheriffs-maskcovid [https://perma.cc/6BUQ-3YJC].
195. See Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 557–58 & nn.26–27 (1960).
196. Id. at 560–61 (emphasis omitted).
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.28.011 (2021); see also State v. Twitchell, 378 P.2d 444, 447
(Wash. 1963).
198. Wash. Op. Att’y Gen. 2004 No. 4 (2004), 2004 WL 3250948, at *5.
199. See Philip J. Van de Veer, No Bond, No Body, and No Return of Service: The Failure to
Honor Misdemeanor and Gross Misdemeanor Warrants in the State of Washington, 26 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 847, 857–60 (2003) (“[T]he traditional contempt sanction for willful failure to serve
the warrant is not available to the judge when law enforcement’s noncompliance is caused by
jail overcrowding . . . .”).
200. See Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 334 (2016) (arguing that
summonses and citations “offer substantial cost savings for municipalities in officer time,
transportation costs, and detention costs”); id. at 335–36 (history of underuse); see also CHRISTINE
S. SCOTT-HAYWARD & HENRY F. FRADELLA, PUNISHING POVERTY: HOW BAIL AND PRETRIAL
DETENTION FUEL INEQUALITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 153–58 (2019) (reviewing this
authority); Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947, 967–73
(2020) (same).
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misdemeanors.201 In Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, and Oregon, citations can even be
issued in lieu of arrest for some or all felonies.202 Most provisions are
permissive rather than mandatory, vesting officers with tremendous
discretion; even “shall” provisions contain a number of highly subjective
exceptions.203 A sheriff could mandate the use of citations as a matter
of office policy, but this is uncommon; a national survey suggests that
in most departments, line officers retain full discretion.204
Sheriffs can and sometimes do use this authority to manage the
number of people in their jails. 205 When the population of the jail in Clay
County, Florida, neared capacity, the sheriff began “encouraging his
deputies to issue a notice to appear in misdemeanor offenses, like
shoplifting.”206 A number of Texas sheriffs have recently adopted
policies of citing, rather than arresting, people found in possession of
small quantities of marijuana, motivated by the realization that such
arrests “have caused jail overcrowding.”207 These sheriffs were certainly
free—but had declined—to have their deputies cite and release in the
absence of capacity constraints.

201. See Appendix II.
202. See Appendix II.
203. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01(1) (2021) (requiring detention where it “reasonably
appears” that detention will “prevent bodily harm” to another, “further criminal conduct will
occur,” or “a substantial likelihood exists that [the suspect] will not respond to a citation”); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.26(A) (LexisNexis 2021) (enumerating when arrest is mandated, including
when an offender “requires medical care” or “cannot or will not offer satisfactory evidence of his
identity”); but see PA. R. CRIM. P. 519(B) (2021) (requiring arrest where the defendant failed to
comply with sex offender registration requirements or was arrested in a domestic violence case).
Officers are more commonly, though not always, obligated to make a custodial arrest when they
stop someone with an outstanding warrant. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3:4-1(b) (2021); but see LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 211.1 (2020) (permitting citation in lieu of arrest on an outstanding
misdemeanor warrant).
204. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, CITATION IN LIEU OF ARREST: EXAMINING LAW
ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF CITATION ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 12 (2016), https://www.theiacp.or
g/sites/default/files/all/i-j/IACP%20Citation%20Final%20Report%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
P7TZ-9H59].
205. But, it appears, decreasingly so. In 1984, there were fifty-one admissions to jail for every
one hundred arrests; that is to say, roughly half of those arrested were immediately released.
SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 22 & n.78. In 1994, the ratio was seventy to one hundred;
by 2016, it was ninety-nine to one hundred. S. REBECCA NEUSTETER, RAM SUBRAMANIAN,
JENNIFER TRONE, MAWIA KHOGALI & CINDY REED, VERA INST. OF JUST., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE
OF POLICE IN ENDING MASS INCARCERATION 3 (2019), https://www.vera.org/downloads/
publications/gatekeepers-police-and-mass-incarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WYQ-2DEQ].
206. Christy Turner, Clay County Sheriff Addresses Potential Overcrowding in Jail, ACTION
NEWS JAX (July 22, 2019), https://www.actionnewsjax.com/news/local/clay-county-sheriffaddresses-potential-overcrowding-in-jail/969142957 [https://perma.cc/D8HK-GYND].
207. Brittany Ford, WilCo Sheriff’s Office Adopts Cite and Release Policy for Small Amounts
of Marijuana, CBS AUSTIN (May 1, 2019), https://cbsaustin.com/news/local/wilco-sheriffs-officeadopts-cite-and-release-police-for-small-amounts-of-marijuana [https://perma.cc/B7JW-9LCF].
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B. Release Powers: Sheriffs as Jail Administrators
In many states, sheriffs also have the statutory authority to
release (or not) some of those brought to or held in their jails, including
those incarcerated by or on behalf of other arresting agencies. 208 Many
of these provisions give them discretion not only over how many but
also over which detainees to release; they are authorized to determine
who must be incarcerated and who need not be. These powers, which
have not been previously cataloged, vary dramatically in scope.209
1. Jailhouse Cite-and-Release
In over a dozen states, a sheriff can elect to cite and release some
arrestees brought to his jail after being arrested by another agency.210
His control of the jail’s bedspace entitles him to override the decision of
a police officer he does not employ and over whom he otherwise has no
authority. Because this Article is concerned with the respective ambits
and motivations of institutional actors, these sheriff-as-jailer cite-and208. The baseline rule—from which the provisions cataloged here represent important
deviations—is that sheriffs generally cannot choose whether to incarcerate someone. Some state
codes contain a clear mandate. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-4(b) (2021) (duty to not release
prisoner until end of sentence); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-12 (2021) (misdemeanor to “refuse[ ] to
receive and take charge” of person charged with or guilty of indictable offense). Elsewhere, the
absence of express authority to release detainees has been interpreted to preclude sheriffs from
doing so. See, e.g., Wash. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 25 (1982), 1982 WL 172650, at *1 (stating that “the
fact that a given county jail may already by overcrowded . . . would not justify a refusal by the
sheriff or other custodian to accept prisoners duly ordered into his custody” or the decision to
“release other prisoners already under confinement in order to make room for the new ones”).
209. With one notable exception: one thoughtful piece did observe this phenomenon a decade
ago, noting that it is “often appointed administrators in a county sheriff’s department, rather than
judges or elected officials, who determine who gets released early.” Lara Hoffman, Separate But
Unequal—When Overcrowded: Sex Discrimination in Jail Early Release Policies, 15 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 591, 597–98 (2009); id. at 599–603 (discussing the mechanics of—and sex
discrimination in—release decisions in multiple counties). But the appointed administrators
Hoffman described take orders from elected sheriffs.
For technical assistance reports recognizing the existence of book-and-release as distinct
from cite-and-release, see Pretrial Servs. Res. Ctr., A Second Look at Alleviating Jail Crowding: A
Systems Perspective, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 8–11 ex.1 (Oct. 2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182507.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ2E-ERC6]; Debra Whitcomb,
Bonnie P. Lewis & Margaret J. Levine, Citation Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 13–15 (Mar. 1984),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/94200NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6YP-TQUG]; see
also Criminal Justice Section Standards: Pretrial Release, AM. BAR ASS’N 10-2.2 (2007),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal_justice_section_archi
ve/crimjust_standards_pretrialrelease_blk [https://perma.cc/389E-BHYW] (identifying these
two junctures).
210. See Appendix III. Where a sheriff has the statutory authority to release, he might
nonetheless have a contractual obligation to detain those held for other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-5.5(4) (LexisNexis 2021) (clarifying that prisoner-release provision does
not authorize sheriff to “modify provisions of a contract” or “to house in a county jail persons
sentenced to the Department of Corrections”).
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release provisions are critically distinct from the sheriff-as-police
provisions cataloged above. The effects are the same: someone is not
jailed. But the incentives for their exercise are crucially different. While
a police chief has no responsibility, fiscal or managerial, over jail
bedspace, a sheriff does.
In Garland County, Arkansas, for example, the sheriff
responded to persistent overcrowding by exercising his authority to cite
and release misdemeanor arrestees; over less than two months in late
2019, the 365-bed jail released about fifty arrestees on misdemeanor
citations, primarily for charges of public intoxication, disorderly
conduct, driving while intoxicated, and criminal trespassing. 211 He
would have been free to release these people even if his jail had
enough room to hold them, but he did not do so absent the impetus of
limited bedspace.
In most states, this authority is limited to misdemeanor cases;
in a few, it extends to some felonies as well.212 Ordinarily, sheriffs’
power to cite in lieu of booking extends to the same offenses as officers’
power to cite in lieu of arrest, but in Minnesota it is even broader:
arresting officers may release only those charged with misdemeanors,
but booking officers may release anyone, even those charged with
serious felonies.213
2. Pretrial Diversion
In certain jurisdictions, sheriffs also exercise some control over
who is permitted to enter pretrial diversion. For example, sheriff’s office
employees in Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan, are responsible for
identifying those misdemeanor detainees with mental illness who will
be “pulled . . . out of the jail” and placed into community-based
treatment.214 In Harris County (Houston), Texas, sheriff’s deputies can
211. David Showers, County Jail Continues to Contend with Overcrowding, SENTINEL-REC.
(Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.hotsr.com/news/2019/dec/08/county-jail-continues-to-contend-with-o
[https://perma.cc/4BYV-GX6U].
212. IOWA CODE § 805.1 (2021); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01(2) (2021); cf. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 5.2(c)
(2021) (authorizing detention officer to cite and release someone arrested for a felony, but only
upon prosecutor’s recommendation); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3(e), (f) (2021) (person arrested for
misdemeanor “shall” be released (absent exceptions), whereas person arrested for felony “may be
continued in custody”).
213. Compare MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01(1) (2021) (at arrest), with MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01(2)
(2021) (at booking). In Illinois, by contrast, sheriffs have narrower power than do officers. See 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-12 (2021) (permitting arresting officer to cite and release in any case but
sheriff to do so only when arrest is for Class C misdemeanor or petty offense).
214. James David Dickson, Wayne County Jail’s Mental Health Misdemeanor Problem,
DETROIT NEWS (Dec. 28, 2019), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2019/
12/29/wayne-county-jail-mental-health-misdemeanor-problem/2607877001
[https://perma.cc/
3ZQS-VZZX].
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encourage an arresting officer not to book someone with a mental
illness, sending him or her instead to a diversion center where officers
are not allowed and services are provided on a voluntary basis. There is
a desk set up in the jail’s booking area specifically to funnel arrestees
towards this program.215
3. Overcrowding Release
In other states, sheriffs’ authority to release detainees is
expressly predicated on and intended to relieve jail overcrowding.216 In
some cases, they are even empowered to act like judges, determining
the constitutionality of conditions, setting population caps, and
reducing sentences.
The broadest grant of this authority exists in Arkansas. There,
sheriffs who conclude that overcrowding in their jails has rendered
conditions of confinement unconstitutional may release or refuse to
accept detainees at their discretion.217 To return to Garland County:
215. Telephone Interview with Virginia Ryan, Jail Population Manager, Harris Cnty. Jail
(Jan. 24, 2020). This program existed prior to the election of the current, reform-oriented sheriff,
Ed Gonzalez, but he has championed it. Samantha Ketterer & Keri Blakinger, Mental Health
Diversion Center Opens in Midtown, HOUS. CHRON., https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/
houston/article/Mental-health-diversion-center-opens-in-midtown-13271981.php (last updated
Oct. 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ELM9-9P27]. As Ingrid Eagly has documented, jail overcrowding
litigation in the 1970s prompted the creation of a distinct process of prebooking screening by
prosecutors in Harris County, who reject a significant proportion of low-level charges. Ingrid V.
Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1126, 1172–73 (2013); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, Justice on the Line: Prosecutorial
Screening Before Arrest, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 859–65 (2019) (providing details of Harris
County’s prosecutorial prebooking screening process and examples of low-level charges that
prosecutors rejected).
216. Some states have enacted emergency overcrowding release laws with respect to their
prison populations; there, the commissioner of corrections is usually the official authorized to
initiate releases. See Bradford J. Tribble, Prison Overcrowding in Alaska: A Legislative Response
to the Cleary Settlement, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 155, 167 n.68 (1991) (in 1991, at least thirteen states
had provisions allowing for early release to relieve overcrowding; of those, provisions in Arkansas,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington remain in effect;
provisions in Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Oklahoma, and South Carolina have been
repealed). Jail releases are likely more politically palatable, especially to rural, conservative
electorates, because the people being released have generally been accused or convicted of lowlevel criminal activity, rather than convicted of more serious offenses. Notably, Michigan has
repealed its prison-release law but not its jail-release law. See id.
217. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-41-503 (2021):
(a) County sheriffs and other keepers or administrators of jails within the State of
Arkansas are responsible for managing the populations and operations of their
respective facilities in compliance with the laws and the Arkansas Constitution and
within the requirements of the United States Constitution. (b) Neither a county sheriff
nor another keeper or administrator of a jail shall refuse to accept any prisoner lawfully
arrested or committed within the jurisdiction of the supporting agency of the jail
except as necessary to limit prisoner population in compliance with subsection (a) of
this section;
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when overcrowding forced jail administrators to house detainees in the
booking area, the sheriff determined that such conditions are “a
violation of inmate rights” and invoked this provision. 218 Although the
statute does not require this, the sheriff consulted with the county
court, seeking the judges’ “input” on which detainees to release prior to
the completion of their misdemeanor sentences. The sheriff also
implemented intake restrictions.219 In this remarkable paradigm,
sheriffs serve in a quasi-judicial capacity; they are at once
constitutional arbiter and bail setter.220
In a few states, sheriffs’ release powers come to bear once a
numerical population cap is reached. Oregon’s jail overcrowding statute
requires counties to opt in, but allows them to confer on sheriffs
similarly broad and discretionary release powers. 221 Either a county
board of commissioners or county court can implement a population cap;
after consultation with other relevant stakeholders, it may prescribe
population-reduction measures to be taken in the event of
overcrowding, including “authorization . . . for the sheriff to order
adults in custody released.”222 Although a county’s order might do so,
this statute imposes no limits on which detainees a sheriff may release
to alleviate overcrowding. In Utah, it is the sheriff himself who sets a
maximum operating capacity for his jail, although, as in Oregon, it must
see also Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2007-240 (2007), 2007 WL 3352510, at *2–3 (“[T]he sheriff may
release prisoners of a county jail if such a release is necessary to comply with constitutional
safeguards or provisions pursuant to A.C.A. § 12-41-503(b) . . . without necessarily a promise to
appear at appropriate times.”); Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2011-164 (2012), 2012 WL 424323, at *1
n.2 (recognizing that this provision “authoriz[es] [a] sheriff to refuse to accept prisoners where
necessary in order to manage the jail in compliance with constitutional requirements”); Tom
Sissom, State Reports Show Many Jails Overcrowded, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/oct/28/state-reports-show-many-jails-overcrowd
[https://perma.cc/KEB7-WDKE] (eight of ten most populous counties in Arkansas have
overcrowded jails; one, with operational capacity of three hundred, “has released up to 20 detainees
a week”; the sheriff of another county “closes the jail” when population reaches capacity, releasing
detainees on a one-for-one basis if necessary to admit someone facing violent felony or domestic
abuse charges, with the jail closed more often than open over past two years).
218. Showers, supra note 211.
219. These population-reduction efforts may have forestalled jail expansion in the county. See
Hot Springs Sentinel-Record, Proposed County Budget Would Add Women’s Unit at Arkansas Jail,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/oct/26/
proposed-county-budget-would-add-womens-unit-arkan [https://perma.cc/3QKD-MVYQ] (county
adopted a “wait-and-see approach” to increasing capacity, while jail supervisors manage
population through “a triage of sorts,” “mak[ing] judgments on which inmates present the greatest
criminal liability or propensity for violence”).
220. This is all the more striking because Arkansas sheriffs, like their counterparts in many
other states, are precluded from practicing law in the jurisdiction where they serve. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-22-210 (2021).
221. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169.042-169.046 (2020).
222. Id. § 169.046(2) (also providing that the “sheriff shall immediately notify all police
agencies in the county to make maximum use of citations in lieu of custody”).
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be approved by the county’s legislative body. Once this threshold is
reached, the sheriff has the authority to release prisoners to supervised
release or alternative incarceration programs according to criteria he
establishes or to modulate admission based on a policy he imposes. 223 A
federal court hearing a conditions case about a Utah jail would have to
convene three judges and make extensive findings about noncompliance
with past remedial orders in order to set a population cap and release
order; the jail’s sheriff can do so with the stroke of a pen.224
In states where release authority is contingent upon a countyimposed population cap, jailers have particularly direct control over the
number of people they incarcerate. A few years ago, Lane County,
Oregon, closed jail dorms due to cost constraints and simultaneously
implemented a population cap and release plan.225 In Multnomah
County, Oregon, a couple of hours north, the sheriff and commissioners
similarly empowered themselves to cut the jail population by opting to
shutter part of its bedspace; this left the jail constantly near capacity
and necessitated frequent releases.226
In other cases, the scope of a sheriff’s overcrowding release
authority is more bounded. In certain states, only detainees with lowlevel charges can be released. In Louisiana, for example, a sheriff whose
jail exceeds its rated capacity can declare a state of emergency and then
reduce the jail population by citing arrestees and furloughing sentenced
prisoners, but only those charged with or convicted of nonviolent

223. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-5.5(2) (LexisNexis 2021); see also Hoffman, supra note 209, at
597 n.34 (explaining that in Salt Lake County, Utah, the county commission and not a court order
sets the jail population cap).
224. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act governing
prisoner release orders).
225. See Anderson, supra note 91, at 478–79 (2014) (budget cuts in 2013 caused release of over
a thousand detainees as sections of jail facilities were closed due to lack of personnel). Something
similar happened in Jefferson County, Colorado, despite the absence of a population-capping
statute. See Elise Schmelzer, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office May Release Inmates Early or Refuse
to Book Arrestees to Meet 2020 Budget, DENVER POST (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.denverpost.com/
2019/12/06/jefferson-county-sheriffs-office-jail-release [https://perma.cc/4QL2-26EX] (explaining
that the sheriff’s office closed a floor of the jail, reducing the jail capacity, to facilitate a $5.5 million
budget cut).
226. See Katie Shepherd, Overcrowding Caused Multnomah County to Release More than 160
People from Jail Since July, WILLAMETTE WK. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.wweek.com/news/
courts/2018/03/26/overcrowding-caused-multnomah-county-to-release-more-than-160-peoplefrom-jail-since-july [https://perma.cc/3S9F-ZDYG]; Nina Mehlhaf, Hundreds of Inmates Released
in Metro Area Due to Overcrowding, KGW8, https://www.kgw.com/article/news/investigations/
hundreds-of-inmates-released-in-metro-area-due-to-overcrowding/283-517966521 (last updated
Feb. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W2RU-MXG3].
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ordinance violations may be released.227 Some states’ statutes involve
county judges in the process.228
Michigan has codified by far the most elaborate provision for
release of jail detainees due to overcrowding, with tiers of increasing
authority and shifting responsibility as a jail approaches its rated
capacity.229 Although a number of officials have significant discretion in
its implementation, this is one of a few jail-overcrowding provisions to
mandate release when rated capacity is reached. Releases begin before
the jail hits capacity, but at this stage, judges retain the power to veto
the release of any particular detainee on public safety grounds.230
When population exceeds capacity, the sheriff declares a state of
emergency and notifies county judges, commissioners, and other law
enforcement.231 These officials are free to “attempt to reduce the
prisoner population” through the plethora of “means which are already
within the scope of their individual and collective legal authority.”232
Some of the enumerated options are within the ambit of judges and
prosecutors: accelerated court calendaring, bail reduction, diversion,
and alternative sentencing. Many others are expressly within the
sheriff’s wheelhouse, like “alternative booking, processing, and housing
arrangements,” such as the use of appearance tickets, work release, and
community confinement.233 Sheriffs and county officials are also
empowered to free up space by terminating agreements to house
detainees for other jurisdictions.234 The statute does list as one potential
response to overcrowding—the penultimate item in a list of seventeen—
”recommend[ing] to the county board of commissioners [ ] construction

227. LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:764 (2021); see also La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 05-0230 (2006), 2006 WL
374181, at *1–2 (concluding that a sheriff has the “inherent power” to deem the jail unsafe and
unfit and discontinue its operation after transferring detainees); La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 10-0014
(2010), 2010 WL 2071089, at *3–4 (discussing a parish’s financial responsibility for detainees
transferred when jail is unsafe); La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 16-0151 (2016), 2016 WL 6122481, at *2
(concluding that a parish may not impose “a cap on the number of prisoners whose care the parish
will fund”).
228. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4024.1 (West 2021) (setting forth procedures for accelerating
the release of detainees during a bed shortage); NEV. REV. STAT. § 211.240 (2021) (same).
229. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Whitmer of Michigan issued an executive
order authorizing officials to employ these release provisions even when their jails were not above
capacity and without regard to the various procedural requirements. Mich. Exec. Order No. 202029 (Mar. 29, 2020).
230. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 801.51a (2021); see also, e.g., Rebecca Russell, Overcrowding at
Barry County Jail Causes State of Emergency, Early Release of 16 Inmates, FOX 17 (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://fox17online.com/2018/11/09/overcrowding-at-barry-county-jail-causes-state-of-emergencyearly-release-of-16-inmates [https://perma.cc/M3X9-S7VM].
231. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 801.52-801.54 (2021).
232. Id. § 801.55.
233. Id. § 801.55(l).
234. Id. § 801.55(f).
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of new jail facilities and funding for construction.”235 The Michigan
legislature plainly did not intend for this to be the sole or even
default option.
If those already-authorized measures are insufficient, the sheriff
reports information regarding detainees’ offenses, bonds, and sentences
to the chief circuit judge, who reduces bail amounts and sentence
lengths for those she deems to pose a low risk to public safety.236 The
extent of the resulting releases depends considerably on the judge’s
discretion, but there is a backstop.237 If the overcrowding has not ended
within a month of the sheriff’s declaration, he acquires quasi-judicial
authority to reduce the sentences of all convicted prisoners in the jail
by up to 30%; if that does not suffice, the sheriff is empowered to close
the jail to new admittees, deferring acceptance of those charged with or
convicted of certain crimes.238
In all of these states, a sheriff who limits the supply of bedspace
in his jail dramatically expands his power to reduce demand for that
bedspace. It is precisely because he and the commissioners in his county
have declined to build—or have been prevented from doing so—that
release is authorized or, in Michigan, required.
4. Court Orders
In some states, sheriffs are also empowered to release detainees
as a result of litigation challenging the overcrowding that can occur
when they do not expand their jails.239 In Riverside County, California,
235. Id. § 801.55(p).
236. Id. § 801.56; see also, e.g., Christina Hall, Macomb County Jail May Release Inmates Due
to Overcrowding, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/
michigan/macomb/2014/11/10/macomb-county-jail-overcrowded/18802103 [https://perma.cc/889RE9FH] (noting that states of emergency were declared fourteen times between 2003 and 2014).
237. See Amy Waechter, County Officials Held Prisoner to Jail Overcrowding: Muskegon
County Board of Commissioners v. Muskegon Circuit Judge, 9 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 481, 490 (1992)
(judge directed sheriff to transfer rather than release detainees, but court of appeals ordered him
to stop interfering with sheriff’s duties under the overcrowding-release provision).
238. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 801.57-801.58 (2021) (chief circuit judge may override bar on
acceptance in individual cases, on recommendation of either the sheriff or sentencing judge); see
Sam Fry, Sheriff Parker: Jail Overcrowding Is Getting Worse, HILLSDALE DAILY NEWS (July 23,
2019), https://www.hillsdale.net/news/20190723/sheriff-parker-jail-overcrowding-is-getting-worse
[https://perma.cc/6W7Q-9UV5]. Although a sheriff is required to end a state of emergency after
seventy days even if sufficient population reduction has not occurred, the act also contemplates
reinvocation. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 801.59(b), 801.63 (2021).
239. Ordinarily, courts (mostly federal) become involved in capping jail populations in the
course of civil prisoners’ rights litigation; such caps were much more common prior to the passage
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See Albert C. Price, Charles Weber & Ellis Perlman, Judicial
Discretion and Jail Overcrowding, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 222 (1983); see also Wayne N. Welsh, Jail
Litigation in California: An Empirical Assessment, 71 PRISON J. 30, 40–41 (1991) (describing two
paradoxical “adaptations to jail litigation”: “(1) system expansion” and “(2) increased use of pre-
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the five-jail system has released tens of thousands of detainees early to
comply with a federal court order.240 By replacing an existing facility
with one five times the size, at a cost of about $375 million, the county
will be able to avoid some such releases. In Marion County, Ohio, a
county court order in place for two decades permitted the release of lowlevel detainees to avoid overcrowding. The jail relied on this authority
on a daily basis.241 But in 2019, a newly elected judge withdrew the
order. In his view, the sheriff had usurped his own role; using this
release power rather expanding the jail “undermine[d] the authority
and respectability of all the courts . . . and the justice system in
our community.”242
5. Sentence Credits and Supervised Release
Finally, sheriffs in many states have the authority to determine
how and for how long detainees serve sentences. In states across the
country, the law allows sheriffs to shorten or lengthen sentences by
granting more or fewer good-time credits.243 Sheriffs can also release
trial and post-trial alternatives”; criticizing the use of alternatives as “stop-gap measures only,
pending new jail construction,” given that “building has continually proven to be an ineffective
solution to overcrowding”). In some historical cases, state court judges even ordered sheriffs to
expand jail capacity. Welsh, supra, at 35. Sometimes, state courts take the initiative to respond to
limited bedspace at the jails that hold detainees appearing before them as criminal defendants. In
Kansas City, Missouri, the council struggled to find contract bedspace to house municipal court
defendants after Jackson County doubled its per diem rate. Sam Zeff, Kansas City Needs a New
Place for Its Inmates, Some Councilmembers Don’t Want a New Jail, KCUR (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.kcur.org/post/kansas-city-needs-new-place-its-inmates-some-councilmembers-dontwant-new-jail [https://perma.cc/37HQ-DN7G]. The municipal court observed that it “would face a
complicated population control problem” and took the unusual step of hiring its own “population
control manager to make sure that only those who needed to be locked up are, in fact, in jail.” Id.
240. Jeff Horseman, Riverside County’s $376 Million Indio Jail Could Open by Early 2020,
PRESS-ENTER. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.pe.com/2019/12/16/riverside-countys-376-millionindio-jail-could-open-by-early-2020 [https://perma.cc/H6YX-UHH7]. The magnitude of these
releases is due in part to the realignment of prisoners from California’s state prisons to its county
jails. See, e.g., Magnus Lofstrom & Steven Raphael, Impact of Realignment on County Jail
Populations, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. 2 (June 2013), https://www.ppic.org/content/
pubs/report/R_613MLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C9K-C96D].
241. Volpenhein, supra note 64.
242. Id. The editorial board of the local newspaper has urged officials to “investigate why other
counties get by on much less jail space [per capita] than Marion County” does. Our View: Marion
County Jail Levy Deserves Scrutiny, MARION STAR (Dec. 22, 2019), https://www.marionstar.com/
story/news/local/2019/12/22/our-view-marion-county-jail-levy-deserves-scrutiny/2681430001
[https://perma.cc/W9H9-388Y]. The rescission of the release order prompted the sheriff to rent
bedspace while county commissioners proposed a tax increase to fund a jail expansion. See Sarah
Volpenhein, Marion County Sending Record Number of Jail Inmates to Other Counties, MARION
STAR (Dec. 15, 2019), https://www.marionstar.com/story/news/local/2019/12/15/marion-countysending-record-number-jail-inmates-other-counties/4411662002 [https://perma.cc/BF4D-6577].
243. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-7(b) (2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.3 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:164-24 (West 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.110 (2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
42.032 (West 2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.151 (2021); W. VA. CODE § 7-8-11 (2021); see also Ana
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detainees on various forms of supervision. In Arkansas, the sheriff is
free to decide which sentenced prisoners serve their sentences “on
electronic monitoring, on weekends, or by any other lawful alternative
to continual detention in the county jail that rehabilitates the convicted
person or benefits the county when this does not conflict with any court
orders.”244 In Maine, sheriffs may grant sentenced prisoners furloughs
of unlimited length to facilitate medical, mental-health, and substanceuse treatment and are responsible for assigning them to community
confinement programs.245 California law allows sheriffs to assign
sentenced prisoners to work release, during which participants sleep at
home.246 Arizona sheriffs can establish and select detainees to
participate in work release and (with the consent of the county board of
supervisors) home detention programs.247 In certain Tennessee
counties, sheriffs have “sole discretion” to release detainees on
furlough.248 And in Wisconsin, the home detention statute gives
sheriffs—not judges—unfettered authority to determine who
participates;249 as the state court of appeals has explained, “the sheriff
manages the jail, the court does not.” 250

Yáñez-Correa & Molly Totman, Costly Confinement and Sensible Solutions: Jail Overcrowding in
Texas, PUB. POL’Y CTR., TEX. CRIM. JUST. COAL. 45–46 (2010), https://www.texascjc.org/system/
files/publications/Costly%20Confinement%20Sensible%20Solutions%20Report%20%28Oct%2020
10%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VZL-A772] (advocating that sheriffs afford additional good-time
credit). Avlana Eisenberg has recognized that prison officers’ discretionary decisions to revoke
good-time credit are a form of resistance to decarceration. Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration
Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 71, 111 (2016). Her focus was on individual
decisions by correctional officers, but some sheriffs have not only the authority to approve
individual revocations based on disciplinary infractions but also the power to set jail-wide policy
regarding how much credit is accrued.
244. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-41-503(c) (2021).
245. ME. STAT. tit. 30-A, §§ 1556, 1659-A (2021). Recall that rates of mental illness and
substance use among jailed people are extremely high. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
246. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4024.2 (West 2021); see also Noah D. Zatz, The Carceral Labor
Continuum: Beyond the Prison Labor/Free Labor Divide, in LABOR AND PUNISHMENT (Erin Hatton
ed.) (forthcoming 2021) (observing functional similarity to community service but that this
“arrangement proceeds under the sheriff’s authority over defendants sentenced to jail time, not
under a court’s authority to substitute probation for incarceration”).
247. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-459 (2021).
248. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-2-143(a)–(b) (2021).
249. WIS. STAT. § 302.425(2) (West 2021).
250. State v. Galecke, 702 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005); see also State v. Schell, 661
N.W.2d 503, 509 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (“The decision to place a person on home monitoring is no
doubt informed by the particular . . . budgetary and space constraints of each sheriff’s office and
county jail. The sheriff, perhaps more than any other person, is in the best position to undertake
these analyses.”).
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C. Informal Pressures: Sheriffs as County Politicians
In addition to the formal mechanisms for jail population
management discussed above, sheriffs wield a lot of soft power.251 Their
control over jail bedspace enables them to influence the behavior of local
police, prosecutors, and judges by constraining the supply of carceral
capacity.252 Of course, many choose not to exercise this influence, opting
instead to push for jail expansion or contract for additional bedspace.
In Douglas County, Nebraska, the jail reached capacity during
the summer of 2019; sending detainees to nearby facilities was not
possible because they, too, were full. In response, jail officials “sent out
a plea.”253 At the sheriff’s behest, the Omaha Police Department, which
uses a significant portion of the jail’s bedspace, “reminded officers of the
standard policy” on when to cite and release. Thanks to this effort, as
well as the cooperation of the county’s probation service, the jail’s
population decreased markedly.254 In Stanly County, North Carolina,
the sheriff has sought and obtained the district attorney’s approval to
release detainees due to overcrowding.255 In some places, sheriffs and

251. While this Section focuses on sheriffs’ informal but direct controls over jail population
levels, they also have formal but indirect influence in some states. In Georgia, for example,
bondsmen must be “approved by the sheriff” and comply with “all rules and regulations established
by the sheriff.” GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-50(b)(4) (2021); see Training for Bail Bondsman Jobs in
Georgia, BOUNTYHUNTEREDU.ORG, https://www.bountyhunteredu.org/georgia/georgia-bondsman
(last visited Mar. 14, 2021) [https://perma.cc/MUR6-CUTZ] (observing that this local licensure
requirement “often results in a close relationship between [sheriffs] and bail companies”). These
bondsmen have broad discretion to set the rates criminal defendants and their families must pay
to obtain release from jail. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-30 (2021). They can use it to alter the force
(and ameliorate—or worsen—the disparate impact) of judges’ decisions regarding bail. See
generally Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46
STAN. L. REV. 987 (1994).
252. To the extent that county jails hold prisoners from other jurisdictions—federal, state, or
local—jailers’ decisions about bedspace will have even broader effects, albeit more attenuated ones,
because a given county’s jail will be one of multiple possible sources of detention capacity. See, e.g.,
Spokane Co. Jail Will Not Recognize Some Warrants for Probation, Parole Violations, KREM2
(Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.krem.com/article/news/local/spokane-co-jail-will-not-recognize-somewarrants/293-acffbf28-17b2-4205-a240-7566ceec47fc [https://perma.cc/6EPW-7XR4].
253. Ruta Ulcinaite, Douglas County Jail Population Decreasing, 3 NEWS NOW (Dec. 7, 2019),
https://www.3newsnow.com/news/local-news/douglas-county-jail-population-decreasing
[https://perma.cc/Q8MB-TCNB].
254. Id.; see also Max Bryan, Sheriff: Old, New Measures to Keep Jail Population Down, TIMES
REC. (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.swtimes.com/news/20191103/sheriff-old-new-measures-to-keepjail-population-down [https://perma.cc/Q658-H3WM] (sheriff asks local police departments to join
in using signature bond program “to keep the population from swelling to numbers seen in years
prior”); Mehlhaf, supra note 226 (when jail reaches 95% capacity a “red alert . . . gets dispatched
to all cars in the field, so they’ll . . . be diligent of what [they are] booking ” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
255. Evan Moore, Inmates Released from Jail Due to Overcrowding, STANLY NEWS & PRESS
(Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.thesnaponline.com/2019/08/05/inmates-released-from-jail-due-toovercrowding [https://perma.cc/62UX-ED9L].
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their employees convene an array of county officials in an ongoing
population-management effort.256 Staff at Canyon County, Idaho’s
overcrowded jail “work daily with prosecutors, defenders, and judiciary
to identify inmates who can be released early to make room.” 257
According to a jail captain, this process has made judges
“more lenient.”258
Some urban Texas sheriffs with particularly dangerous jails say
that they have taken hands-on approaches to ensuring that “nonviolent
inmates are not languishing in a jail cell,” although their efforts on this
front very much remain works in progress.259 On a weekly basis, the
sheriff of Bexar County (San Antonio), Texas, has been “generating a
list of all of the people who were just here on a misdemeanor, nothing
else, with less than a $2,500 bond,” and “physically sitting down with
pretrial services and probation, all the stakeholders, every week, and
going, ‘OK, what about this guy? He’s been here for two weeks already.
Can we get him out?’ ”260 Although the sheriff does not see these
initiatives as his “responsibility,” he says that “if that’s what it’s going
to take to keep them from dying in my jail, then we’re going to do it.”261
In Harris County (Houston), Texas, the sheriff has hired a fulltime jail population manager; she has created an online dashboard that
shows judges information about everyone on their dockets who remains
in pretrial detention.262 The sheriff’s office identifies the detainees to be
256. Processes for making decisions about pretrial detention and jail population management
will likely be complex—and, ideally, coordinated—in large urban jurisdictions. See, e.g., VERA INST.
OF JUST., LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL OVERCROWDING REDUCTION PROJECT, at i–iii (2011),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/los-angeles-county-jail-overcrowding-reductionproject-final-report/legacy_downloads/LA_County_Jail_Overcrowding_-_Executive_Summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6GR-3ZVK] (discussing the need for coordination in Los Angeles County). Such
decisions are made more unilaterally in smaller jurisdictions.
257. Madeline White, High-Risk Suspects Released Due to Canyon County Jail’s
Overcrowding, IDAHO NEWS 6 (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.kivitv.com/news/hundreds-of-highrisk-suspects-released-due-to-canyon-county-jails-inability-to-house-them
[https://perma.cc/
DP4J-RJLP].
258. Id.
259. Scott Huddleston, Sheriff Details Multi-pronged Plan to Fix San Antonio Jail Woes, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Sheriffdetails-multi-pronged-plan-to-fix-San-14838330.php [https://perma.cc/ZP7W-Y7YM].
260. Id.
261. Id. (twelve detainees died in the jail in one year); see also Emily Baucum, Family of Man
Who Died at Bexar County Jail Files Federal Civil Rights Lawsuit, FOX29 (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://foxsanantonio.com/news/local/family-of-man-who-died-at-bexar-county-jail-files-federalcivil-rights-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/E4PE-NNWK] (describing the death of a detainee in the jail).
262. Telephone Interview with Virginia Ryan, supra note 215. Ryan previously held a similar
position in New Orleans and discussed both jurisdictions. For the public-facing version of this
dashboard, see Jail Population Statistics, HARRIS CNTY., TEX., https://charts.hctx.net/jailpop (last
visited Jan. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/VXZ5-9Q8J]. This sheriff and these judges were elected
together in a recent wave of progressive victories. See Keri Blakinger, The Beto Effect:
Transforming Houston’s Criminal Justice System, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 25, 2020),
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considered for release and sends this information to the judges.
Although some judges’ practices have not changed, others have begun
coming weekly to the jail’s intake center and signing recognizance
bonds en masse, for numerous defendants at a time, without individual
hearings. The sheriff has plans to allocate a housing pod to hold those
likely to be released on recognizance, so that they stay out of the main
jail and “never put on an orange jumpsuit.” 263 These and other reforms
could not be more urgent, as illustrated by the case of Preston Chaney,
a man who died of COVID-19 after spending three months at the Harris
County Jail due to his inability to pay a $100 bond; he was facing
charges that he stole lawn equipment and frozen meat.264
As policing scholars have noted, the fact that sheriffs run jails
gives them not only the incentive to keep people out of jail unnecessarily
(at least when at capacity), but also the information—what Andrew
Crespo calls the “systemic facts”—necessary to do so.265 The fact that
overcrowding-release statutes in a number of states require sheriffs to
report data about those they are incarcerating to other actors in the
criminal legal system reflects a simple but important reality: sheriffs
have access to and have aggregated these data, while courts,
prosecutors, and police chiefs often do not or have not.
In New Orleans, Louisiana, for example, the chief of police
wanted to ensure that his officers were using summonses instead of
arresting whenever authorized but lacked any efficient way of figuring
out who had been booked. The jail began providing him with a weekly
spreadsheet of hundreds of detainees being held on summons-eligible
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/02/25/the-beto-effect-transforming-houston-s-criminaljustice-system [https://perma.cc/8T9M-DU7B].
263. Telephone Interview with Virginia Ryan, supra note 215.
264. Gabrielle Banks & Samantha Ketterer, ‘Deep Indifference to Human Suffering’ at Harris
County Jail, Lawyers Say, HOUS. CHRON., https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/crime/article/harris-county-jail-indifference-human-suffering-15926278.php (last updated
Feb. 6, 2021) [https://perma.cc/57FR-JJFX] (“[T]he sheriff arranged access to video bail hearings,
but very few judges took him up on it.”).
265. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2109–10 (2016); see also Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 614 (2016) (discussing the
functioning of sheriffs’ office databases and their lack of interface with other county criminal legal
system agencies); Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV.
2179, 2204 (2014) (“[I]nteragency disputes led the local sheriff’s office to cut off the city police
department and several other agencies’ access to a county-maintained law enforcement records
system, severely hampering police and prosecutor operations.”). But see William A. Crozier,
Brandon L. Garrett & Arvind Krishnamurthy, The Transparency of Jail Data, 55 WAKE FOREST
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
117),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3741638 [https://perma.cc/NBG2-7CMC] (describing administrative
database to which Durham, North Carolina, judges, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and
public defenders share access, containing detailed “information regarding pretrial conditions and
status of any given criminal defendant”).
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charges. Armed with these lists, an assistant chief spoke to every officer
in the department during roll call; after three months, virtually no one
was being arrested on these low-level charges.266 Similarly, the city
manager of Tucson, Arizona, requested the “help[ ]” of the Pima County
Jail to “identify inappropriate law enforcement bookings,” such as
bookings of “chronic offenders” charged with “minor crimes.”267 The city
wanted to keep the jail population “as low as practicably possible,” but
the jail had better data on the work of Tucson’s police than their own
department did.268
IV. SHERIFFS’ INCENTIVES
As this Article has demonstrated, sheriffs have significant power
over both the supply of and the demand for jail bedspace, and therefore
play a critical and distinctive role in determining how many people are
incarcerated in thousands of counties across America. This Part
explores their motivations for exercising that authority in a carceral
direction: to expand jail capacity and population.
Many scholars believe that the fragmentation of roles in our
criminal legal systems—namely, that different officials are responsible
for law enforcement and incarceration—causes misalignment of
incentives. Because the people who determine how many people are
incarcerated do not bear the costs of incarceration, this line of thinking
goes, they operate without self-restraint. But sheriffs complicate this
story; although they do unify these roles to a significant degree, sheriffs
remain aggressive and effective proponents of jail building. Instead,
system fragmentation may serve to obscure who and what is
responsible for carceral growth. As this Part argues, sheriffs’
bureaucratic interests in budget maximization and labor relations are
an important engine of jail growth and help to explain their resistance
to policy shifts like bail reform and jailhouse cite-and-release.
A. Role Consolidation and Fragmentation
A sheriff whose jail is full has a wide array of options within his
discretion: He can work with county commissioners to embark on a jail266. Telephone Interview with Virginia Ryan, supra note 215.
267. Memorandum from C.H. Huckelberry, Cnty. Adm’r, to Pima Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors
Regarding City of Tucson Intergovernmental Agreements for Animal Care Services and Prisoner
Housing 3 (June 2, 2015), https://webcms.pima.gov/UserFiles/Servers/Server_6/File/Government/
Administration/CHHmemosFor%20Web/June%202015/June%202,%202015%20-%20City%20of%
20Tucson%20Intergovernmental%20Agreements%20for%20Animal%20Care%20Services%20and
%20Prisoner%20Housing.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ENQ-QGXM] [hereinafter Huckelberry Memo].
268. See id.
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building campaign, with the knowledge that new beds will most likely
be filled.269 He can send detainees to other jurisdictions at a cost to the
taxpayer or decide to free up beds by no longer accepting detainees from
other jurisdictions. He can tell his deputies to stop arresting intoxicated
homeless people, instruct his booking officers to release those arrested
by local police departments for drug possession, shorten sentences
through an overcrowding release valve, accelerate accrual of good-time
credits, or call the local prosecutor and urge her not to seek money bail
in shoplifting cases.
Although these powers are significant individually, they are
especially remarkable in combination. Each is exercised in the shadow
of the others; they are not independent choices, but alternatives.270
Sheriffs run the only state- or local-level agencies that “unify the inputs
to the criminal justice system—law enforcement—with the outputs of
the system—incarceration.”271 Sheriffs with empty beds lose formal and
informal powers to decarcerate; they gain incentives (and others gain
opportunities) to do the opposite.
The literature has identified the fragmentation in our criminal
legal system as a significant explanation for its overgrowth, but this
Article’s account of sheriffs casts some doubt on its explanatory power.
Beginning with Frank Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, scholars have
focused on prosecutors’ “correctional free lunch,” proposing to force
those who choose to charge defendants with crimes to bear or at least
consider the cost of prisons. 272 In an article that deserves tremendous

269. See MAI ET AL., supra note 19, at 27–30 (citing examples of jail expansion leading “key
institutional players [in the] local justice system to simply use a now more readily available
resource: jail beds”); Wayne N. Welsh, Henry N. Ponetll, Matthew C. Leone & Patrick Kinkade,
Jail Overcrowding: An Analysis of Policy Makers’ Perceptions, 7 JUST. Q. 341, 359 (1990) (“Once
we find some more jail beds, we’re going to fill those suckers up as fast as we can.”).
270. Consider, by analogy, the impact of the congressional ICE bed quota on incentives for and
rates of immigration enforcement. See generally Anita Sinha, Arbitrary Detention? The
Immigration Detention Bed Quota, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77 (2016).
271. W. David Ball, Defunding State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1060, 1076 (2014) (emphasis
omitted) (proposing reforms designed to achieve this); see also Thomas A. Henderson, The Relative
Effects of Community Complexity and of Sheriffs Upon the Professionalism of Sheriff Departments,
19 AM. J. POL. SCI. 107, 109–10 (1975) (sheriff department is “ideal setting” to study “determinants
of public policy,” as a “coherent government unit to implement policy in a specific functional
area . . . headed by a single individual rather than a multimember body”).
272. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 211–15 (1991);
cf. W. David Ball, Why State Prisons?, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 84 (2014) (“[T]he correctional
free lunch might even turn into a profit opportunity, as overcrowded state prisons pay local
facilities to house state prisoners.”). There is no question that it matters who bears the cost of
imprisonment. See Aurélie Ouss, Misaligned Incentives and the Scale of Incarceration in the
United States, 191 J. PUB. ECON., no. 104285, Sept. 2020 (finding that shift in cost burden of
juvenile incarceration from state to counties resulted in stark drop). But the magnitude and
direction of the effect turns on the precise interests of the particular decisionmakers. See id. at 8,
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credit for grappling with the jail-related incentives of actors in local
criminal legal systems, Adam Gershowitz suggests putting prosecutors
in charge of jail budgets.273 But his core assumption—that “[i]f
prosecutors were responsible for jail budgets [while controlling jail
population inflows], they would want jails to be less crowded, less
expensive, and easier to manage”—is predicated on the view that
“sheriffs [who are currently responsible for jail budgets] have little
control over how many inmates they receive.”274 This analysis is called
into question when one appreciates that sheriffs are responsible for jail
budgets and do control jail population levels to a significant, and
crowding levels to an even greater, extent. Sheriffs do not have nearly
as much discretion as do prosecutors, but at least for sheriffs, role
consolidation alone has not disincentivized bedspace expansion.275
Although a theory that foregrounds fragmentation and the
resulting misalignment of incentives does not appear to explain sheriffs’
decisionmaking, it provides insight into sheriffs’ rhetorical justification
and—to the extent their self-description has been uncritically
accepted—our impoverished understanding of their role. As Richard
Bierschbach and Stephanos Bibas argue, because criminal legal policy
is made by a “mishmash” of “loosely coordinated institutions,” officials
are able to “obscure[ ] responsibility and accountability” for pro-carceral
decisions as well as for the attendant costs.276 In the world of the sheriff,
fragmentation may be less explanation than excuse.
How is it that sheriffs, though in some jurisdictions criticized for
the harshness of jail conditions, have largely avoided blame for decades
of carceral growth? Through dissembling rhetoric, they have managed
to portray themselves as passive facilitators, rather than shapers, of

11 (suggesting that much of observed drop was due to diversion or dismissal by probation officers,
who have broad discretion and are highly cost-sensitive).
273. Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors Control
the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677 (2016).
274. Id. at 680, 685–87; cf. Barkow, supra note 185, at 279 (recounting the contrary concern of
a representative that incorporation of the federal prison system into the Department of Justice
was “eminently improper” because “one responsible for administering prisons would have
incentives to see them fully occupied”).
275. See also Daniel J. D’Amico, The Social Provision of Punishment and Incarceration, 76 AM.
J. ECON. & SOC. 1107, 1113, 1124–25 (2017) (concluding from comparative study that “centralized
bureaucracies incentivize excessive rather than optimal” levels of incarceration).
276. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 187, 189–90 (2017); see also PFAFF, supra note 22, at 144–45 (prosecutors “disingenuous[ly]”
portray mounting costs of prosecutions they decided to pursue as “unavoidable financial hurricane
that leaves shattered county services and infrastructure in its wake”); Su, supra note 33, at 857–
58 (noting the greater fragmentation in rural governments).
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local criminal legal policy.277 When they release people from jail, they
generally say they have “no choice”—that the releases were “forced.”278
By contrast, they emphasize the impact of decisions made by other
criminal legal system players; judges, prosecutors, and probation,
parole, and police officers are “variables in the Justice System” who
dictate how many jail beds are “normally . . . needed,” and therefore
must be funded by taxpayers.279
These dynamics have long been at play even in debates over
inhumane treatment of detainees, for which sheriffs do not disavow
responsibility entirely. A study of a Texas jail published in the mid1970s observed that the “overlapping of jurisdiction for the operational
aspects of the jail” between the sheriff and the commissioners “often
results in ambiguity and repeated disclaimers of responsibility, both of
which foster inaction” on improvement of jail conditions.280 But the
increasingly complex web of interjurisdictional detention arrangements
has only contributed to further displacement of blame. As Amada
Armenta put it, officers involved in immigration enforcement through
a 287(g) agreement in effect at the jail in Nashville “wielded their
relative powerlessness as a shield against accusations that they [are]
committing injustices. . . . Instead, they point to other agencies and
actors who they believe are more culpable.”281

277. A similar self-conception of reactive passivity has long been recognized among state
prison planners vis-à-vis local criminal legal systems. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 272, at
62, 211–13.
278. Brovsky, supra note 159; see also Virtual Jail Statistics, 2013-2018, BENTON
CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., OR., https://www.co.benton.or.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/
sheriff039s_office/page/2599/12_december_virtual_jail.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/6Y7T-7CUA] (chart representing “inmates who should have been held, but were
released due to lack of space”).
279. Virtual Jail Statistics, BENTON CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., OR., https://www.co.benton.or.us/
sheriff/page/virtual-jail-statistics (last visited Mar. 14, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HQZ4-GDUU].
280. Bernard Ortiz de Montellano, Jailhouse Politics: A Study of the Bexar County (Texas) Jail,
1 J. CONTEMP. L. 30, 40–41 (1974); see also Welsh et al., supra note 269, at 346–47, 361–63
(identifying different forms of blame avoidance by county officials as “powerful heuristic for
research into jail policy”).
281. AMADA ARMENTA, PROTECT, SERVE, AND DEPORT: THE RISE OF POLICING AS IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT 119–20 (2017). Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g), authorizes the attorney general to delegate authority to state and local law enforcement
officers to enforce federal immigration law. For a history of the development of the 287(g) program,
see Huyen Pham, 287(g) Agreements in the Trump Era, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1253 (2018).
Although some 287(g) agreements of the “task force” model initially permitted immigration
enforcement on the beat, independent of any criminal law violation, these were eliminated by the
Obama Administration due to concerns about racial profiling; jails are now the sole, and indeed
have always been the primary, sites of 287(g) immigration enforcement. Id. at 1270–71, 1280. For
an intriguing student note questioning the authority of sheriffs to enter into 287(g) agreements
unilaterally, see Gregory Taylor, Note, Dillon’s Rule: A Check on Sheriffs’ Authority to Enter 287(g)
Agreements, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1053 (2019).
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Sheriffs’ reluctance to acknowledge their own authority over jail
population levels has generally gone unchallenged, but it has come into
stark relief during the COVID-19 pandemic. In a number of
jurisdictions, sheriffs have clear statutory authority to release
detainees to protect them in emergency situations.282 Despite
confirmation from state officials, sheriffs not only refused to exercise
this power, but claimed that they could not release anyone from
detention absent a court order or prosecutor’s agreement.283
B. Jailers as Bureaucrats
There is another more basic flaw in applying to jails the
traditional account of fragmentation and misaligned incentives as
contributors to carceral growth: it assumes that government officials
involved in incarceration treat the provision of bedspace as a cost they
would prefer not to bear. In the case of sheriffs, this Article posits, the
reverse is often true. Sheriffs want more spending on incarceration—
and thus more incarceration—because it is their job to incarcerate.284
“[A]dditional appropriations for the office” will, they hope, “result in a
long [and] successful tenure as sheriff.”285
A brief historical detour offers helpful perspective. Before the
salary revolution described by legal historian Nicholas Parillo took hold
in American government, sheriffs generally operated on a fee system
that tied their personal compensation directly to their performance of
various services, like serving process.286 The fee system also allowed
282. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8658 (West 2021) (authorizing release when “emergency
endangering the lives of inmates of a state, county, or city penal or correctional institution has
occurred or is imminent”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-3-7 (2021) (authorizing release when “any
infectious or contagious disease shall appear in the vicinity of any jail”).
283. See, e.g., Div. of L. Enf’t, Cal. Dep’t of Just., Information Bulletin: COVID-19 and
Statutory Authority Under Government Code Section 8658, No. 2020-DLE-05 (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/2020-dle-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW6TLEYC] (confirming authority); Aparna Komarla, Santa Rita Jail Does Not Administer or
Recommend COVID-19 Testing Prior to Quarantine Release, DAVIS VANGUARD (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://www.davisvanguard.org/2020/10/santa-rita-jail-does-not-administer-covid-19-testingprior-to-quarantine-release/ [https://perma.cc/BU2Z-QPK2] (jail commander taking the position
that “the jail has no authority to release individuals early”).
284. Spending on jailing is more likely to be treated as a cost by county commissioners;
however, they may, depending on how a construction project is financed, see a jail project as a
source of revenue and employment (which it is their job to generate), rather than as a fiscal hit.
285. ASS’N OF ARK. CNTYS., ARKANSAS COUNTY SHERIFFS 2018 PROCEDURES MANUAL 15
(2018), https://www.arcounties.org/site/assets/files/4815/county_sheriffs.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8AJ4-BGSZ].
286. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE (2013); see Richard W. Harding,
John Rynne & Lisa Thomsen, History of Privatized Corrections, 18 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
241, 243 (2019) (jail fee system in United Kingdom); Raymond Moley, The Sheriff and the
Constable, 146 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 28 (1929) (jail fee system in United States).
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them to profit personally from detention contracts; as late as 1921, the
Montana Supreme Court held that a sheriff, not the county, was the
“proper party” to a federal detention contract and that funds he received
for the subsistence of detainees “were not in any sense public funds and
had no place in the county treasury.”287 Some sheriffs—like those in
Alabama who claimed the right to pocket state-appropriated jail
food funds—clung fast to the remnants of these arrangements until
very recently.288
Although the fee system has been abolished, modern sheriffs’
desire to build and fill bedspace may still be driven by their mundane
interests as agency heads and employers as much as by their views on
incarceration.289 In this view, sheriffs are striving to ensure the viability
and growth of the criminal legal apparatus of which they are an
integral part and hence to shore up and augment their institutional
power. There is both theoretical and evidentiary support for
this understanding.
A view of sheriffs as bureaucrats finds support in the budgetmaximizing model put forward by public choice theorist William
Niskanen, who suggests that officials may be motivated to increase
their budgets in order to increase their own and their employees’
salaries, electoral and job security, and political and professional
power.290 Ariel Kleiman has argued that Niskanen’s model may help to
explain upward pressure on criminal legal fees.291 As she points out, the
fact that a criminal legal agency is a “monopolistic provider of a
mandatory service” to criminal defendants makes these agencies’
incentives distinctive and problematic.292

287. Majors v. Lewis & Clark Cnty., 201 P. 268, 270 (Mont. 1921).
288. See Connor Sheets, Here’s How Federal Inmates Made an Alabama Sheriff $1.5 Million,
AL.COM (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.al.com/news/2018/12/heres-how-federal-inmates-made-analabama-sheriff-15-million.html [https://perma.cc/CS22-7Q99]; Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez,
Bringing Transparency and Accountability to Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 455, 463–65 (2011).
289. See Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 6, at 322 n.4 (gesturing at this important point).
290. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36–42
(1971); see also Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 6, at 321–22 (arguing that “sheriffs’ offices function
much like any other government bureaucracy,” that “[t]he bigger they get and the more resources
they command, the more powerful they are and the better positioned they are to command more
and more resources,” and suggesting that sheriffs benefit politically from having more employees
because of increased voter outreach, and benefit from having larger jails because of ability to dole
out contracts); Ortiz de Montellano, supra note 280, at 42–43 (observing that jails can be “a source
of power and patronage” for local officials); Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE
L.J. 1381, 1384–85 (2018) (arguing that “the reach of the criminal justice system” is in part “the
product of disaggregated institutions—both state and nonstate actors—making choices that they
view as rational responses to discrete organizational incentives”).
291. Kleiman, supra note 114, at 537–38, 546 n.172.
292. Id. at 536–38.
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These features are, if anything, even more striking in the jail
context, again due to the practice of bedspace contracting. Although a
municipality has a monopoly on the power to impose nonvoluntary
criminal legal system fees, it can do so only on those “users” whose cases
fall within its jurisdiction. Courts, prosecutors, and probation systems
do not generally offer their services to or seek revenue from other
jurisdictions, but sheriffs search far and wide for “users” to fill their jail
beds. Kleiman also notes that the criminal defendants on whom fees are
imposed are often unable to challenge their treatment by voting, as
many states disenfranchise those who owe criminal legal system
debt.293 The lack of political recourse is even more complete when it
comes to jail detainees being held for other jurisdictions, who will not
even have ties in or return to the community in which they are confined.
These theories appear to be borne out. Empirical evidence
suggests that sheriffs who run jails indeed receive higher salaries, and
those with larger jails command more resources, have more employees,
and dole out larger contracts.294 Subtler evidence that carceral
bureaucracy impacts sheriffs’ decisionmaking arises in a variety of
other arenas as well.
Sheriffs who run jail bureaucracies understand bail reform as a
grave threat because it may lead to jail closure. Sheriffs who opposed
legislative reforms enacted (and subsequently retrenched) in New York
described the resulting reductions in their population levels as an “offthe-cliff dive,” and one jail administrator revealingly complained that
“[w]e lost 25% of our population.”295 They heard Governor Cuomo’s
administration project hundreds of millions in long-term cost savings to
county governments; far from rejoicing, they were distressed by his
suggestion that “[i]n the longer term, local jails should be able to reduce

293. Id. at 538.
294. Ronald Helms, Locally Elected Sheriffs and Money Compensation: A Quantitative
Analysis of Organizational and Environmental Contingency Explanations, 33 CRIM. JUST. REV. 5,
18 (2008) (regression analysis of sheriff salaries showed that those who operate jails are paid
significantly more and hypothesized that this is because operating jails is a “key source of
organizational complexity and administrative contingency”).
295. Joseph Spector, Chad Arnold, Jonathan Bandler & Steve Lieberman, Bail Reform Results
in
Hundreds
of
Empty
Jail
Cells,
TIMES HERALD-REC. (Jan.
23,
2020),
https://www.recordonline.com/news/20200123/bail-reform-results-in-hundreds-of-empty-jail-cells
[https://perma.cc/ZWM5-EMN4] (emphasis added). Similar opposition has occurred in other states.
See, e.g., Taylor Torregano, Manatee County Sheriff Leads New Effort to Keep Law Requiring Some
Inmates to Serve 85 Percent of Their Sentence, WWSB (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.mysuncoast.com/
2020/02/06/manatee-county-sheriff-leads-new-effort-keep-law-requiring-some-inmates-servepercent-their-sentence [https://perma.cc/4JV4-ZR44]; Helen Wilbers, Callaway County Sheriff:
Reforms Endanger Community, NEWS TRIB. (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.newstribune.com/
news/local/story/2020/jan/05/callway-county-sheriff-reforms-endanger-community/810930
[https://perma.cc/X6GD-N68Z].
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staffing and potentially close housing units.”296 “Savings” of this sort
would hit their budgets and cost deputies’ jobs, especially valuable in
rural economies.297 They feared being “put out of business.” 298
Sheriffs’ reactions to two other efforts to reduce reliance on
pretrial detention reinforce the impression that they may be motivated
less by genuine policy commitments than by bureaucratic interests.
Jocelyn Simonson notes that community-funded bail-outs, which seek
the release of a large number of detainees at once, encounter “jailhouse
actors” who are “obstructionist to the farthest extent possible.”299 That
jailers feel threatened not only by campaigns to change bail laws but
also by campaigns to comply with them (albeit en masse) suggests that
their opposition is motivated more by the existential threat posed by
jail-emptying than by substantive concerns about who should be
detained pretrial.
Similarly, sheriffs frequently lament that their jails have
become their communities’ largest providers of mental health and
addiction care, but then oppose diversion of resources from the budgets
to fund alternatives to incarceration.300 Instead, they advocate for
investment in jail-based services—that is, additional funding for their
offices. Sheriffs in New York told legislators and the press that they
opposed bail reform because people no longer incarcerated would be
“missing out” and may never have a “chance to come clean.”301
296. Joe Mahoney, New York Sheriffs Not Seeing Financial Savings from Bail Changes,
AUBURN CITIZEN (Jan. 28, 2020), https://auburnpub.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/new-yorksheriffs-not-seeing-financial-savings-from-bail-changes/article_a58f538d-9880-5cc8-926f03fb644d5fcc.html [https://perma.cc/5NAN-BX54].
297. The director of the New York State Sheriffs’ Association was careful to challenge the
suggestion that labor costs could be reduced, arguing that “[i]f you have one person in a cell block
or 20, you need the same number of officers,” due to state “staffing mandates imposed on jail
administrators” (which are primarily intended to protect detainees, not deputies). Id.
298. Jessica Pishko, When a Sheriff’s Jail Is Emptied, APPEAL (Jan. 24, 2020), https://
theappeal.org/politicalreport/sheriffs-and-bail-reform-the-badge [https://perma.cc/M5SJ-MLHV].
299. Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of ‘The People’ in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 267–68 (2019).
300. See, e.g., E. Fuller Torrey, Aaron D. Kennard, Don Eslinger, Richard Lamb & James
Pavle, More Mentally Ill Persons Are in Jails and Prisons than Hospitals: A Survey of the States,
TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR. (2010), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/
final_jails_v_hospitals_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YZZ-QLYH] (reporting a consensus among
Colorado sheriffs that “coping with the challenges posed by housing mentally ill inmates is the top
problem facing sheriff’s offices statewide”; quoting a Florida sheriff saying that “[j]ails have become
asylums for thousands of inmates with mental illnesses whose problems and needs far exceed what
jails can provide”).
301. Bail Reform: Suffolk County Sheriff Says Law Is Preventing Some Inmates from Receiving
Needed Help, CBS NEW YORK (Jan. 10, 2020), https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2020/01/10/bailreform-inmate-help [https://perma.cc/HD82-8VW7]; Joseph Spector, Chad Arnold, Jonathan
Bandler & Steve Lieberman, Impact of Ending Most Cash Bail in NY: Hundreds of Empty Jail
Cells, EVENING TRIB. (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.eveningtribune.com/news/20200127/impact-ofending-most-cash-bail-in-ny-hundreds-of-empty-jail-cells [https://perma.cc/54LC-K9EM]; see also
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Further evidence of the primacy of sheriffs’ bureaucratic
interests can be found in the explanations they give for their
disinclination to cite and release someone brought to jail for booking.
Often, they justify their resistance not in terms of the appropriateness
of incarcerating arrestees but in terms of professional respect.302 As one
Indiana sheriff recently said, “there’s no way I can . . . tell a police
officer I don’t have room for your criminal”; releasing arrestees “feels
like a slap in the face” to the arresting officers, whether employed by
his office or a municipal police department.303
A recent election in Snohomish County, Washington, illustrates
vividly the extent to which sheriff decisionmaking is driven not just by
views on crime and punishment but also by the demands of running and
maintaining control of a bureaucracy. In 2019, a sergeant in the
sheriff’s office, Adam Fortney, challenged sitting sheriff Ty Trenary.
The key focus of his campaign was opposition to Trenary’s policy to not
book misdemeanor arrestees who were under the influence of drugs.304
Although Fortney did accuse Trenary of being insufficiently “tough on
crime,” his messaging concentrated more heavily on the policy’s impact
on deputies than on public safety. Fortney argued that Trenary did not
appreciate the “impacts those jail restrictions [have on] the men and
Maki Becker, Fewer Inmates, More Larcenies: Sifting Through Bail Reform Controversy, BUFF.
NEWS (Feb. 8, 2020), https://buffalonews.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/fewer-inmates-morelarcenies-sifting-through-bail-reform-controversy/article_a584a4d4-97a6-5273-a7580e81639521f2.html [https://perma.cc/S8TV-UEAH] (thirty people have died in one of quoted
sheriff’s jails in last fifteen years).
302. Falcone & Wells, supra note 6, at 49 (describing sheriffs’ “symbiotic relationship” with
personnel, in contrast to “structural antagonism” and “natural alienation” of police officers from
administrators). Sheriffs also celebrate jail construction as job creation and fear the loss of jobs
that would accompany termination of a detention contract. See, e.g., Stole, supra note 137 (sheriff
“proud” that expanding jail has allowed him to “create over 200 jobs, and it’s very meaningful in
our parish, . . . not only the pay but they get health benefits”); Kirsti Marohn, Sherburne County
Proposes Expanding Jail for More ICE Detainees, MPRNEWS (June 4, 2019),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/06/04/sherburne-county-proposes-expanding-jail-for-moreice-detainees [https://perma.cc/R9WL-SHXG] (sheriff expressed concern that “[l]osing the ICE
contract would cost about 63 jobs in the sheriff’s office, while expanding the jail would create at
least 61 more jobs”).
303. Isaiah Seibert, Who’s in the Vanderburgh County’s Jail? A Look at the Population on One
Day, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.courierpress.com/
story/news/2019/10/21/snapshot-inmate-population-vanderburgh-county-jail/3835613002
[https://perma.cc/C2RQ-NKZD]. Of course, this reflects an important and unexamined carceral
assumption: that a police officer has done her job well by putting a person in jail. Consider, by
analogy, the description of a prosecutor’s role as obtaining convictions. Cf. Criminal Justice
Standards:
Prosecution
Function,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
3-1.2(b)
(4th
ed.
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEditi
on [https://perma.cc/ERG7-8ZL4] (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the
bounds of the law, not merely to convict.”).
304. Jason Rantz, Snohomish County Sheriff Candidate: ‘We Haven’t Had Support for Six
Years,’ 770 KTTH (Oct. 31, 2019), https://mynorthwest.com/1575933/snohomish-sheriff-adamfortney [https://perma.cc/WS65-KHAJ] (policy prompted by deaths in custody).
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women” he employed,305 who “aren’t really able to do their jobs.”306
Deputies were “frustrate[d],” he said, and did not feel “supported.”307
Arresting someone and being turned away, he said, “has a horrible
impact on morale.”308
Trenary, the incumbent, responded on policy grounds: “[Y]ou
can’t arrest your way out of the opioid or drug crisis,” he said, touting
innovations he had implemented, including outreach teams with social
workers, a “one-stop shop for treatment, detox, and wrap-around
services,” and a medication-assisted opioid treatment program. But his
campaign did not address the frustration of his employees.309 While he
was supported by a “long list of elected and executive leaders,” Fortney,
his challenger, was endorsed by the rank and file, including the
deputies’ association and a number of police unions across the county.310
Fortney won; in his victory speech, he promised to “open[ ] up the jail
for business again.”311
V. DECARCERAL REGULATION AND RESISTANCE
The remainder of this Article focuses on what policymakers and
the public can do with the account it provides of jails and jailers. It
begins from a simple premise about which there is growing consensus:
far too many people are in jail in America.312 The economic and political

305. Hana Kim, An Uncomfortable Race for Snohomish County Sheriff Comes Down to One
Key Difference, Q13 FOX (Oct. 31, 2019), https://q13fox.com/2019/10/31/an-admittedlyuncomfortable-race-for-snohomish-county-sheriff-comes-down-to-one-key-difference
[https://perma.cc/4Q27-ZAZ5].
306. Stephanie Klein, Trenary Loses to Fortney in Snohomish County Sheriff Race, 770
KTTH (Nov. 6, 2019), https://mynorthwest.com/1583829/snohomish-county-sheriff-election
[https://perma.cc/DLG6-Q44J].
307. King 5 Staff, Snohomish County Sheriff Concedes Election Before Results Drop on County
Site, KING 5 (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.king5.com/article/news/politics/elections/snohomishcounty-sheriff-election/281-c210cbd2-daa4-4741-a964-3d1c3f2b9025
[https://perma.cc/DA8ET5XL]; Rantz, supra note 304.
308. Rantz, supra note 304.
309. Klein, supra note 306.
310. Kim, supra note 305.
311. King 5 Staff, supra note 307. Shortly after the election, the county executive proposed
taking control of the jail away from the sheriff. Ben Watanabe, County Exec Suggests Taking Jail
Oversight Away from Sheriff, HERALDNET (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.heraldnet.com/
news/county-exec-suggests-taking-jail-oversight-away-from-sheriff [https://perma.cc/J4N6-3Z3P].
312. The extent of consensus can certainly be overstated. See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus
Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259 (2018). Some scholars have begun to
follow activists’ lead in questioning incarceration wholesale, interrogating whether it is the only,
or the best, way to enforce society’s behavioral norms and promote public safety. See Allegra M.
McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156 (2015); Amna A. Akbar,
Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 460–73 (2018). But even the
incrementalists agree that “[w]hatever it did before,” when incarceration rates were lower, carceral
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dynamics of jail expansion and population management this Article has
elucidated are among the numerous indications that jail size has
become dangerously untethered from reasonable judgments about
social control. From a deeper understanding of jail finance and
governance, this Part argues, emerges not only evidence of carceral
excess but also promising decarceral tools, some of which advocates
have begun to employ. It highlights two very different avenues to
disincentivize and deter jail overgrowth: state and federal judicial and
administrative regulation, and local elections and budgeting.
A. Regulating Jail Contracting as Public Enterprise
In recent years, state courts and federal agencies have begun to
recognize that jail contracting has become a public enterprise and to
conclude that the constraints imposed on sheriffs and commissioners
should reflect this turn. They have taken seriously the sheriff of
Rapides Parish, Louisiana, who called himself a jail “CEO,” and the
commissioners of Jefferson County, Pennsylvania, who celebrated their
ability to rent “a lot” of juvenile detention beds at a lucrative rate as
“good news.”313 These developments, which arise in arenas as diverse
as state-court adjudication of labor disputes and federal agency
regulation of tax exemption, may prove useful in efforts to strip jailing
of its revenue motive.
For much of American history, jails were seen by courts and
legislatures as elements of local governance so essential that they
warranted special exemption from fiscal limitations. 314 This view
“growth now almost certainly imposes a net social loss.” PFAFF, supra note 22, at 115. The tools
discussed in this Section will be of interest to those across the decarceral spectrum.
313. Brooke Buford, The Business of Being Sheriff: Crunching the Numbers at RPSO, KALB
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.kalb.com/content/news/The-Business-of-Being-Sheriff-Crunching-thenumbers-at-RPSO—506787291.html [https://perma.cc/EZK7-DB6M]; Linda Harris, Jefferson
County Jail Will Take Juveniles from Indiana County, Pennsylvania, HERALD-STAR (Nov. 30,
2019), https://www.heraldstaronline.com/news/local-news/2019/11/jefferson-county-jail-will-takejuvenile-inmates-from-indiana-county-pennsylvania [https://perma.cc/5DFK-6A9Z].
314. See, e.g., Potter v. Douglas Cnty., 87 Mo. 239, 241–44 (1885) (concluding that if a
constitutional debt limit applied to sheriff’s jailing expenses, counties without sufficient revenue
would be in a “lamentable . . . predicament,” “bereft . . . of all means for the safe keeping of that
dangerous class of persons”); Durritt v. Buxton, 39 S.W. 56, 57 (Ark. 1897) (recognizing the
continuing validity of a special act authorizing the county court to contract for the building of a
jail without prior appropriation); Gladwin v. Ames, 71 P. 189, 189–90 (Wash. 1903) (holding that
a municipal warrant for building a city jail was valid despite the city exceeding the limit of its
indebtedness because it is “absolutely necessary for the protection, and therefore for the existence
of the city, that some provision should be made for the compulsory detention of criminals”);
Collingsworth Cnty. v. Allred, 40 S.W.2d 13, 16–17 (Tex. 1931) (construing a constitutional
amendment precluding the legislature from authorizing the issuance of municipal bonds to not
impair the rights of counties to issue bonds for jail construction, in light of the “absolute necessity
of creating debts to build courthouses and jails” and the “most disastrous consequences” that would
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reflected governmental practice in the early republic; jails were among
the first public buildings erected in newly formed counties. 315 As the
Florida Supreme Court explained forcefully in 1952:
A county jail or courthouse stands in a different class from any other county building or
any other county undertaking. The erection of a county jail or courthouse serves not only
a county purpose, but it is an absolute and indispensable county necessity. A county
government could not exist without a county jail and a courthouse. . . . Without jails
or places of detention and incarceration, we would have confusion, disorder, chaos
and anarchy.316

Jail exceptionalism in state and local finance law has continued
into the present in many jurisdictions.317 Some state courts still permit
jail financing mechanisms in violation of constitutional debt limits,
though, as in West Virginia, they may now justify this treatment in
terms of the importance of providing acceptable conditions of
confinement.318 In Nevada, a fiscal note is required for any legislation
that would reduce local government revenues or increase

result if counties were unable to do so); State v. Santa Rosa Cnty., 105 So. 2d 365, 368 (Fla. 1958)
(confirming consistent holding that “jails are essential to the existence of county government and
do not have to be approved by a vote of the freeholders”); Chism v. Jefferson Cnty., 954 So. 2d 1058,
1097 (Ala. 2006) (Parker, J., dissenting), as modified on reh’g (Oct. 5, 2006) (quoting statement
from 1901 legislative debate over constitutional debt limit that “the reason counties should create
debts are very few[—]to build court houses and jails, and bridges, and roads”); cf. Luter v. Pulaski
Cnty. Hosp. Ass’n, 34 S.W.2d 770, 771–72 (Ark. 1931) (recounting differing judicial positions as to
whether county could contract to spend more than annual revenue to erect or repair jail and
legislative response thereto, but confirming agreement that jails were “absolutely necessary in the
administration of the state government”).
315. The first book of minutes of the commissioners of Carroll County, Maryland, reflects that
their initial task was finding a site for a county jail. Prior to its construction, prisoners were housed
in a private home, outfitted by the sheriff with “chains and rings.” Mary Ann Ashcraft, Carroll
Yesteryears: Carroll County’s Beginnings Included a Jail, Free Schools, CARROLL CNTY. TIMES
(Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/carroll/lifestyles/cc-lt-carroll-yesteryears120719-20191206-i632yug5bngx3eqygbvllz4wea-story.html [https://perma.cc/G8P9-DEH5]. One
early act of the first judges of Gloucester County, Vermont—who initially met in the “howling
wilderness,” wearing snowshoes—was to commission the sheriff to build a jail “out of logs.” Harold
Goldman, The Wild East: Law and Justice in Vermont’s Earliest Courts, 1768-1775, 20 VT. BAR J.
& L. DIG. 35, 36 (1994). The “monumental rock features” marking the intersection of the westward
Oregon and California trails came to be known as the “Courthouse and Jail Rocks.” Courthouse
and
Jail
Rocks,
NAT’L
PARK
SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/scotts_bluff/
courthouse_jail_rocks.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/QDS6-AZTA].
316. State v. Fla. State Improvement Comm’n, 60 So. 2d 747, 749 (Fla. 1952); see also id. at
752 (declining to extend this treatment to county hospitals).
317. In economic terms, this treatment is animated by the view that jails are public goods with
positive externalities that taxpayers can be expected to underfund. See Daniel J. D’Amico, The
Business Ethics of Incarceration: The Moral Implications of Treating Prisons Like Businesses, 31
REASON PAPERS 125, 125–26 (2009); Daniel J. D’Amico, The Prison in Economics: Private and
Public Incarceration in Ancient Greece, 145 PUB. CHOICE 461, 463 (2010).
318. See State ex rel. W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. W. Va. Inv. Mgmt. Bd., 508
S.E.2d 130, 138 (W. Va. 1998) (permitting legislature to evade constitutional debt limitation in
using proceeds of state insurance taxes to finance jail-construction bonds considering importance
of meeting constitutional confinement standards).
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expenditures—except if it does so by increasing jail populations. 319 A
couple of years ago, following the transfer of many state prisoners to
county jails, the Indiana legislature authorized counties to impose
additional income taxes exclusively for the purpose of jail building.320
And, as in Washington, the sparse restrictions on detention contracting
imposed by state law often incentivize rather than inhibit ongoing
participation in the bedspace market.321
As jails have increasingly sought revenue from the bedspace
market, however, some courts have begun to recognize the significance
of this departure from their traditional, core function and to deviate
from the privileged treatment jail finance was previously afforded.322 In
2008, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals heard a dispute between the
sheriff of Ozaukee County and a union representing his deputies.323 The
sheriff had created a new unit at the behest of the county circuit court
to improve security at the county courthouse. A major function of the
unit, however, was to transport federal and state detainees housed in
the Ozaukee County Jail pursuant to detention contracts.324 The parties
agreed that the sheriff’s appointment of deputies to this unit had not
complied with the union’s collective bargaining agreement.325 The
parties also acknowledged “the well-settled law that a sheriff may not
be restricted in whom he or she assigns to carry out his or her
constitutional duties if he or she is performing immemorial, principal,
and important duties characterized as belonging to the sheriff at
common law.”326 The case turned on whether the transportation of
contract detainees was such a “constitutionally protected” duty. 327
The court held for the union, focusing repeatedly on the fact that
this was a “money-generating” task.328 Although creation of the unit
319. NEV. REV. STAT. § 218D.435 (2021).
320. H.B. 1263, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018).
321. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 70.48.090 (2021) (only limits on freedom to contract arise
“when state funds are provided to construct or remodel a jail in one governing unit that will be
used to house prisoners of other governing units”; then, termination is prohibited or penalized).
322. But see Cent. La. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Avoyelles Par. Police Jury, 493 So. 2d 1249, 1257–58
(La. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that the sheriff undertook to expand parish jail and police jury
incurred debt to fund expansion based on an understanding that it would house more detainees
for other jurisdictions, but rejecting challenge to issuance of debt on this ground).
323. Ozaukee Cnty. v. Lab. Ass’n of Wis., 763 N.W.2d 140 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
324. See id. at 143.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 144 (citing Wis. Pro. Police Ass’n v. Cnty. of Dane, 316 N.W.2d 656 (Wis. 1982)).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 148; see also Milwaukee Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Clarke, 772 N.W.2d 216, 222–23
(Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (further relying on this distinction). Over a century earlier, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court recognized a different category of county detention facilities as characteristically
revenue generating: “insane asylums.” Kyes v. St. Croix Cnty., 83 N.W. 637, 638 (Wis. 1900). Our
jails have become mental health institutions in more ways than one.
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had been prompted by the county court’s request for extra security, the
court explained, “[t]he transport of other entities’ prisoners in order to
provide prisoners bed space in exchange for revenue is separate and
distinct.”329 The court also saw that transportation of contract detainees
was uncoupled from—and did not serve—the interests of the local
criminal legal system. “These noncounty prisoners,” it said, “are not
held at the behest of the Ozaukee court and will have no occasion to go
before the Ozaukee court.”330 Growth-favoring deregulatory treatment
was inappropriate when jailing was done for profit, not public safety.
In 2016, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine was asked to
decide whether Somerset County would be able to profit from its
contract with the Marshals Service.331 Somerset County
significantly overbuilt its new county jail with a clear intent to recoup construction costs
by using its surplus capacity to house inmates from courts of other jurisdictions
(principally the federal courts) and apply the boarding fees to retirement of the
construction debt. The boarding capabilities of the Somerset County Jail create[d] a quasiproprietary income-generating mechanism for the County.332

This quickly brought it into conflict with the state Board of Corrections,
responsible for managing state subsidies for jail operations and
overseeing the supply of jail bedspace. After commissioners directed
surplus revenue from the detention contract towards future capital
improvements at the jail and spent the remainder to service its jailconstruction debt, the Board withheld state subsidy funds as an
offset.333 The majority and dissent both recognized that Somerset
County sought to “profit” off its excess bedspace, but their attitudes to
this endeavor differed markedly.334 The dissent protested that “[f]or all
of its forward thinking and planning, Somerset County’s reward” was
to lose its state subsidy funds, which were “replaced with the Board’s
disheartening suggestion that it seek debt reduction funds through yet
another tax on the residents of Somerset County.”335 The
majority, though, was dismayed by the county’s attempt at jail
profiteering, recognizing it as an obstacle to the Board’s efforts to

329. Ozaukee Cnty. v. Lab. Ass’n of Wis., 763 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
330. Id. The county pointed to three examples from the mid-nineteenth century in support of
its position that sheriffs had “long administered [the] jail to do more than house inmates who will
be appearing before the county court,” one of which involved the brief incarceration in the
Milwaukee County Jail of a person detained by a U.S. Marshal as a fugitive slave. Id. at 146–47.
See generally Justin Simard, Citing Slavery, 72 STAN. L. REV. 79 (2020) (suggesting that the legal
profession reckon with its tradition of citing cases involving slavery as authority).
331. Somerset Cnty. v. Dep’t of Corr., 133 A.3d 1006, 1008 (Me. 2016).
332. Id. at 1018 (Mead, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 1010–11 (majority opinion).
334. See id. at 1020 (Mead, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 1019.
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create a “coordinated correctional system” with the right amount of
carceral capacity.336
Federal agencies have likewise recognized—and regulated—the
ways that county jails are being used as engines of municipal profit. In
the past half-decade, the Internal Revenue Service’s Tax Exempt and
Government Entities Division has initiated a number of investigations
into whether it was improper to characertize municipal bonds used to
finance jail construction as tax exempt when a significant portion of the
bedspace was rented out.337 Generally, interest on state and local bonds
is excluded from gross income for purposes of federal taxation.338 But
this tax exemption does not apply to bonds that meet the “private
business use” and “private security or payment” tests. 339 The division
has concluded that jails filled in large part through federal detention
contracts fail these tests.340
For example, bonds were issued to finance the construction of a
440-bed jail facility in Glades County, Florida.341 While the Glades

336. Id. at 1016 (majority opinion).
337. See Matt Clarke, Jails in Trouble as IRS Investigates Tax-Exempt Bonds, PRISON LEGAL
NEWS (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2015/aug/31/jails-trouble-irsinvestigates-tax-exempt-bonds [https://perma.cc/2QXY-UDKG]. These investigations remain a
priority of the division. See Tax Exempt & Gov’t Entities Div., Fiscal Year 2020 Program Letter,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 4, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5313--2019.pdf (last visited Mar.
14, 2021) [https://perma.cc/G8P2-YDTD].
338. 26 U.S.C. § 103(a). This tax advantage makes them appealing to investors.
339. Id. § 103(b)(1); id. § 141(b)(1) (more than 10% of bond proceeds for private business use);
id. § 141(b)(2) (more than 10% of bond debt service to be derived directly or indirectly from
payments for or secured by private business property).
340. See, e.g., Letter from Allyson D. Belsome, Manager, Tax Exempt Bonds Field Operations,
to Jeffrey Cox, Fin. Manager, Baker Corr. Dev. Corp. 2 (July 18, 2017),
https://emma.msrb.org/ER1070348-ER838489-ER1239351.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GDD2-SH9D];
Notice of Material Event, Baker County Correctional Development Corporation First Mortgage
Revenue Bonds (Baker County Detention Center Project) Series 2008, BAKER CNTY. CORR. DEV.
CORP. 1 (Sept. 27, 2016), https://emma.msrb.org/ES824855-ES647222-ES1042341.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PS9C-49M2]; Notice of Filing of Trust Instruction Proceeding, Hearing Date and
Related Matters, Baker Corr. Dev. Corp. First Mortgage Revenue Bonds (Baker County Detention
Center Project) Series 2008, UMB BANK, NAT’L ASS’N 1, 7 (May 15, 2017),
https://emma.msrb.org/EP994203-EP770945-EP1172717.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DGA-6RF8];
Letter from Allyson D. Belsome, Manager, Tax Exempt Bonds Field Operations, to Pamela
Heltner, Otero Cnty., N.M. 2 (August 4, 2017), https://emma.msrb.org/EP1023716-EP793227EP1194794.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU2C-Z8TA]; Notice of Material Event, Otero County, New
Mexico Jail Project Revenue Bonds, Series 2007, OTERO CNTY, N.M. 1 (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://emma.msrb.org/ES996859-ES780692-ES1182002.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DM8-DETY]. See
generally Clarke, supra note 337 (detailing the recent IRS crackdown on misuse of tax-exempt
bonds for jail construction projects).
341. Notice of Material Tax Event, Glades Correctional Development Corporation First
Mortgage Revenue Bonds (Glades County Detention Center Project) Series 2006, UMB BANK, NAT’L
ASS’N
(Feb.
13,
2017),
https://emma.msrb.org/ES1009263-ES790584-ES1191826.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NK3C-SLQ9] [hereinafter Glades County Notice]; see also Jacob Kang-Brown &
Jack Norton, More Than a Jail, VERA INST. OF JUST. (July 5, 2018), https://www.vera.org/in-our-
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County Sheriff’s Office was to manage the facility and house some of its
own detainees there, the jail was intended primarily to house ICE and
Marshals Service detainees.342 Expected revenue from the rental of
about 85% of the bedspace to these federal agencies was used to secure
the debt.343 As the financial report for the project put it, the project was
“viewed as a means to address the County’s own need and as an
opportunity to offer beds for rental to the[se] Federal agencies,
producing economic benefits to the County.”344 As a result, the IRS
determined that the bonds met the private business tests and had been
improperly classified as tax exempt.345 Notably, Glades County’s federal
detention contract would have fallen within a regulatory exception to
the private business use rule if the contract had been short-term and
the property’s construction had not been “financed for a principal
purpose” of providing it for use by the federal agencies.346 Like the court
in Maine, the IRS has concluded that when a jail is purpose-built to
raise revenue as a provider of detention services, rather than built
primarily to serve the local criminal legal system, it should not benefit
from the preferential treatment afforded to core public functions.347
During previous administrations, the Department of Justice’s
Office of the Inspector General has also criticized the department’s
practice of allowing localities to profit (in some cases, handsomely) from
reimbursement that exceeds the “actual, allowable, and allocable costs
associated with operation of the facility that benefit federal
backyards-stories/glades-county-more-than-a-jail [https://perma.cc/K35U-KHAW] (explaining
how Glades County became a “hub of incarceration, immigration detention, and deportation”).
342. Glades County Notice, supra note 341, at 1–2.
343. Id. at 2.
344. Id. at 2–3.
345. Id. at 4. Branches of the federal government may not speak in unison. In a similar case,
Baker County, Florida’s jail bonds were reclassified; officials obtained a federal rural development
loan, as discussed infra, to help the county cover the cost of redeeming the bonds and reissuing
them as taxable securities. Jack Norton & Jacob Kang-Brown, Federal Farm Aid for the Big House,
VERA INST. OF JUST. (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.vera.org/in-our-backyards-stories/federal-farmaid-for-the-big-house [https://perma.cc/LD4A-A53K].
346. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.141-3(d)(3)(i) (2021) (the exception); id. § 1.141-3(f) (examples).
347. The division has also been investigating the taxability of bonds issued to finance privately
managed prisons and jails. See Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-5 I.R.B. 18 (detailing when a management
contract will result in private business use). When a management contract includes profit sharing,
IRS regulations dictate that “private payments will arise if the [facility] houses other prisoners
(such as those of a neighboring jurisdiction) for a fee.” Bob Eidnier, IRS Scrutiny Puts Prison
Financings
on
Lockdown,
PUB.
FIN.
TAX
BLOG
(Nov.
12,
2014),
https://www.publicfinancetaxblog.com/2014/11/irs-scrutiny-puts-prison-financings-on-lockdown
[https://perma.cc/S6S6-76TP]. While fees can be used to cover operating expenses attributable to
detainees held for other jurisdictions, “if the fees provide any contribution toward overhead or
financing cost, then the issuer will realize net private payments that count against the private
payment limit [for tax exemption].” Id. In this context as well, the IRS recognizes that when a local
government’s decision to expand jail bedspace is financed (and the debt incurred in doing so is
serviced) by renting that bedspace out, the project is no longer motivated by a public purpose.
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detainees.”348 The nuances of the Inspector General’s dispute with the
Office of the Federal Detention Trustee and Justice Management
Division are beyond the scope of this Article. For present purposes, the
important observation is that since receiving statutory authorization to
make payments in excess of costs to localities with detention contracts,
federal officials have eagerly departed from past practice to do so, often
without bothering to modify the language of their contracts to reflect
the change.349 As these audits recognize, reimbursement at a rate
beyond operational costs serves to ensure that jail bedspace remains
available for federal use.350 The logical conclusion they do not expressly
acknowledge is that profit will also incentivize carceral growth.
As these state and federal examples suggest, the motivators of
detention policy may be easiest to glimpse, and thus to regulate, in
intergovernmental interstices. Much as Emma Kaufman’s study of
interstate prisoner transfers and Ben Grunwald and John Rappaport’s
work on “wandering” police officers excavate deep questions of law and
policy (a jurisdiction’s obligations to those it punishes and the adequacy
of administrative police accountability mechanisms, respectively) by
putting a relatively narrow subset of inter- rather than intra-entity
actions under microscopic focus, studying interjurisdictional markets

348. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV., OVERSIGHT OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE AND THE OFFICE
OF
THE
FEDERAL DETENTION TRUSTEE, AUDIT REPORT 07-26, at 130 (2007),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/USMS/a0726/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D72L-HBBQ]. This is not to
suggest that all or even most jurisdictions with federal detention contracts end up experiencing
net economic benefit. In the prison-building context, “[a]lthough empirical studies suggest that
[economic] benefits are minimal to none, local politicians and their constituents certainly believe
they exist.” PFAFF, supra note 22, at 88 & 262 n.23 (citing Amy K. Glasmeier & Tracey Farrigan,
The Economic Impacts of the Prison Development Boom on Persistently Poor Rural Places, 30 INT’L
REG’L SCI. REV. 274 (2007); Gregory Hooks, Clayton Mosher, Thomas Rotolo & Linda Laboa, The
Prison Industry: Carceral Expansion and Employment in US Counties, 1969-1994, 85 SOC. SCI. Q.
37 (2004)); John Eason, Prisons as Panacea or Pariah? The Countervailing Consequences of the
Prison Boom on the Political Economy of Rural Towns, 6 SOC. SCI. 7 (2017); cf. Felicia Arriaga,
Banking on Immigrants, SCALAWAG (May 27, 2019), https://www.scalawagmagazine.org/
2019/05/north-carolina-ice [https://perma.cc/4PZ3-ABPN] (although officials “initially highlighted
cost recovery as a reason to adopt 287(g)” immigration enforcement deputization agreements,
“program costs covered by local government far outpaced federal reimbursements”). For an
unusually rigorous assessment of the comparative costs of different approaches to rural county jail
expansion, see Mark A. Edelman & Adrian J. Mayer, An Analysis of Costs by Size of Jail for
Selected Counties in Iowa (Iowa State Univ., Econ. Staff Paper 289, 1997), https://lib.
dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1289&context=econ_las_staffpapers [https://perma.cc/
5XC2-GNG2].
349. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 348, at 9–17.
350. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV., THE UNITED
STATES MARSHALS SERVICE’S COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT PROGRAM, AUDIT REPORT 05-28 (2005),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/USMS/a0528/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/C39E-FGL8] (declining use
of direct capital investment in jails in exchange for guaranteed bedspace).
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for jail bedspace illuminates covert but powerful drivers of local
jail expansion.351
More practically, these junctures could also provide an
opportunity for meaningful pressure in a decarceral direction. At the
federal level, a quirk of tax law presently deems an Ohio jail holding
ICE detainees—but not one renting space to the state or another
county, even one in Kentucky—to be put to private business use. A
Congress genuinely interested in addressing mass incarceration could
disincentivize overexpansion of county jails across America by altering
this rule and making clear that bonds used to build a jail to hold
detainees for any other jurisdiction will be taxable.352 At the state level,
the market in jail bedspace currently operates without centralized
regulation in most jurisdictions; it could be constrained by statutory
restrictions on construction and the use of detention revenue, by
replacement of per capita fees with a different reimbursement
model, by conversion to a regional jail system, or by a cap-andtrade program.353
B. The Ballot and the Budget
At the local level, decarceral strategies include nascent efforts to
elect more progressive sheriffs as well as campaigns, primarily
targeting commissioners, to cut back funding for jails. Both approaches
face challenges but hold promise.
Unlike police chiefs354 and corrections commissioners,355 their
351. Kaufman, supra note 134; Ben Grunwald & John Rappaport, The Wandering Officer, 129
YALE L.J. 1676 (2020).
352. Such a move would reduce overall counties’ incentives to build the jail bedspace on which
federal agencies rely; however, it would actually increase the relative appeal of expansion to
accommodate a federal detention contract, which is disfavored under current tax law.
353. See Eisenberg, supra note 243, at 126 (shifting from per capita reimbursement model
would realign incarceration incentives for county jails holding state prisoners as well as for private
prisons); John Eck, Cheryl L. Johnson & Francis T. Cullen, The Small Prison, in THE AMERICAN
PRISON: IMAGINING A DIFFERENT FUTURE (Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl L. Johnson & Mary K. Stohr
eds., 2013) (proposing cap-and-trade). Of course, it would be critical to study any less-than-direct
mode of regulation to determine whether it actually had a decarceral effect.
354. See Fred W. Rainguet & Mary Dodge, The Problems of Police Chiefs: An Examination of
the Issues in Tenure and Turnover, 4 POLICE Q. 269, 269 (2001) (average police chief tenures of 2.5
to 5.5 years); Yudu Li & Ben Brown, Police Chief Turnover in Texas: An Exploratory Analysis of
Peer-Evaluation Survey Data Pertinent to Police Performance and Turnover, 22 POLICE Q. 391, 393
(2019) (average police chief tenures of four to six years).
355. See Michael Zoorob, There’s (Rarely) a New Sheriff in Town: The Incumbency Advantage
for County Sheriffs (2020) (manuscript at 1–2, 14), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3485700 [https://perma.cc/P4VY-NXXP]. Per the author’s review, as of the
beginning of 2020, thirty-one states’ heads of correctional agencies had been replaced in the
preceding two years (in one case, twice); all but four had been replaced in the preceding five years.
Only two, in Louisiana and Wyoming, had been in office over a decade.
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closest analogues, sheriffs are almost always elected,356 but this does
not necessarily make them more accountable.357 Historically, at least,
sheriffs—who are almost always white and male358—have been
unusually insulated from electoral pressures.359 Rural local elections
tend to be low-turnout affairs, with local politics controlled by business
interests.360 Even against this backdrop, sheriffs have enjoyed striking
levels of job security. Their tenures in office are extraordinarily long: an
average of eleven years and as long as half a century.361 When they run
for reelection, they are frequently unopposed and enjoy an incumbency
advantage that “far exceeds that of other local offices and even members
of Congress.”362
Also unlike police chiefs and corrections commissioners, sheriffs
are not directly accountable to other elected government officials
because they generally cannot be removed from office except in cases of
extreme misconduct.363 In a survey of police chiefs and sheriffs about
356. Sheriffs in Rhode Island and a few counties in other states are appointed rather than
elected. Other than in Indiana, New Mexico, West Virginia, and some Colorado counties, they have
no term limits. NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, supra note 52.
357. Cf. John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539,
1594 n.322 (2017) (view of law enforcement insurer that “sheriffs tend to be more resistant [to
pressure from insurers] than police chiefs because sheriffs are elected rather than appointed”).
Margo Schlanger is certainly correct that sheriffs are more likely than governors to get bad press
coverage and face electoral consequences from a damages award in a conditions case. Schlanger,
supra note 18, at 1681–82. But it is probably true that sheriffs, who rarely lose elections for any
reason, rarely lose them due to jail (mis)management. To the extent that bad press coverage about
their jails does matter to sheriffs, it is likely to induce jail building; sheriffs are unlikely to be
blamed for high taxes. On the limits of local news coverage of sheriffs, see also Lindsey Meeks,
Undercovered, Underinformed: Local News, Local Elections, and U.S. Sheriffs, 21 JOURNALISM
STUD. 1609, 1610 (2020).
358. Bulman, supra note 192, at 1843 (only 4% of counties had a Black sheriff at any time
between 1991 and 2015); Confronting the Demographics of Power: America’s Sheriffs, REFLECTIVE
DEMOCRACY (June 2020), https://wholeads.us/research/americas-sheriffs/ [https://perma.cc/3JMQDRN8] (90% of sheriffs are white men).
359. When a sheriff is voted out of office, it commonly reflects voters’ rejection of his ethical
(usually, financial) impropriety, rather than his policy positions. See, e.g., Joseph Cranney, SC
Voters Usher in New Wave of Sheriffs After Scandals. Advocates Eye Reforms., POST & COURIER
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/sc-voters-usher-in-new-wave-of-sheriffsafter-scandals-advocates-eye-reforms/article_14e451f0-1dfb-11eb-8a11-23e4bc6f877d.html
[https://perma.cc/UDQ9-HVWB].
360. Su, supra note 33, at 856–58, 886.
361. Zoorob, supra note 355, at 13–14.
362. Zoorob, supra note 355, at 2; see also Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 6, at 319, 323–25. There
is reason to believe that handovers of power between sheriffs are frequently mediated by other
elected county or state officials empowered to fill vacancies in the office until the next election
occurs. See, e.g., Zara Ahmed, Flint Police Chief Resigns, Enters Genesee County Sheriff’s Race,
MLIVE (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/2019/11/flint-police-chief-resigns-entersgenesse-county-sheriffs-race.html [https://perma.cc/3RAJ-8GJD] (current sheriff was appointed
when previous one retired and has since been reelected five times).
363. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-16-26 (2021) (permitting removal from office only by the
governor, upon recommendation of review commission of two other sheriffs and attorney general);
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conditions that might jeopardize their positions, both expressed similar
concerns about a variety of issues, with one glaring difference: 44% of
chiefs identified “political pressure from other government officials” as
a very serious issue, while only 18% of sheriffs did.364
There is also reason to question whether the policy positions of
sitting sheriffs are easily shaped by the electoral process. Political
scientist Dan Thompson, who has compiled the largest available
database of sheriff elections, found evidence that Democratic and
Republican sheriffs from politically similar counties make similar
immigration enforcement decisions, indicating that partisan contests
may have little effect on policy choices.365 His analysis suggests that
sheriffs’ decisionmaking is influenced less by the pressure of
competitive elections and more by candidate entry and selection.366 In
brief: “candidates for sheriff need law enforcement credentials to run,”
and this requirement produces candidates that fall within a “narrow
band of the ideological spectrum.”367
That said, there are historical and contemporary bases for
guarded optimism that electoral politics can, at least in some
jurisdictions, influence criminal legal policymaking by sheriffs. Two
see also Jason Pohl & Ryan Gabrielson, We Revealed California Jails are in Crisis. Gavin Newsom
Is Calling for More Oversight, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.sacbee.com/
news/investigations/california-prisons/article237336684.html
[https://perma.cc/JPF4-HLC7]
(“challenging local sheriffs could prove more difficult” than other aspects of governor’s criminal
legal reform platform; proposed bill allowing counties to create sheriff oversight bodies with
subpoena power was shelved after opposition from state sheriffs’ association, whose lobbyist said,
“[s]heriffs and jails are already overseen or monitored”). The relative frequency with which sheriffs
engage in egregious misbehavior is itself evidence of their self-perceived impunity. See, e.g., Tony
Bartelme, Not Exactly Mayberry: SC Sheriffs Earn 2019 Newsmaker of the Year for Scandalous
Behavior, POST & COURIER (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/sc-sheriffs-earn2019-newsmaker-of-the-year-for-scandalous-behavior/article_3287a316-1847-11ea-bef3673772ca16df.html [https://perma.cc/6QJ6-WPDM].
364. Zoorob, supra note 355, at 15–16.
365. Daniel M. Thompson, How Partisan Is Local Law Enforcement? Evidence from Sheriff
Cooperation with Immigration Authorities, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 222, 227–29 (2020).
366. Id. at 224. Qualified and credible challengers with divergent policy perspectives are
especially hard to come by in rural areas. Cf. Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, Picking
Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1537, 1537 (2020) (showing based on national survey of local
prosecutor elections that “incumbents are rarely contested and almost always win”; revealing
“stark divide between rural and urban prosecution,” in that rural areas “rarely hold contested
elections and sometimes are not able to field even a single candidate for a prosecutor election,”
such that elections are “not a likely source of reform”).
367. Thompson, supra note 365, at 224. In many states, the requirement of law enforcement
experience is de jure, but elsewhere it is essentially de facto; over 95% of sheriffs have prior law
enforcement experience. Id. at 224 n.4. One key area for further research is how those sheriffs
without such experience differ in terms of jail policy. The emergence of “progressive” prosecutors
has involved recruitment of candidates without prosecutorial (and often with criminal defense)
experience. See Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1415,
1424–25 (2021). Any similar trend in the profession of sheriff might involve candidates with social
service backgrounds, at least in states where they would be eligible for election.
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recent studies provide evidence that Black sheriffs, and the sheriffs that
Black voters elect, exercise their discretion to arrest fewer Black people
for low-level crimes.368 One showed that following the passage of the
Voting Rights Act, Black people were arrested at lower rates in areas it
covered “with a large number of newly enfranchised black voters,” and
that this decrease was driven by a drop in low-level arrests by sheriffs’
deputies.369 Another found that in the rare instances when Black
sheriffs replace white sheriffs, arrests of Black people go down,
particularly for less-serious offenses.370
Recently, concerted mobilizations have unseated an increasing
number of sheriffs. In 2014 and 2016, two metropolitan sheriffs
notorious for their egregiously improper jail management were forced
or voted out of office.371 A study of sheriff elections during the 2018
midterm—a referendum on the presidential administration—found
that in a dozen elections where “local campaigns [were] nationalized”
by a focus on immigration enforcement, incumbents were much less
safe; more than half lost.372 Now, for the first time, national advocacy
groups are investing in sheriff elections, led by a group called Sheriffs
for Trusting Communities, and coordinated local organizing is
underway.373 This effort has notched a few significant victories already,
including in 2020 races in Cobb and Gwinnett Counties in Georgia’s

368. Similar studies of electoral impacts on sheriffs’ decisions to expand bedspace and release
incarcerated people are sorely needed.
369. Giovanni Facchini, Brian G. Knight & Cecilia Testa, The Franchise, Policing, and Race:
Evidence from Arrests Data and the Voting Rights Act 30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 27463, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27463 [https://perma.cc/W4BU-DZM6]
(finding no corresponding pattern for arrests of white people).
370. Bulman, supra note 192, at 1850–53.
371. Lee Baca of Los Angeles County, California, and Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona,
both lost their jobs thanks to hard-fought organizing and litigation campaigns. See Shelby Grad,
The Rise and Fall of Lee Baca, L.A. County’s Onetime ‘Teflon Sheriff’, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-baca-story-20170315-story.html
[https://perma.cc/
3JWM-GWZL]; Fernanda Santos, Joe Arpaio’s Surprising Legacy in Arizona, POLITICO MAG. (Nov.
10, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/11/10/joe-arpaio-arizona-latino-activistselected-office-229906 [https://perma.cc/2UZV-MA4U]. For a detailed history of the campaign
against Arpaio, see Sunita Patel, Jumping Hurdles to Sue the Police, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2257,
2316–38 (2020). These sheriffs were outliers: both had been involved in extensive litigation
regarding civil rights abuses, and both were subsequently convicted of federal crimes. See Matt
Hamilton, Former Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca Is Now a Prison Inmate in Texas, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-02-05/former-los-angelescounty-sheriff-lee-baca-is-now-a-prison-inmate-in-texas [https://perma.cc/7GN2-4J4D].
372. Michael Zoorob, Going National: Immigration Enforcement and the Politicization of Local
Police, 53 POL. SCI. & POL. 421, 424 (2020) (but observing that the “presence of challengers” is a
“scope condition” limiting electoral pressure on sheriffs).
373. Id. at 423; SHERIFFS FOR TRUSTING COMMUNITIES, https://www.trustingsheriffs.org (last
visited Jan. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/F8X8-YWLN]; see also Ouziel, supra note 6, at 550 n.98
(providing examples of local efforts across the country).
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metro Atlanta area and in Charleston County, South Carolina.374 In all
three, the successful challengers (two Black men and a white woman)
promised to immediately terminate 287(g) agreements with ICE. 375 In
Hamilton County, Ohio, a whistleblower who was fired after
complaining about excessive use of force against jail detainees was
elected sheriff.376
Given the challenges to electoral accountability for sheriffs,
advocates have pursued strategies that go after jailers’ pocketbooks in
addition to their badges. Decarceral organizers have increasingly
demanded reductions not simply in the number of people incarcerated
but also in the funding for and number of jail beds. 377 They appreciate
that fiscal constraints on bedspace may more durably undermine
carceral excess than changes in policing, prosecutorial, and adjudicative
practice. While a district attorney’s bail practices and a police chief’s or
sheriff’s cite-and-release policy can be changed in a memo or an election,
building a jail costs tens or hundreds of millions of dollars over a period
of years, and significant budget cuts would block new construction and
necessitate closures and layoffs, changes that are harder to reverse.378
Campaigns to block funding for jail expansions or defund
existing jails have made tremendous strides in recent years. In Los
Angeles, for example, a powerful coalition of organizers combined
efforts to curtail the sheriff’s power with a push to siphon money away
from jail construction and towards alternatives to incarceration. In
2020, it won passage of Measure R, which gave a civilian oversight
board subpoena power to investigate complaints against the sheriff and
also authorized it to draft a plan to reduce jail population levels, and
Measure J, which dedicated 10% of local revenue (hundreds of millions
of dollars per year) to community investment and alternatives to

374. Daniel Nichanian, ICE Suffered Blows in the South in Last Week’s Elections, APPEAL
(Nov. 12, 2020), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/sheriffs-2020-immigration [https://perma.cc/
DB4S-YG6L].
375. Id.
376. Maria Cramer, Woman Who Says She Was Fired for Being a Lesbian Is Elected Sheriff,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/08/us/charmaine-mcguffey-sheriffhamilton.html [https://perma.cc/Q33P-Q5BY].
377. During the Civil Rights Movement, limited jail capacity also proved critical in challenging
abuses at the hands of sheriffs. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., put it in 1960, “If we fill up his
jails, the white man will have no place to put us.” Ray Cromley, Negroes Plan to Extend ‘Sit-ins,’
N.Y. WORLD-TELEGRAM & SUN (Apr. 26, 1960).
378. HENRICHSON ET AL., supra note 19, at 21–23 (discussing the impact of fixed and step-fixed
costs on savings from population reduction); PFAFF, supra note 22, at 99 (observing that marginal
reductions in incarcerated population result in no savings in wages, utilities, and even spending
on food); Marie Gottschalk, Democracy and the Carceral State in America, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POLI. & SOC. SCI. 288, 291 (2014) (“The only way to seriously reduce spending on corrections is to
shut down penal facilities and lay off correctional staff.”).
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incarceration.379 Shortly after the sheriff defied the first such subpoena,
advocates convinced the county board of supervisors to move towards
closing the county’s largest jail facility—and released a benefit album
featuring Aloe Blacc and Vic Mensa entitled Defund the Sheriff.380 Such
campaigns have occurred not only in major metropolitan centers but
also in communities like Douglas County, Kansas, where a coalition of
nonprofits has fought to stop commissioners from issuing a jailexpansion bond without a vote.381
Close attention to jail finance suggests a few strategic choices
decarceral activists may wish to explore in advancing their agendas.382
It could be helpful to increase direct and indirect electoral control over
issuance of jail construction financing instruments by advocating that
any debt issuance occur in the form of general obligation bonds, which
are often roundly rejected by voters, even in conservative jurisdictions,
and by criticizing elected officials for circumventing voter control when
other mechanisms are used. 383 To the extent that proposed ballot
measures bundle additional spending on jail construction with more
379. Alene Tchekmedyian, On Heels of Sheriff’s Department Scandal, L.A. County Voters
Overwhelmingly Back Stronger Oversight, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2020-03-05/voters-support-measure-r-oversight-sheriffs-department
[https://
perma.cc/C4G7-HBVK]; Jaclyn Cosgrove, L.A. County Voters Approve Measure J, Providing New
Funding for Social Services, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2020-11-03/2020-la-election-tracking-measure-j [https://perma.cc/E2JH-G8KF].
380. Cindy Chang, L.A. Sheriff Will Defy Subpoena From Oversight Commission on Jail
Conditions, L.A. TIMES (May 20, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-20/l-acounty-sheriff-will-defy-subpoena-from-oversight-commission-to-testify-about-jail-conditions
[https://perma.cc/M27D-H2H5]; Alene Tchekmedyian, L.A. County Seeks Plan to Close Aging Men’s
Central Jail in a Year, L.A. TIMES, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-07/menscentral-jail-closure-plan (last updated July 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FC8K-H2YN]; Defund the
Sheriff (The Album), JUSTICELA, https://justicelanow.org/sheriffalbum (last visited Jan. 21, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/E6CL-9NKH].
381. Mackenzie Clark, Douglas County Commission Illegally Blocking Vote, Petition Against
Jail Expansion Funding, Legal Action Alleges, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www2.ljworld.com/news/county-government/2020/mar/16/douglas-county-commissionblocking-petition-jail-expansion [https://perma.cc/TYG4-RVDM].
382. Groups like Californians United for a Responsible Budget have grappled in nuanced ways
with the mechanisms of carceral finance. Though some rural communities have vigorous
organizing efforts, relatively little reporting covers them. But see Jack Norton, “We Are Not Going
to Rest”: Organizing Against Incarceration in Upstate New York, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Sept. 3,
2019), https://www.vera.org/in-our-backyards-stories/we-are-not-going-to-rest [https://perma.cc/
T77G-VJ4A] (describing efforts in Binghamton, New York).
383. Although unsuccessful, the Detroit Justice Center brought a lawsuit to challenge the lack
of adequate notice regarding a jail construction bond issued by Wayne County, Michigan, in 2018.
See Press Release, Detroit Just. Ctr., Detroit Justice Center Sues Wayne County in Federal Court
to Defend Public’s Right to Referendum on New Jail (July 18, 2018), https://www.detroitjustice.org/
blog/2018/7/18/h3bpress-releasebh3detroit-justice-center-sues-wayne-county-in-federal-court-todefend-publics-right-to-referendum-on-new-jail [https://perma.cc/Q3UJ-Z2YX] (detailing groups’
allegations of “sham notice” surrounding bonds and providing a link to the complaint); Buni v.
Cnty. of Wayne, No. 18-CV-12243, 2019 WL 1570820, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2019) (granting
the county’s motion to dismiss).

2021]

CARCERAL POLICYMAKING

943

popular investment in alternatives to incarceration, advocates will
want to consider pushing for disaggregation.384 When sheriffs and
commissioners spend public funds to advocate for passage of jailfunding measures, this misuse of taxpayers’ money should be
challenged—and seized as an opportunity to highlight the ways that
these officials’ interests and those of county residents have diverged.
Other strategies that push stakeholders to seriously consider
alternatives to incarceration are worth pursuing as well. Investors in
municipal securities could be encouraged to divest from jail
construction, either through corporate accountability or shareholder
campaigns or through research demonstrating that these are unsafe
investments in light of bail and other criminal legal reforms. 385 Local
advocates could prepare their own alternative population projections
that account for the possibility of a decreased need for jail beds;
estimating concretely the savings that would accrue to taxpayers from
building and staffing less jail bedspace might win over skeptics.386 Just
as the movements for police reform and abolition are grappling more
seriously of late with the ways in which municipal finance systems can

384. Including funding for alternatives to incarceration in jail bond issues placed on ballots
may induce voter support for otherwise unpopular jail construction. Cf. Marie Gottschalk, The
World’s Warden: Crime, Punishment, and Politics in the United States, 55 DISSENT 58, 59–60
(2008) (voters approved prison construction “slickly packaged as part of a billion-dollar bond
measure that included money for state parks and homes for the mentally handicapped”). This
strategy is increasingly employed in some jurisdictions. See E-mail from Gini Pingenot, Legis. Dir.
of Colorado Cntys., Inc., to Author (Oct. 14, 2019) (on file with author) (“Most of the jail-related
[ballot] questions I’ve seen of recent are much broader than simply ‘jail
reconstruction/construction.’ Most counties also seek support for wrap-around services and
diversion activities to keep low-level offenders out of jail.”). In some cases, bond issues that will
result in unabated carceral growth have been marketed, disingenuously, as funding innovative
solutions. See, e.g., Spencer Joseph & Elita Goyer, Measure A Could End Revolving Jail Door
Problems, ACTION NEWS NOW (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.actionnewsnow.com/
content/news/Measure-A-could-end-revolving-jail-door-problems-566532121.html [https://perma.
cc/5YAM-25MN] (sales tax measure described as “help[ing] the revolving door finally meet an
end”); Ordinance No. SCC 2019-05, CNTY. OF SHASTA, https://www.elections.co.shasta.ca.us/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/executed.CoCo_.Sales_.Tax_.Res_.030320.Ballot.Ord_.201905.100119.pdf [https://perma.cc/L29Z-3T5L] (4% of revenue from said measure allocated for
treatment and rehabilitation programs, while 50% designated for detention operations).
385. See Kevin Pranis, Doing Borrowed Time: The High Cost of Back-Door Prison Finance, in
PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS IMPRISONMENT (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright
eds., 2008).
386. Indeed, this is among the demands the JusticeLA Coalition made of the Board of
Supervisors. About L.A. County’s Jail Expansion Plan, JUSTICELA, https://justicelanow.org/
jailplan (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HNW3-8ZL6] (“Establish and apply a
methodology to calculate local jail and probation savings from current and projected population
reductions and report on projected plans to spend the anticipated state-level justice allocations.”).
A pro bono team of quantitative policy experts able to produce custom reports for activists in
jurisdictions around the country would provide an incredibly valuable service.
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impede or promote change, the movement to end mass incarceration at
the local level must do so as well. 387
CONCLUSION
To many Americans, particularly wealthy people who live in big
cities, jails and prisons are vaguely synonymous, and sheriffs ride
horses in old Westerns. Mass incarceration is a monolith. But to those
who feel shame rather than pride at our country’s place on the carceral
leaderboard—who do not think that people should be locked in cages
because they are Black or poor or lack housing or use drugs—it is
important to understand whose decisions and incentives have created
our current calamity and what specifically can be done about it. To
those subject to the coercive force of our criminal legal system, and to
their loved ones, the dynamics of carceral expansionism are matters of
freedom—even of life and death.
Jails and jailers are an important and underexplored piece of the
puzzle. Over the course of a year, they confine more people than our
nation’s prisons, and the availability of jail bedspace impacts
everything from misdemeanor justice to immigration detention.
Sheriffs and commissioners have pursued expansion by relying on
projections that ignore the possibility of policy shifts, circumventing
taxpayer opposition through creative financing mechanisms, and
eagerly participating in interjurisdictional jail bedspace markets.
Unlike any other officials, sheriffs sit at the nexus of carceral supply
and demand, advocating for and facilitating jail growth while exercising
significant control over the number of people they incarcerate through
their tripartite policing, correctional, and political powers. But this role
consolidation does not incentivize carceral restraint. Their desire for
bedspace expansion is as much about their interests as bureaucrats and
employers as it is about their views on criminal legal policy. Judicial
and administrative regulation of jailing-for-profit and local electoral
and budgetary advocacy hold promise as avenues for undermining the
incentives that fuel mass incarceration.

387. See, e.g., Alyxandra Goodwin, Whitney Shepard & Carrie Sloan, Police Brutality Bonds:
How Wall Street Profits from Police Violence, ACTION CTR. ON RACE & ECON. 9, 15, 20 (June 2020),
https://acrecampaigns.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ACRE_PBB_2020_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BH9S-CVFQ] (drawing attention to incentives of local governments, banks, and investors in
borrowing to cover costs of settlements and judgements in police brutality cases).

